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I Two International Research and Training Projects 
on the EU Succession Regulation
This issue of the ELTE Law Journal contains four additional papers on the Regulation (EU)
No 650/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 July 2012 on jurisdiction,
applicable law, recognition and enforcement of decisions and acceptance and enforcement
of authentic instruments in matters of succession and on the creation of a  European
Certificate of Succession (hereinafter referred to as Regulation or Succession Regulation) from
the perspective of Hungarian academics and practitioners.
These papers were drafted within the frame of two connecting international research and
training projects co-funded by the EC DG Justice and Consumers, Justice Programme:
‘Governing Inheritance Statutes after the Entry into Force of EU Succession Regulation’
(GoInEU, 2017–2019)1 and ‘Integration, Migration, Transnational Relationships. Governing
Inheritance Statutes after the Entry into Force of EU Succession Regulations’ (GoInEUPlus,
2018–2020).2 The papers published in this issue are the deliverables of the latter. 
The General Objective of the projects was and is to contribute to the correct and coherent
application of the Succession Regulation through analytical and capacity building activities
Ádám Fuglinszky — Orsolya Szeibert — Balázs Tôkey*
Prelude to the GoInEUPlus Papers: 
The Hungarian Perspective on the 
EU Succession Regulation
— Prognoses and the Very First Experiences
7 n
* All three authors are full time faculty members of Eötvös Loránd University, Budapest, Faculty of Law, Civil Law
Department. Ádám Fuglinszky is professor of civil law, principal investigator of the Hungarian team of the GoInEU
and GoInEUPlus research and training projects (fuglinszky@ajk.elte.hu). Orsolya Szeibert is professor of civil law
(szeibert@ajk.elte.hu), Balázs Tőkey is assistant professor of civil law (tokeybalazs@ajk.elte.hu), both of them are
researchers within the frame of the GoInEU and GoInEUPlus project. This paper is an output of GoinEUPlus
Project Co-funded by European Union’s Justice Programme 2014–2020. The European Commission’s support
for the production of this publication does not constitute an endorsement of the contents, which reflect the views
only of the authors, and the Commission cannot be held responsible for any use, which may be made of the
information contained therein.
1 See the website of the project: <https://eventi.nservizi.it/evento.asp?evID=192> accessed 10 February 2020.
2 See the website of the project: <https://eventi.nservizi.it/evento.asp?evID=225&IDm=&lng=2> accessed 10
February 2020.
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targeting legal practitioners. Partners in the actions are the University of Florence (coor -
dinator), the Italian Foundation of Notaries, the Italian Association of Family Lawyers (AMI),
le Centre national de la recherche scientifique (CNRS, France), the Universities of ELTE
Budapest, Valencia, and Coimbra (in GoInEUPlus, also the De Gasperi Foundation).
The Law Faculty of Eötvös Loránd University (ELTE) participated and participates in the
projects with three researchers, Ádám Fuglinszky, Orsolya Szeibert and Balázs Tőkey. Laura
de Negri joined the team when GoInEUPlus started. The Hungarian chapter organised an
international conference and seminar in April 2019 having the title ‘Diversity in Unity: The
Succession Regulation in Hungary and Beyond’. More than 250 practitioners (notaries, judges,
attorneys) and academics attended.3 The next seminar is going to be held in 2020, with the
title: ‘International Succession Law and Matrimonial Property Law – Interrelations’.
When the cooperation started, the Hungarian project team contacted the Hungarian
Chamber of Civil Law Notaries in order to map the status quo when the Regulation entered
into force and also the forecasts regarding the application of the Regulation with special regard
to the challenges and difficulties. The experiences and rough findings of these meeting
(in January 2018) and of some other pieces of information acquired during the projects are 
the subject of this introductory essay. The project team opted for this method (interviewing the
Notaries’ Chamber4) in particular, because when the projects started, only two years had
passed since the Regulation’s entry into force; there were no published judgments on its
application in Hungary. As such, the only chance to get access to some experience from the
practice was (and mostly still is) to collect unpublished cross-border cases from the notaries
who have (exclusive) authority to proceed with the probate procedure in Hungary. The goal
was to set the scene and the framework (regarding Hungary) within which the actions of the
projects were to be taken.
II The Succession Regulation and Its Relevance in Hungary
The Succession Regulation is an important step in the creation of the General Part of Private
International Law in the European Union, by the harmonisation and unification of pri -
vate international law in matters of succession.5 The aim of the Regulation is ‘to make life easier
for citizens by laying down common rules enabling the competent authority and law applicable
to the body of assets making up a succession, wherever they may be, to be easily identified’.6
n ELTE LAW JOURNAL • ÁDÁM FUGLINSZKY – ORSOLYA SZEIBERT – BALÁZS TÔKEY
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3 See the website of the conference with the slides, cases and hypotheticals solved and with the video recordings
of the presentations with English subtitles: <https://eventi.nservizi.it/evento.asp?evID=192&IDm=2285> accessed
10 February 2020.
4 Represented by Ádám Tóth (President of the Hungarian Chamber of Civil Law Notaries) and Tibor Szőcs
(Director of the Hungarian Notaries’ Academic Research Institute).
5 Andreas Köhler, ‘General Private International Law Institutes in the EU Succession Regulation – Some Remarks’
(2016) 18 Annals Fac. L.U. Zenica 169.
6 Richard Frimston, ‘The European Union Succession Regulation No. 650/2012’ (2013) 33 Estates, Trusts & Pensions
Journal 104, citing the Commission in the European Judicial Network website.
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The Regulation deals with several aspects and the following matters are the most important:
jurisdiction (Chapter II),7 choice of law (Chapter III),8 recognition, enforceability and
enforcement (Chapter IV), authentic instruments and court settlements (Chapter V) and the
European Certificate of Succession (Chapter VI). 
The relevance of the Regulation cannot be overestimated due to the relatively high
proportion of cross-border successions in Hungary,9 which can be traced back to several 
– at least four – reasons. First, there was an ‘in kind compensation’ in Romania in return for
the expropriation and exploitation of property during the communist regime, right after the
fall of the communist era, and therefore several Hungarian citizens regained and have
property there for historical reasons.10 Second, many Hungarians had settled in other EU
Member States – in Austria in particular – as refugees after the Revolution in 1956 and moved
home again after 1990,11 but they still have significant property (inter alia real estate and
bank accounts) in those countries whereto they had emigrated during or immediately after
the revolution. Third, numerous retired people from some Western European Member States 
– from Germany and from the Netherlands in particular – live now in Hungary because they
can afford a higher standard of living by spending their pension in Hungary instead of their
home countries. Fourth, many skilled workers moved from Hungary to Western European
Member States – with Germany in first place – where they live as migrant workers. 
III Experienced and Forecasted Challenges
1 Non-harmonised Issues
The Regulation harmonises and basically unifies the rules on jurisdiction (and some other
matters of the international civil procedural law) and on applicable law in matters of
succession. However, there are several other questions, which could come up in connection
with cross-border successions. 
PRELUDE TO THE GOINEUPLUS PAPERS... n
9 n
7 The Member State in which the deceased had his habitual residence at the time of death shall have jurisdiction
according to Article 4.
8 As a general rule the law applicable to the succession shall be the law of the State in which the deceased had his
habitual residence at the time of death according to Article 21. However, the deceased can choose the law of the
State whose nationality he or she possesses at the time of making the choice or at the time of death according to
Article 22. The application of renvoi is restricted.
9 2-4% of the probates are cross-border succession cases (estimation by the Hungarian Chamber of Civil Law
Notaries).
10 Transylvania was part of Hungary until the Treaty of Trianon in 1920 and a significant Hungarian minority has
been living in Romania since then. However, the migration of this minority to Hungary is remarkable – in
particular from the ’90s – and this also increases the number of cross-border successions.
11 The reason of the return of the ‘56-refugees and emigrants to Hungary was the regime change and the
democratization of the country at the end of the ’80s and in the beginning of the ’90s.
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a) Lack of tax law harmonisation
The first problem is that the taxation issues are not harmonized, which makes asset planning
rather difficult, since the differences between taxation rules can and do influence the choice
of law. However, the European Union has no competence to harmonise taxation.
b) Lack of uniform registration (supranational register) of probate procedures
Second there is no (uniform) notification system or register of probates (registration book)
covering (all Member States of ) the whole European Union,12 though it would be necessary
to find an effective method or solution to avoid or at least to handle parallel (probate)
procedures. In order to apply Article 17 on lis pendens cases13 the competent authorities,
courts and notaries should be notified of probate procedures and other processes in
connection with the same succession case already commenced in another Member State, but
in fact such notification rarely – if ever – happens. Notaries and courts therefore basically do
not have the chance to be informed on parallel procedures. According to a real-life example
explained by the Chamber of Civil Law Notaries,14 a French citizen, who lived in Budapest
for 15 years and had a Hungarian girlfriend, passed away in Hungary. His sister, who lives in
Paris, made a statement on some aspects of the succession after the death of his brother (that
one died in Hungary) before a French court. It is highly likely that the competent Hungarian
notary who is in charge of the probate procedure in the same succession case will not be
informed on the procedure already running in France. It is also possible that the Hungarian
notary does receive a notice but too late, just after the release of the estate or the European
Certificate of Succession being issued. 
c) Probate procedures commenced in third countries
It is even more problematic if the probate procedure has already commenced in a third
country and not in a Member State. Since Article 17 applies only to ‘proceedings involving the
same cause of action and between the same parties in the courts of different Member States’,
it will not be the Regulation but the autonomous private international law rules of the Member
State that shall apply in such cases, whether or not the judgment of the court of a third country
can be recognized and enforced in the Member State and therefore whether or not a probate
procedure in this third country qualifies as lis pendens in Hungary. Section 69 Paras 1 and 4
of Act XXVIII of 2017 on Private International Law apply in this respect, according to which
if a procedure launched previously is in progress before a foreign court, concerning the same
n ELTE LAW JOURNAL • ÁDÁM FUGLINSZKY – ORSOLYA SZEIBERT – BALÁZS TÔKEY
n 10
12 However, there is a network, the so-called ‘European Network of Registers of Wills Association’ and the aim of
this project is ‘to develop and implement effective interconnection of European registers of wills’. The majority of
the member states take part in this programme. <http://www.arert.eu/?lang=en> accessed 10 February 2020.
13 According to Article 17 (1) of the Regulation where proceedings involving the same cause of action and between
the same parties are brought in the courts of different Member States, any court other than the court first seized
shall of its own motion stay its proceedings until such time as the jurisdiction of the court first seized is established.
14 Given by Ádám Tóth (President of the Hungarian Chamber of Civil Law Notaries).
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right arising from the same factual basis, the Hungarian court may, either ex officio or upon
request, suspend the procedure, provided that the recognition of the foreign court’s decision
is not excluded in Hungary. The Hungarian court shall terminate the procedure if the foreign
court rendered a decision on the merits of the case and the decision can be recognised in
Hungary. Thus, the Hungarian court has to check the preconditions of recognition of a foreign
judgment. According to Section 109 Para 1 lit. a) ‘A decision of a  foreign court shall be
recognised if the jurisdiction of the proceeding foreign court is well-founded in accordance
with this Act.’ This is not the case, for example, if Hungarian courts have exclusive jurisdiction
(Section 88), but the court (or notary) in the third country takes nevertheless actions and
horribile dictu passes a judgment. 
The Hungarian legislator also recognised that the national rules on jurisdiction and
applicable law can apply in cross border succession cases besides the Regulation, for example
if the probate procedure commenced in a third country and the beneficiary of the estate
wishes to enforce any claim regarding the inheritance in this procedure. This situation is not
covered by the Regulation, though the beneficiary may need proof that he or she is entitled
to claim the assets. Therefore the amendment of the Act XXXVIII of 2010 on Probate
Proceedings15 in 2018 introduced the so-called ‘certificate of inheritance for the enforcement
of claims in third countries’ (which is not to be confused with either the domestic certificate of
inheritance or with the European Certificate of Succession). According to Section 102/D 
of the amended Act, at the request of any beneficiary of the estate, the notary shall issue
a certificate of inheritance, indicating the succession regime applicable under Hungarian law,
if the deceased holds Hungarian citizenship and all his/her estate is situated in a third country
and, pursuant to the Regulation, no Member State has jurisdiction. Thus, the sole function of
this certificate of inheritance is the enforcement of a claim by the beneficiary of the estate in
a third country.16
d) The undefined magic-word: habitual residence
As Recital No. 23 emphasises: 
In view of the increasing mobility of citizens and in order to ensure the proper administration of
justice within the Union and to ensure that a  genuine connecting factor exists between the
succession and the Member State in which jurisdiction is exercised, this Regulation should provide
that the general connecting factor for the purposes of determining both jurisdiction and the
applicable law should be the habitual residence of the deceased at the time of death.
The content and the application of the general term ‘habitual residence’ is therefore crucial,
since the autonomous and uniform application of the Regulation depends predominantly 
on how courts, notaries, etc. in the Member States interpret this term. 
PRELUDE TO THE GOINEUPLUS PAPERS... n
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15 We used the English translation of the Act No. XXXVIII of 2010 on Probate Proceedings by CompLex DVD
Jogtár.
16 See Tibor Szőcs, ‘Az európai öröklési rendelet hazai alkalmazását érintő legújabb rendelkezések’ (2019) (1) Európai
Jog 9–10.
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The meaning and interpretation of the legal term ‘habitual residence’ was and is expected
to be problematic from the practitioners’ point of view, since the Regulation does not contain
a definition for it. The scholarly writings confirm this prognosis: 
Some commentators have found the proposed connecting factor of habitual residence
unsatisfactory since it is a term that is to have a uniform meaning throughout the European Union
and subject to interpretation by the Court of Justice of the European Union (EUCJ), and yet it is not
currently one of the terms clearly defined in Art. 3 of the draft Regulation. It may, therefore, in
practice, have a different interpretation placed on it by the courts in different Member States.17
Furthermore, the Court of Justice of the European Union has not yet decided any case in
connection with the meaning of habitual residence concerning the Regulation. Although there
are other regulations containing a definition of habitual residence, it is a huge question
whether the definition of habitual residence in one Regulation can be taken into consideration
in the course of the application of another Regulation.18 For example, Article 19 of the Rome I
Regulation19 and Article 23 of the Rome II Regulation20 provide that the habitual residence
of a natural person acting in the course of his business activity shall be his principal place of
business.21 These definitions however cannot be applied for the interpretation of the
Regulation due to the different focuses of the respective regulations. Recitals 2322 and 2423
n ELTE LAW JOURNAL • ÁDÁM FUGLINSZKY – ORSOLYA SZEIBERT – BALÁZS TÔKEY
n 12
17 Frimston (n 6) 110.
18 The legal literature had already discussed it widely before the Succession Regulation. The definition of habitual
residence can be analysed in connection with the Succession Regulation – see among others Lurger Brigitta,
‘A szokásos tartózkodási hely’ in Tanulmányok az Európai Öröklési Rendelet témaköréből. Európa a közjegyzőkért,
a közjegyzők Európáért (az Europe for Notaries – Notaries for Europe. Training 2015–2017 fordítása) MOKK 10–12.
19 Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008 on the law applicable
to contractual obligations (Rome I).
20 Regulation (EC) No 864/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007 on the law applicable
to non-contractual obligations (Rome II).
21 Páli Fatime Lejla, ‘Joghatóság, alkalmazandó jog az Európai öröklési rendelet kapcsán’ (2017) (6) Közjegyzők
Közlönye 49–51.
22 ‘In order to determine the habitual residence, the authority dealing with the succession should make an overall
assessment of the circumstances of the life of the deceased during the years preceding his death and at the time
of his death, taking account of all relevant factual elements, in particular the duration and regularity of the
deceased’s presence in the State concerned and the conditions and reasons for that presence. The habitual
residence thus determined should reveal a close and stable connection with the State concerned, taking into
account the specific aims of this Regulation.’
23 ‘In certain cases, determining the deceased’s habitual residence may prove complex. Such a case may arise, in
particular, where the deceased for professional or economic reasons had gone to live abroad to work there,
sometimes for a long time, but had maintained a close and stable connection with his State of origin. In such
a case, the deceased could, depending on the circumstances of the case, be considered still to have his habitual
residence in his State of origin in which the centre of interests of his family and his social life was located. Other
complex cases may arise where the deceased lived in several States alternately or travelled from one State to
another without settling permanently in any of them. If the deceased was a national of one of those States or had
all his main assets in one of those States, his nationality or the location of those assets could be a special factor in
the overall assessment of all the factual circumstances.’
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reveal some aspects to be taken into account in identifying the habitual residence. The
Regulations on the field of family law, just like the Brussels IIA Regulation24 and the Rome III
Regulation25 do not include any definition of habitual residence; however, the parents’, the
spouses’ and the child’s habitual residence have already been interpreted and applied in the
CJEU’s judiciary. The majority of these judgments have dealt with the habitual residence of
the child, and the determination of an adult’s habitual residence cannot be in all cases the
a same as identifying the child’s habitual residence. It has the consequence that we are no
closer to the meaning of the habitual residence under the aegis of the Succession Regulation.
Let’s see the following example to highlight the uncertainties referred to above: the
deceased (a Hungarian citizen) worked in Vienna on four working days of the week, thus
from Monday to Thursday (and he lived there with his girlfriend and their common child in
a flat in Vienna) and, with the approval of his employer, he worked from his home-office in
Győr (Hungary) on Fridays, where he spent the weekends with his family (wife and two
children). The majority of the deceased’s real properties are located in Vienna. In such cases,
it seems to be unclear whether Vienna or Győr was the habitual residence of the deceased.
Recitals No. 23 and 24 highlight some circumstances that should be considered (e.g. the centre
of interests of family and social life or the location of the assets), but the relationship of these
factors to each other is unclear, i.e. whether they have equal importance or one is more
significant than another. How to weigh up those circumstances and how to evaluate the big
picture if some factors (e.g. family relationship) appear in several Member States even more
puzzling. As far as this hypothetical case is concerned, the habitual residence of the deceased
can’t be unambiguously determined. Given that the assets are mainly located in Vienna, and
according to Recital No. 24, this should be taken into account as a special factor; moreover,
since the deceased’s family connections were ‘shared’ as well, prima facie Vienna seems to be
the last habitual residence, because, besides the location of the valuable assets, a significant
part of his family and social life also connected him to Vienna, where he spent more time
than in Hungary. At the same time, it can be reasoned that the deceased had the main point
of his family life in Hungary, notwithstanding the fact that he had a child in Austria too,
because he went to Austria originally ‘for professional or economic reasons’, and – in line
with the first variation of Recital No. 24 – had still maintained a close and stable connection
with his State of origin, and therefore he is to be considered ‘still to have his habitual residence
in his State of origin in which the centre of interests of his family and his social life was located’.
(Another factor to be taken into account in favour of Hungary is the deceased’s Hungarian
citizenship.)
Another real case26 confirms that the interpretation of habitual residence will probably
not be uniform in different Member States: an Austrian citizen had lived for a long time in
PRELUDE TO THE GOINEUPLUS PAPERS... n
13 n
24 Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 – jurisdiction, recognition and enforcement of matrimonial and parental
judgments.
25 Council Regulation (EU) No. 1259/2010 of 20 December 2010 implementing enhanced cooperation in the area
of the law applicable to divorce and legal separation.
26 Mentioned by Ádám Tóth (President of the Hungarian Chamber of Civil Law Notaries).
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Hungary, but the Austrian authorities found that her habitual residence was (in) Austria (and
not in Hungary) because her closest relative lived in Austria.
It is also a crucial issue whether the deceased could have two habitual residences at the
same time (cf. in the first Győr–Vienna case mentioned above). It has continuously been
a problem in connection with the application of the majority of the Regulations as people
are much more mobile and have special living circumstances. The original idea of the
concept of habitual residence was simple and had the aim that one person can have only one
habitual residence, as this corresponds to the structure and aim of determining jurisdiction
and the applicable law. Although the CJEU has already faced challenges in the course of
the application of the different Regulations, especially when applying the Brussels IIA
Regulation in the issues of parental responsibilities for the habitual residence of the child,
it has insisted so far on the original goal and determined only one habitual residence for one
person.27
2 Lack of Access to Information Needed to Proceed 
with the Probate Procedure
According to the representatives of the Hungarian Chamber of Civil Law Notaries, the most
serious practical problem that the Hungarian notaries face (related to cross-border succession
cases) is that they cannot get access to the substantive information needed to proceed with the
probate procedure, first and foremost which assets (located abroad) belong to the estate. 
The two typical examples are bank accounts and the content of safe deposit boxes. The
Regulation does not seem to offer them any useful and effective tools for this purpose either.
The Hungarian (substantive) succession law is based on the principle of ipso iure
succession. It means that the estate devolves upon an heir in its entirety immediately by and
after the death of the deceased without any action by the heir.28 However, the probate
procedure follows the so-called additional model:29 the notary issues a ‘decree of release’
which lists all the assets and debts of the deceased and testifies authentically the facts of and
rights related to the particular succession (what is the content of the estate, which assets does
it consist of, who are the heirs, etc.). For example, the heir can register his or her ownership
of real estate into the land register only by presenting the decree of release, which proves that
the particular asset was devolved upon him or her after (and with) the death of the deceased.
Therefore, in order to issue the decree of release, the notary must know exactly which
particular assets belong to the estate. If the notary cannot identify the assets, several
difficulties arise. For example, the heirs cannot enter into a settlement within the probate
n ELTE LAW JOURNAL • ÁDÁM FUGLINSZKY – ORSOLYA SZEIBERT – BALÁZS TÔKEY
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27 See primarily Case C-435/06, C, ECLI:EU:C:2007:714, Case C-523/07, A, ECLI:EU:C:2009:225; Case C-497/10
PPU, Mercredi, ECLI:EU:C:2010:829, Case C-111/17 PPU, OL, ECLI:EU:C:2017:436, Case C-512/17, HR,
ECLI:EU:C:2018:513, Case C-393/18 PPU, UD, ECLI:EU:C:2018:835.
28 Vékás Lajos, Öröklési jog (8th edn, Eötvös József Könyvkiadó 2014, Budapest) 14, 147–149.
29 Ibid.
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procedure on the distribution of the particular assets among themselves; moreover, the basis
of the compulsory share30 cannot be calculated, either.
Foreign banks generally do not provide information to Hungarian (or any foreign) notaries
if they receive a direct request with reference to bank secrecy (frequently provided for in their
general terms and conditions). The Hungarian notaries therefore try to get access to the
information needed by addressing an indirect request, i.e. they do not contact the financial
institutions directly, but the court (competent for probate procedures in the respective
country; in Austria for example the Probate Court – Nachlassgericht) and this court requests
the necessary information from the bank and then forwards the data to the Hungarian notary.
This legal aid is based on the Council Regulation (EC) No 1206/2001 of 28 May 2001 on
cooperation between the courts of the Member States in the taking of evidence in civil or
commercial matters. Though this modus vivendi seems to work on both sides, for example
with Austria, but less so with some other Member States. According to the Notaries Chamber’s
experience, the foreign banks argue – if they receive a request from a Hungarian notary –
that they cannot open the safe deposit box and look inside without the client’s permission,
again due to their general terms and conditions. 
Some Hungarian notaries follow the innovative solution proposed by the Notaries
Chamber based on Article 63 (2) c) of the Regulation, according to which it is possible to
issue the European Certificate of Succession to demonstrate ‘the powers of the person
mentioned in the Certificate to execute the will or administer the estate’. Thus, if the notary
designates one of the heirs as the executor of the will and issues this type of certificate then
the designated heir, in his or her capacity as the administer of the estate, can request the
information needed, since he or she can prove his or her authorisation. However – as Section
43/B Paras 1–2 of Act No. XXXVIII of 2010 on Probate Proceedings provides for – the issue
of this kind of European certificate of succession must be preceded by a specific decree issued
by the notary, in which he entitles one or more parties involved in the probate procedure to
gather information, data, documents and deeds on the assets located abroad. If more parties
are authorised in this decree to do so, they can only act jointly (together). Though it is not
required that all parties involved in the probate procedure agree upon which of them is
entitled to gather information on the assets abroad, it is much easier if there is a consensus
on that point and the parties involved notify the notary on which of them is willing and ready
to discover and locate the assets abroad and to report on the result. If there is no such
agreement among the parties, the notary can still make use of the opportunity of simultaneous
authorisation of several parties, but in this case – as seen above – they can act only jointly
(together). Moreover, the European Certificate of Succession based on Article 63 (2) c) of the
PRELUDE TO THE GOINEUPLUS PAPERS... n
15 n
30 See Section 7:75 of Act No. V of 2013 on the Civil Code. In the legal literature cf. Hella Molnár, ‘The Position of
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testamentary disposition.’
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Regulation must also be issued accordingly, i.e. it must be specified that the authorised parties
can only act jointly. This can be difficult if there are hostilities between the parties.  
The Hungarian legislator was made aware of the problem that Hungarian notaries cannot
obtain all the information they need on the assets located abroad. Act No. XXXVIII of 2010
on Probate Proceedings was therefore amended twice in this respect, first in 2015 and then
in 2018. After the first amendment, Sections 43/A and 43/B prescribed that assets located
abroad shall be included in the estate inventory if the beneficiary of the estate has verified their
existence and the fact that they form part of the estate. The notary could issue a special
probate procedural certificate upon the reasoned request of the beneficiary of the estate and
enable him or her to obtain information on the assets located abroad with it. However, foreign
banks did not accept this particular certificate instead of the European Certificate of
Succession. The act was therefore amended again, in 2018, and the rules on the probate
certificate were repealed. According to the latest version of the act, the beneficiary of the
estate shall provide information on the assets located abroad in the first place, but the notary
may also take action ex officio for obtaining documentary evidence to verify the existence of
foreign assets and that they form part of the estate. In our opinion, this is rather a formal and
not a substantial solution of the problem concerned, because – as seen above – neither the
beneficiaries nor the notaries have any effective means of obtaining all the necessary
information on foreign assets in all Member States.31
3 Adaptation Proceedings
If the legal system of a Member State does not know a right in rem which is created or
transferred to a beneficiary by succession under the applicable law ‘that right shall, if necessary
and to the extent possible, be adapted to the closest equivalent right in rem under the law of
that State, taking into account the aims and the interests pursued by the specific right in rem
and the effects attached to it’ according to Article 31 of the Regulation. However, the
Regulation does not provide for the rules of the adaptation proceedings itself. It is stated in
Recital No. 17 only that the ‘adaptation of unknown rights in rem as explicitly provided for
by this Regulation should not preclude other forms of adaptation in the context of the
application of this Regulation’.
The Hungarian legislator enacted the rules of adaptation proceedings into the Act LXXI
of 2015 on Adaption Proceedings of Article 31 of Regulation (EU) No 650/2012 of the
European Parliament and of the Council. According to Section 3 Para 3 of this act The Central
District Court of Buda (i.e. one of the district courts in Budapest) has the exclusive
competence in the first instance to decide on the adaptation of those particular foreign legal
institutions that do not exist in Hungarian law. 
However, the Chamber of Notaries is convinced that the adaptation of several foreign
rights, rules, terms and institutions is going to be very difficult if not impossible. The so-called
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Dauertestamentsvollstreckung (long-term will-executorship) under German law32 can serve
as an example (this states that if the only heir of the deceased is his six-year-old child, then
the deceased can designate someone as a long-term executor of the wills, similar to a trustee).
Dauertestamentsvollstreckung does not exist under Hungarian law. Another example is the
notaries’ right to act as estate-trustees (Verlassenschaftkurator) in Austria. The Hungarian
notaries are not allowed to do so. This difference follows also from the diverging traditions
of substantive succession laws in the two countries. While in Hungary the succession occurs
ipso iure, i.e. when the bequeather dies, in Austria the estate becomes hereditas iacens first
and has legal personality; and the heirs acquire ownership on the estate only by the decree of
the probate court.33
To sum up, it is questionable whether these rights or legal institutions could be registered
into the Hungarian land register and, if yes, under which legal title. For example, in the case
of long-term will-executorship, there are several possible solutions: this could be converted
either into ‘prohibition of alienation and encumbrance’34 or to a title based on ‘fiduciary asset
management contract’.35
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32 See Section 2209 of the German Civil Code. ‘According to this provision, the deceased may entrust an executor
with the administration of the estate without assigning to him any tasks other than those of the administration;
he may also direct that the executor is to continue the administration after the completion of any other tasks
assigned to him.’ <https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_bgb/> accessed 12 February 2020.
33 Cf. Section 546-547 ABGB: ‘Verlassenschaft als juristische Person § 546. Mit dem Tod setzt die Verlassenschaft
als juristische Person die Rechtsposition des Verstorbenen fort. ’
‘Gesamtrechtsnachfolge § 547. Mit der Einantwortung folgt der Erbe der Rechtsposition der Verlassenschaft nach;
dasselbe gilt mit Übergabebeschluss für die Aneignung durch den Bund.’
See also ‘Einantwortungsprinzip § 797. (1) Niemand darf eine Erbschaft eigenmächtig in Besitz nehmen. Der
Erwerb einer Erbschaft erfolgt in der Regel nach Durchführung des Verlassenschaftsverfahrens durch die
Einantwortung der Verlassenschaft, das ist die Übergabe in den rechtlichen Besitz der Erben.’
34 Cf. Sections 5:31–5:34 of the Hungarian Civil Code. For the essence see: ‘Section 5:31 [Establishing the prohibition
of alienation and encumbrance] 
(1) For the purpose of securing a right regarding the object of ownership, the owner may establish a prohibition
of alienation and encumbrance or a prohibition of alienation regarding the object of the ownership, effective
against third parties. With regard to real estate, the real estate register shall also indicate the right that is secured
by the prohibition. 
(2) The prohibition of alienation and encumbrance and the prohibition of alienation shall be terminated upon
the termination of the right the prohibition intended to secure.’
35 Cf. Sections 6:310–6:330 of the Hungarian Civil Code. According to Section 6:310 Para 1: ‘Under a fiduciary asset
management contract, the trustee shall manage on his own behalf and for the benefit of the beneficiary the things
transferred to his ownership, as well as the rights and obligations transferred to him by the settlor (hereinafter
“trust property”), and the settlor shall pay the fee.’ On the registration of the trustees’ property right see Section
17 Para 1 No. 28 and Section 38 of the Act No. CXLI of 1997 on the Register of Immovables.
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IV Some Closing Remarks
The Regulation is – no doubt – an important milestone in the harmonisation of European law. 
However, the first impressions and experiences of the notarial practice direct one’s attention 
to the ambiguities and lacunae (unharmonised issues, undefined terms such as habitual 
residence, coexistence of the Regulation and of the national rules on applicable law and 
jurisdiction if, for example, probate procedures in third countries are involved) inasmuch as 
to the factual and practical difficulties of the application (access to information on assets 
located in another Member State). The former challenge could be met in the first place by the 
Court of Justice of the European Union; its judgments are going to be an important contribu -
tion to the autonomous and uniform application of the Regulation. It can be overlooked that 
the legislators of the Member States are also responsible for the obstacle-free and smooth 
application of the Regulation, since several more or less technical norms shall be enacted to 
serve this purpose, despite the direct effect of the Regulation. Without these additional rules, 
harmonization – which is the aim of the Regulation – can easily fail.
Moreover, it remains to be seen whether the harmonisation of jurisdiction and applicable 
law will have an impact on substantive succession law and if it does then to what extent. The 
notaries and courts will apply foreign law more often because of the new jurisdiction rules, and 
therefore information on foreign (succession) laws is expected to become more widespread 
and to become part of the everyday (in Hungary: mainly notarial) practice. National and 
international knowledge bases will likely be developed. This transparency of the various 
succession law regimes, the awareness of their similarities and differences will very probably 
influence the choice of law and facilitate choosing the applicable law in general. At the end of 
the day, it cannot be excluded that the wheels of the European legal approximation turn to 
(some) harmonisation of the substantive succession law, too. This could be seen as salutary 
according to scholarly writings and maybe the difficulties on this field are not as serious as 
they seem to be.36
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I Introduction: Regulation of the European Union in the Field 
of International Private Law
The Treaty of Amsterdam,1 which entered into force on 1 May 1999, amended the statutes
of the European Union in a way that international private law and the international procedural
law of the Member States may be unified by regulations in the fields listed in Art. 81 of the
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TEU). The results achieved by now in this
field – despite their weak points – must be considered as logical steps in the process of the
unification.2 The unification of rules on jurisdiction, recognition and enforcement, as well as
those of on conflict-of-laws is a  significantly easier task than the harmonisation of the
substantive rules. Concerning the latter, important and hopeful first steps have been made,
for example the directives3 formed in the field of consumer protection or the model rules4 of
the PECL, but we cannot talk about a breakthrough even in the field of the seemingly simplest
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contract law harmonisation.5 Conversely, the creation of regulations in the field of
international private law brought spectacular results within the short period of one and a half
decades. No less than ten regulations have been created, which form the common law of the
European Union over a broad area by answering questions on international jurisdiction,
recognition and enforcement; furthermore, they unify the rules of conflict-of-laws to
determine the applicable law in international issues. It comes with the desirable consequence
that, in several fields – the rules on jurisdiction, recognition and enforcement as well as the
rules on conflict-of-laws – international private law rules became unified in all Member States.
Consequently, in the same matters of fact, the courts (arbitration courts and other
jurisdictional organs) of all Member States will apply the same rules of international conflict-
of-laws norms and, accordingly, the same substantive law. The determination of the applicable
substantive law therefore does not depend on which state’s forum the case will be brought
before, or which state’s organ will proceed in the case.
II About the Succession Regulation
To these regulations belongs Regulation (EU) No 650/2012 of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 4 July 2012 on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and enforcement of
decisions and acceptance and enforcement of authentic instruments in matters of succession and
on the creation of a European Certificate of Succession (hereinafter Succession Regulation or
Regulation).6 This Regulation shall be applied to the succession of persons who died on or after
17 August 2015. Before the succession regulation entered into force, the conflict-of-laws rules
of the Member States applied different connecting factors for the determination of the applicable
law. In some legal systems (such as the Hungarian),7 the last citizenship of the deceased, in
others the last residence, while again in others the last habitual residence was the basis for
determining the applicable law.8
Similarly to other EU regulations, the conflict-of-laws norms of the Succession Regulation
have a loi uniforme character. This means that the courts apply, through the Regulation, the
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8 See the summary in the study of the Max Planck Institute in Hamburg: (2010) 74 RabelsZ 522, 125–126. margin
numbers.
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same substantive law, whether the applicable rule is that of a Member State or not. The basic
idea of international private law is that the applicable law cannot depend on the proceeding
forum. This principle requires that every forum of all Member States apply the norms
determined by the Regulation, even if the applicable law is that of a State where the Regulation
is not applicable or even that of a  non-Member State. In this way a  so-called ‘double
channelled application process’, the application of different conflict-of-laws rules for cases
within and outside the European Union, can be avoided. It would lead in the given case to the
application of different substantive laws and unnecessary difficulties. However, there is
generally no reason that would make different conflict-of-laws rules necessary in internal EU
and external cases. In extreme cases, the court of a Member State can deflect an unacceptable
result by using the ordre public clause. 
The Succession Regulation accepts the principle of the unity of the estate. It means that
it makes no difference between movable and immovable assets and therefore the issue of the
estate is subordinated to one single state’s law. With this solution, the Regulation intends to
avoid complications which arising from the division of the estate. In cases when the assets are
located in several states, these problems would increase the costs and significantly hinder the
testator in planning the issue of succession. As one of the Member States where the Succession
Regulation is applicable, the earlier French succession law followed the principle of dividing
the estate: the law of the location of the subject (lex rei sitae) was applicable to the immovable
assets, and the deceased’s personal law to the movable assets.9 [Note: Denmark (using the
opportunity assured by Articles 1. and 2. of the Protocol No 22. attached to Article 81 of 
the TEU) ruled out its participation in the unification process, which is based on Article 81
of the TEU. Consequently, the succession regulation is not applied in Denmark. The United
Kingdom and Ireland did not use their opt-in possibility in Articles 1–3 of Protocol No. 21
attached to Article 81 of the TEU. Accordingly, the succession regulation is not applicable in
these states either.]
The objective connecting factor of the Succession Regulation is the habitual residence of
the deceased at the time of the deceased’s death. There is an escape clause, which helps the
reasonable solution of extraordinary situations. When the overall assessment of all the factual
circumstances of the case indicates that the deceased was manifestly more closely connected
with another law (typically to the law of the state of his/her citizenship), the latter law has to
be applied. The testator can provide that the issue of his/her estate has to be determined by
the law of the state of his/her nationality at the time of making the choice or at the time of
death. This restricted possibility of choice of law wants to ensure that he/she can order the estate
under whichever state’s law was the familiar, economic and cultural centre of his/her life.
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III The Differences in Substantive Succession Rules
1. The differences in substantive succession law are found in the background of the
unification of the European conflict-of-laws rules. The aim of the Succession Regulation is –
above the differences in substantive laws – creating unity by harmonising international private
law rules and by ensuring the international harmony of decision-making.
In the legal literature, the perception is considerably prevalent that traditions play a more
significant role in the differences between national succession laws than regarding contractual
laws. This is presumably the truth, even if we can discover many differences in succession laws
that have no deep roots and for which substantial reasons cannot be found. 
Comparative law implies the possibility of closing legal solutions concerning the order of
succession. The observation of foreign laws was already a common method in the era of
codifications since the end of the 19th century. For example, Béni Grosschmid took the
solutions of foreign legal systems into account in almost all the problems he discussed in his
study evaluating the justification of the draft act on the intestate succession ‘ex privata
diligentia’.10 The utilisation of the results of comparative law is even more unavoidable in the
process of preparing national legislation nowadays. As an example, we can refer to the
preparatory work on the fourth book, on succession, of the Dutch Burgerlijk Wetboek of 2003,
during which the solutions of almost every European codification – among these the first
Hungarian Civil Code – were considered.11 Of course, this method of legislation does not
result directly in the unification of legal solutions. 
2. In the following we are going to reflect on two possible differences in the general part of
succession law (section IV). After this we will discuss in detail the significant differences in
the intestate succession rules of some legal systems (section V). Despite the practical
importance of the question we are not discussing the substantive requirements of the
testament. This topic is simply passed by, because the Succession Regulation – in accordance
with the Hague Convention12 of 1961 and the principle of favor testamenti – aims that the valid -
ity of a written testament shall be saved if possible. This is served by that rule of the Regulation
which prescribes that the testament is formally valid if it fulfils the requirements of the law
where it was made, of the testator’s personal law or the law of his/her residential state or the
law of the state of his/her habitual residence. Furthermore, a clause about an immovable is
valid if the formal requirements of the state’s law where the immovable is located were
fulfilled. In the last part of our study we shall deal with the problems that derive from 
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different interpretations of the compulsory share of inheritance. The Succession Regulation
extends the applicable law to the compulsory share. 
IV Differences in the General Part
First of all, we present two possible problems in the general part, therefore we are going to
answer the questions which can occur in intestate and testate succession, as well as regarding
compulsory shares. 
1. There are differences in legal systems as to whether they prescribe a requirement of some
legal action to bring about succession. The majority of modern legal systems do not contain
such a requirement, which means that without any specific legal action the succession comes
about by the force of law at the moment of the death of the deceased: the principle of ipso iure
succession.13 This also means that the deceased’s assets do not become derelict; there is no
estate without a  claimant. On the other hand, there are some legal systems today that
prescribe a requirement for some legal action to bring about succession. These systems – on
the contrary to ipso iure systems – are called aditionalis succession systems. Such are, for
example, the Austrian and Italian succession laws. According to Austrian law – with specific
exceptions – the heir does not immediately become the owner of the estate that passes to
him, but the law on succession requires a non-contentious procedure and the successor’s
declaration (Einantwortung) to acquire the estate. According to the Italian law, legal succession
comes about only due to the so called accettazione.14
2. The second problem is another difference in the regulation of renunciation contracts
concluded with the testator. The ABGB and the BGB, as well as the majority of the legal
systems following the German succession law tradition (e.g. Hungarian law) as well as the
Nordic legal systems are familiar with the legal institution of renunciation (Erbverzicht).15 On
the contrary, renunciation contracts are null and void in some Romance legal systems
(Spanish, Catalonian, Portuguese) without exception, while in others (French, Belgian, Italian)
with specific exceptions. Art. 25 of the Succession Regulation seeks to solve this question.
However, not even the unified conflict-of-laws rules are capable on their own to balance all
the problems which originate from the different basic understandings, for example in the
event of a change of statues due to a change in the deceased testator’s habitual country of
residence.16
BEHIND THE EUROPEAN SUCCESSION REGULATION n
23 n
13 See for example: HCC 7:87. §, BGB 1942. §.
14 ABGB 797. §, 819. §; Codice civile Article 459., Articles 470–476.
15 BGB 2346. § – 2352. §; ABGB 551. §; HCC 7:7. § – 7:9. §.
16 Regarding this problem, see Sebastian Seeger: Erbverzichte im neuen europäischen Kollisionsrecht (Mohr Siebeck
2018, Tübingen).
ELJ-2019-1__1.korr.  2020.05.20.  23:14  Page 23
V Notable Differences of Intestate Succession in the Legal Systems
of the European Union 
1. We can conclude that the rules of intestate succession define the issue of the estate in
every legal system on an auxiliary basis. These rules are applicable only in the absence of
a valid testament, in the event of the debarment of the designated heir in the absence of an
alternate heir or if the testament does not contain dispositions on the whole estate. This
auxiliary role was made possible by the evolution of law: the succession laws of the modern
era – almost without exception17 – gave up18 the Roman legal principle which excludes the
parallel application of testate and intestate succession: nemo pro parte testatus pro parte
intestatus decedere potest.19
This logical sequence is not reflected by practice, because in most European states – for
multiple reasons – the testation rate is far from 50%,20 and the majority of successions are
intestate. 
2. Among the intestate succession rules of the legal systems, we can nowadays find several
differences. This might be considered surprising from many aspects. 
a) First of all, the meaningful differences that show up in the details are hard to explain,
because the motives behind intestate succession are common. At least it is true concerning the
close relatives and the spouse. In the background of the intestate succession of every legal
system there is one requirement that is always emphasised, namely that the law should
determine the order of heirs in the way that the deceased would have ordered it, if he had
made a will, which means, that the law should formulate the presumed intention of the
deceased. It is said that it is even more correct, if the rules of the intestate succession are
formulated in the way in which the deceased would have disposed – in accordance with the
expectations of society. Such a requirement of society is family solidarity or care for family
members.21 These requirements are formulated somewhat generally and therefore they are
unclear, if we consider the individual aspects of the deceased and the diversity of the amount
and composition of the estate, although they do explain the essence. The canon of the law can
hardly be more delicate than the mentioned aspect, and all closer and individualised
considerations can be formulated by the will of the testator. 
b) The national succession law rules have been approaching each other on many issues
because of the social changes over the last 70 years. These changes are directly and specifically 
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in connection with social developments, as for example the changed role of women in society,
as well as their emancipation, and perhaps they are connected with the increased life
expectancy.22 As a general tendency, we can consider the strengthening of the legal status of
the surviving spouse in intestate succession.23
In more recent times, the rules of succession have to fulfil several constitutional and
human rights requirements,24 which are bringing the order of intestate succession even closer
together in the legal systems. From the middle of the 20th century, we can treat the equality
of the spouses as one such requirement concerning intestate succession. Besides these, the
European succession laws have come closer to each other, for example due to the fact that, in
every legal system of the European Union, the full successor status of an adopted child as an
intestate successor has been accepted.25
Even later, it took quite a lot of time to accept the equal position of a child born outside
marriage, especially regarding the succession of the estate of the biological father.26 In
Hungarian law, the legal acceptance of equal succession rights for children born in marriage
and outside marriage was implemented relatively early, in 1946.27 This is impressive, because
it happened much later in legal systems with a significant democratic history. In French law,
for example, the rules causing a negative discrimination of any child born outside marriage
only started to change in 1972, and the discrimination disappeared entirely in the first years
of the 21st century.28 In German law, the Weimar Constitution gave equality to children born
outside marriage in 1919. However, the practical consequences of this constitutional principle
were not included in the succession law rules. So – based on the constitutional thesis of the
Grundgesetz of 1949 and the strong requirements of the sentence of the German
Constitutional Court – an act (Nichtehelichengesetz) was passed in 1969, which basically (but
yet not perfectly) assured the same successor status for the child born outside marriage.29
Finally, we should mention that legal systems approach each other because, most recently,
more and more legal systems are recognizing the same-sex partner’s intestate succession
rights as those of a spouse30 or registered partner.31
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22 For all of these as a summary, see Reid, de Waal, Zimmermann (n 11) 511ff.
23 489ff.
24 Ibid, 448.
25 Regarding the Hungarian evolution of law, see the study by Vékás (n 18) 279ff; for the French law see the study
by Cécil Pérès in Reid, de Waal, Zimmermann (n 11) 40; regarding the German law see the study by Reinhard
Zimmermann in Reid, de Waal, Zimmermann (n 11) 202ff.
26 On the discrimination of children born out of marriage, which lasted for centuries, see Reid, de Waal,
Zimmermann (n 11) 197, 481ff, and the quoted literature.
27 Act No. XXXIX. from 1946. 1. §. On the gradual acceptance of equality in the practice of the Curia see Vékás 
(n 18) 278ff.
28 See the study by Pérès (n 25) 37, 44.
29 See the study by Zimmermann (n 25) 197ff.
30 For the French law, see the study by Pérès (n 25) 49.
31 For the Hungarian law, see the study by Vékás (n 18) 289; on the German law, see the study by Zimmermann 
(n 25) 219.
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c) In the following, we will discuss the differences in the intestate succession rules of
European legal systems (and among these, first of all, the states where the Succession
Regulation is applicable). We will proceed in this way because of the limits to our knowledge
and the framework; however, according to the Succession Regulation (due to its demand for
universal application) the application of rules outside Europe is possible if the deceased’s last
habitual residence or – in the case of a choice of law – his/her citizenship connects the
inheritance case to a legal system outside Europe. 
3. The descendants forego the ascendants and the collateral relatives in every European legal
system, and the sequence of succession among the ascendants is based on the same principle
in the European legal systems. The European laws, almost without exception, distribute the
estate per stirpes. It means that the share of a child who died before the deceased or is debarred
from succession for other reasons will be inherited by his/her children or further descendants
and not his/her siblings.32 As a consequence, the deceased’s closer and further descendants
can inherit at the same time. The justification for the legal systems’ substantively similar legal
solutions as well as the legal literature gives different explanations.33 However, the essential
reason is obvious. By distributing the estate per stirpes among descendants, we can avoid the
unfair consequences of those situations when the child of the deceased who has children dies
before the deceased himself. Without distributing the estate per stirpes, the children (perhaps
further descendants) of the child of the deceased who dies before the deceased would not
receive a share of the estate, and they would be discriminated against, compared to the family
of the deceased’s other children.34
At first sight, succession per stirpes might seem unfair if the children who are debarred
from succession have children of their own in a different number (these are the grandchildren
of the deceased).35 In these cases, the grandchildren receive the share of their parent who is
debarred from succession, and their shares can be different depending on the number of their
siblings. This problem is attempted to be solved by one of the regulations of the Scottish
succession law, which follows the ‘next-of-kin system’ (also applied in some states of the USA).
It makes an exception from the principle of succession per stirpes, and it prescribes an equal
share for all grandchildren in those cases when the estate is inherited only by grandchildren,
who come from different children.36 The fairness of this system is questionable, because it
makes the shares of the grandchildren depend on whether the grandchild’s uncle or aunt or 
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32 See for example the Hungarian HCC 7:55. § (3) sec., German BGB 1924. § (3) sec.
33 See Reid, de Waal, Zimmermann (n 11) 462ff; for the historical background, which leads back to Justinian’s Novels,
see ibid, 453ff; in detail the study by Thomas Rüfner in Reid, de Waal, Zimmermann (n 11) 26ff.
34 The same Reid, de Waal, Zimmermann (n 11) 466.
35 The equal inheritance of the grandchildren to protect families with more children was suggested by Gustav
Boehmer, Vorschläge zur Neuordnung der gesetzlichen Erbfolge (BGB §§ 1924–1936) (de Gruyter 1938, Berlin)
76ff. The prevailing point of view in the literature of the European states maintains succession per stirpes in this case too.
36 Succession (Scotland) Act 1964 section 6(a). See the study by Kenneth G. C. Reid in Reid, de Waal, Zimmermann
(n 11) 389. A similar suggestion occured during the preparation works of the Dutch Burgerlijk Wetboek, but this
was rejected; see the study by Kolkman (n 11) 234.
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a person who belongs to another branch of the ascendants was debarred from succession or
not before the death of the deceased.37
4. The succession laws of the member states of the European Union are different in the
definition of the status of the surviving spouse.38
a) As we mentioned [up in section 2 b)] the strengthening of the surviving spouse’s successor
position is outlined in the latest legal evolution. From a historical perspective, there were
fundamental changes in this field over the last two centuries. While according to the original
version of the Code civil – similarly to the principles laid down in Justinian’s Novels39 – the
surviving spouse, alongside blood relatives, did not inherit,40 but only a hundred years later
the German BGB gave a quarter to the surviving spouse, even alongside the children41 and
in the 20th century (e.g. in Italy in 1975) similar changes were made in most European legal
systems. The reforms concerning the surviving spouse’s successor status took place at the
beginning of the 21st century in the French (2001, 2006), Dutch (2003), Hungarian (2013)
and English (2014) law. 
All these changes mean that by now the surviving spouse has come to a very beneficial
successor status in the European legal systems.42 Perhaps the most favourable status is granted
by the Dutch Burgerlijk Wetboek and the northern legal systems. In these legal systems, the
surviving spouse inherits everything and the common descendants of the deceased are
residual ‘subsequent heirs’; they will inherit only after the death of the spouse.43 The surviving
spouse has the worst status in Spanish law: in the ‘three-line system44, the surviving spouse
theoretically has to share even with the farthest ascendant, and gets usufruct on only the half
of the assets.45 If we assess the successor status of the surviving spouse, the rules of the
matrimonial property regime have to be taken into consideration, as well as other rights of 
the surviving spouse.46
In the details there are still differences. These divergences – among other reasons – can
be attributed to the differences between the rules of the matrimonial property regimes.47
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37 Reid himself thinks that this rule is difficult to prove: ibid, 390.
38 On these problematics, see Weiss Emilia, A túlélő házastárs öröklési jogi jogállása történeti kialakulásában és
fejlődési tendenciáiban (Akadémiai Kiadó 1984, Budapest) 309; Reinhard Zimmermann, ‘Das Ehegattenerbrecht
in historisch-vergleichender Perspektive’ (2016) 80 (1) RabelsZ 39–92.
39 See Földi, Hamza (n 19) 626; Rüfner (n 33) 28.
40 This inimical situation was later lightened by the rules of the matrimonial property regime and other possibilities.
See the study by Pérès (n 25) 46.
41 BGB 1931. §, see the study of Zimmermann (n 25) 211ff.
42 As causes of these improvements see Reid, de Waal, Zimmermann (n 11) 490ff.
43 See the study of M. Scherpe in Reid, de Waal, Zimmermann (n 11) 317ff, and the study of Kolkman (n 11) 242ff.
44 See up in section 4.c).
45 Spanish Civil code, Articles 935–944.
46 See the study of Sergio Cámara Lapuente in Reid, de Waal, Zimmermann (n 11) 106ff.
47 See Reid, de Waal, Zimmermann (n 11) 494ff. For Hungarian law see the study of Vékás (n 18) 284ff.
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b) In the case of succession alongside the descendants, the succession of usufruct, which was
earlier considered the main rule, was gradually forced back. Behind this development, we can
find the financial, demographical and family-sociological changes of the 20th century. The
inheritance of usufruct was formed under those circumstances when the essential inherited
assets (in the first place, the lucrative immovable assets) were profitable stocks and not articles
for personal use. Under these circumstances, the usufruct assured the livelihood of the spouse,
without risking the future enjoyment of the estate by the other heirs after the expiration of the
usufruct. 
In the meantime the nature of the assets has significantly transformed. Nowadays most
movable assets that can be inherited are relatively exhaustible; they are subject instead to
consumption and depreciate quickly. In connection with the usufruct on some assets
(copyright, patent and other rights, business shares, stocks, cash etc.) the interests of the
spouse and the other heirs are often in sharp conflict. The increased life expectancy has
extended the conflicts between the spouse who is the beneficiary of usufruct and the other
heirs, especially in those not so rare cases when the other heirs come from the deceased’s
earlier marriage, and they are often just a bit younger or even older than the spouse. 
Because of all of these, according to more and more European laws, the surviving spouse
inherits a share of the estate. The Italian law48 – starting the reform in 1975 – and from 2013
the Hungarian law49 belong to these legal systems as well. According to the reformed (2001,
2006) Code civil the widow can choose between a share of the estate (one-quarter) and the
usufruct of the whole estate.50 The Belgian51 and the Spanish52 Civil Codes still assure usufruct.
The share inherited by the surviving spouse is typically defined as a certain proportion.53 This
can be one-quarter of the estate,54 one-third,55 a half56 or a child’s-share (whether defining the
minimum share57 or not).58
c) More legal systems intend to assure the family house used before the death of the testator
and the habitual circumstances for the surviving spouse even alongside the descendants.
Austrian law makes it possible for the surviving spouse, by a legacy, to use the house occupied
together with the deceased, as well as the use of the usual furniture and appliances are
n ELTE LAW JOURNAL • LAJOS VÉKÁS
n 28
48 Codice civile Article 581.; see the study by Alexandra Braun in Reid, de Waal, Zimmermann (n 11) 84.
49 HCC 7:58. § (1), b); see the study by Vékás (n 18) 284ff; Vékás Lajos in Vékás Lajos, Gárdos Péter (szerk.),
Kommentár a Polgári Törvénykönyvhöz, 2. kötet. (2nd edn, Wolters Kluwer 2018, Budapest) 2614ff.
50 Article 757.; see the study by Pérès (n 25) 46.
51 Article 745.;
52 Article 834.; see the study by Lapuente (n 46) 107.
53 Determining the share of the surviving spouse in English law is more complicated. See the study by Roger Kerridge
in Reid, de Waal, Zimmermann (n 11) 343ff.
54 For example, Code civil Article 757.; BGB 1931. §.
55 For example, ABGB 757. §; Codice civile Article 581. in the case of sharing with more than one child.
56 For example, Codice civile Article 581. in the case of sharing with one child.
57 For example, Polish Civil Code Article 931.
58 For example:, Hungarian Civil Code 7:58. § (1) b).
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necessary to maintain their former standard of living.59 Hungarian law makes this possible by
usufruct.60 The widow, upon his/her intestate share, receives the legacy or the usufruct. The
Code civil61 and the Italian jurisdiction62 assure the surviving spouse’s usufruct of the house
used together with the deceased, as well as the associated furniture etc., but the value of these
are deducted from his/her other share. By no means all European laws go so far in ensuring
that the surviving spouse can maintain their earlier life conditions.63
d) There are differences in the laws of the EU member states concerning the definition of
the successor status of the surviving spouse in absence of descendants. There are nowadays
legal systems where, in the absence of descendants, the whole estate is inherited by the widow.
This is the situation, for example, in English64 and Danish law65 and – with exception of the
ancestral assets – the Hungarian Civil Code66 of 1959 had the same regulations. According
to other succession laws (for example the Code civil,67 the Polish Civil Code68 and Norwegian
law69), the surviving spouse halves the estate with the parents. With the exception of the
house used together with the deceased, as well as the usual furniture and appliances, this
system was introduced in the Hungarian Civil Code of 2013 (HCC), too.70
The widow receives two-thirds of the estate according to the Austrian ABGB while,
according to the BGB, he/she is entitled to one half in the event of sharing with the deceased’s
parents, grandparents and their descendants.71 The Italian Codice civile also gives two-thirds
to the surviving spouse, in the event of sharing with ascendants or siblings.72 Spanish law, as
we have mentioned, gives only a usufruct to the widow/widower and only on the half of the
estate, in a given case, even when he/she shares with further ascendants.73
5. As much the European legal systems can be considered uniform in the intestate succession
of descendants (see section 3 above) we can find as many differences in the intestate succession
of ascendants and collateral relatives. There is unity in only one question: according to every
European succession law, the ascendants and the collateral relatives may only become
intestate successors in the absence (when there are no descendants or they are debarred from 
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59 ABGB 758. §.
60 HCC 7:58. § (1) a).
61 Code civil Articles 764–766.
62 Cass UU, no 4847, 2013.
63 See Reid, de Waal, Zimmermann (n 11) 491; 501ff.
64 See the study by Kerridge (n 53) 340.
65 See the study by Scherpe (n 43) 314.
66 607. § (4).
67 Article 757-1.
68 Article 933.
69 See the study by Scherpe (n 43) 314.
70 7:60. §.
71 ABGB Article 757., BGB 1931. Article (1).
72 Article 582.
73 Spanish Code civil Articles 935–944., see the study by Lapuente (n 46) 106ff.
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succession) of descendants.74 By a common perception and according to the studies of the
summary handbook cited before, the rules of intestate succession concerning ascendants and
the collateral relatives basically can be categorised into three main systems in civil law
jurisdictions.75
a) We can call the first the parentelic succession system, which was formed in the Erbfolge -
patent gesetz in 1786, and later in ABGB.76 In parentelic systems – such as the Hungarian
succession system77 – the ascendants and the collateral relatives form a  class of heirs
according to levels of ascendants (class of parents, grandparents etc.). The heirs of the class
that is closer to the deceased inherit before those in further classes and collateral relatives
will become heirs only if their own ascendant is debarred from succession. For example, the
sibling of the deceased will inherit only if his/her father or mother is debarred from succession
but, in this case, the sibling inherits before the surviving grandparent. This sequence is
supplemented by the mutual claim for the maintenance and the compulsory share between
the parent and the child. All these are reflecting and representing the strong relationship
between the parents and the children. In the grandparent’s class and in the even further
ascendants’ class of heirs – whose members inherit only in exceptional situations – the
principle of the parentelic succession can only be explained by the logics of the system. Deeper
argumentations are not available.78 The deceased may only express his/her closer emotional
relationship with one of the grandparents or uncle/aunt if he/she left a testament to this end. 
b) The second one consists of those succession systems that are based on the Code civil.
According to the Code civil, and in those succession systems following this one,79 the parents
and the sibling may become intestate successors at the same time and any debarred sibling is
substituted by his/her descendants (the deceased’s nephew or niece). The parents each inherit
one quarter of the estate, and the siblings share the other half of the assets and, similarly, they
inherit the share of the debarred parent. The further ascendants (grandparents etc.) comprise
the third class of heirs, and they inherit before the further collateral relatives who make up the
fourth class of the heirs (uncles, aunts, cousins, etc.).80
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74 Reid, de Waal, Zimmermann (n 11) 468.
75 See Helmut Coing, Europäisches Privatrecht, vol. I. (C. H. Beck 1985, München) 604ff; Heinz Neumayer, ‘Intestate
Succession’ in International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law, vol. 5, ch. 3 (2002), 4–58. margin numbers; Dieter
Heinrich, Dieter Schwab (Hrsg.), Familienerbrecht und Testierfreiheit im europäischen Vergleich (Gieseking 2001,
Bielefeld); Reid, de Waal, Zimmermann (n 11) 458ff.
76 German, Swiss, Hungarian, Greek, Polish law, Dutch law from 2003.
77 HCC 7:63. § – 7:66. §. The ancient example of the parental system is the Austrian ABGB, which was followed by
the German BGB, the Polish Civil Code and many other laws.
78 See Reid, de Waal, Zimmermann (n 11) 474ff.
79 The Belgian Code civil, the Luxemburgish law, the Dutch law from 1838 and in its main part the Dutch law from
2003 (Burgerlijk Wetboek), the Romanian civil code from 1864, the Italian Codice civile from 1865 and from 1942.
To this system can be listed the succession law of the new Romanian Civil Code, which entered into force in
October 2011 (Codul civil). On this see Veress Emőd, Székely János, ‘Törvényes öröklés a román öröklési jog
rendszerében’ (2018) (4) Közjegyzők Közlönye 23–45. It should be noted that, outside Europe this succession
system was accepted by both of Québec’s codifications (1866, 1994).
80 See the study by Pérès (n 25) 40ff.
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c) The third, so called three-line system, is followed by the Spanish Civil Code from 1889 and
the Catalonian and Portuguese codes.81 In this system, the collateral relatives do not inherit
at the same time as the ascendants, but they form a separate class of heirs and, according to
this system, the collateral relatives inherit only after all of the ascendants who are entitled 
to inherit. This means, for example, that the deceased’s grandparents (theoretically even
further ascendants, too) inherit before the deceased’s siblings.82
6. Within the three basic succession systems there are further differences, too, in the order
of succession of ascendants and collateral relatives. These small differences are often not
separated from each other according to the basic systems because they cross over that
classification. 
a) The European succession laws differ according to the furthest ascendants who are entitled
to inherit.83 The Hungarian Civil Code, for example, does not limit the intestate succession
of the ascendants but, concerning the collateral relatives, the intestate succession is closed by
the descendants of great-grandparents.84 With this solution, the Hungarian law (similarly to
some other laws e.g. the Austrian85 and the Polish86 law) is placed in the middle between
those legal systems that are not familiar with any limits87 and those which make strict
barriers,88 even though it is closer to those mentioned before. 
b) The Hungarian lineal inheritance (droit de retour) is a  unique institution in today’s
European succession laws.89 The Hungarian Civil Code of 2013 has kept the system of lineal
inheritance and this decision was supported by remarkable arguments.90 In the absence of
descendants according to lineal inheritance, an asset that was inherited by or donated to the
deceased by one of the parents (or in defined cases from collateral relatives) goes back to 
the branch where it came from. Those who inherit according to lineal inheritance must prove
that the acquisition was free-of-charge.91
c) The institution known in French as la fente successorale is a unique solution concerning
the succession of the ascendants. According to these rules, half of the share due to a parent
without descendants who is debarred from succession will be inherited by the other parent;
the other half will be inherited by the closest ascendant of the debarred parent (in typical case 
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81 Catalan law 1960, 1987, 1991, 2008), Portugiese law (1867, 1966). It should be noted that outside Europe this
succession system was accepted by all Latin American codifications.
82 See the study by Lapuente (n 46) 105ff, 111ff.
83 On this, see Reid, de Waal, Zimmermann (n 11) 475ff.
84 HCC 7:66. §.
85 ABGB 735. § – 741. §, see the study by Christiane Wendehorst in Reid, de Waal, Zimmermann (n 11) 174.
86 See the study by Frederyk Zoll in Reid, de Waal, Zimmermann (n 11) 302.
87 For example, the German BGB 1929. §, see the study by Zimmermann (n 25) 197; Scottish law, see the study by
Reid (n 36) 389ff.
88 For example, English law, see the study by Kerridge (n 53) 327ff; further the Nordic laws, see the study by Jens M.
Scherpe (n 43) 310ff.
89 See Reid, de Waal, Zimmermann (n 11) 472.
90 See Vékás Lajos (n 49) 2624ff.
91 HCC 7:67. § – 7:71. §.
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the deceased’s grandparent in the same line). The surviving parent will inherit the whole share
of the debarred parent, if this parent has no ascendants.92 However, the parent is closer to the
family of the deceased than the grandparent who is on the other line of ascendants, or even
another further ascendant.93 Considering the historical root of la fente successorale is a residue
of the paterna paternis materna maternis principle and of the tradition of protecting the
family property, which does not really fit together with modern succession laws. Nowadays
it is family solidarity that is leading the order of intestate succession and not the intention of
keeping the family property together. It is a great difference compared to lineal inheritance,
that behind the institution of la fente successorale it can be only presumed that the asset
derives from the ascendants, while it must be proved in the case of lineal inheritance. 
7. There are significant differences in the European succession laws concerning the intestate
successor position of the state, or perhaps the federal state (Germany94) or the municipality
(Poland95).96 In this field, the first dividing line between the legal systems is whether the state
acquires the assets by virtue of succession. There are some European legal systems (for
example France, Austria and the Netherlands),97 where the state’s acquisition of derelict assets
is based on sovereignty (iure imperii) and not on succession upon the death of the owner.
Article 33 of the succession regulation prescribes that such a Member State (in the absence
of any other heirs) independently from the applicable law, can acquire those assets that are
located on its territory but the state shall assure the satisfaction of the claims of creditors. 
The differences between the laws that accept the legal succession of the state by virtue of
succession (iure successionis) comprise after which ascendants or collateral relatives the state
will be the intestate heir. In those legal systems where are no barriers to considering the level
of ascendants and collateral relatives (German law) or ascendants (Hungarian law) in intestate
succession, the state inherits only in the absence of all other heirs, perhaps as a necessary
intestate heir, who cannot refuse the estate.98 In other legal systems (for example in Italy), 
the intestate succession right of the ascendants and the collateral relatives is limited to
a definite level and these laws determine the state as an intestate heir.99
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VI Significant Differences between the Legal Systems of the
European Union Considering the Rules of the Compulsory Share 
1. The institution of the compulsory share was formed by the European private law as an
instrument to release the conflict between the idea of the freedom of testamentary disposition
and the care of the family and solidarity or keeping the property in the family. By assuring the
claim for the compulsory share, the legislator intends to give a particular share of the assets
(mostly the value of these in money instead) to the closest relatives and the spouse of the
deceased, against the expressed will of the testator in the testament. The compulsory share
is therefore the minimum share of the estate which the closest relatives and the spouse of the
deceased shall receive ex lege. 
Except for English succession law, which limits the freedom of testamentary disposition
only exceptionally and therefore does not know the institution of the compulsory share
according to our civil law concept, and it only assures a claim for adequate maintenance and
support for specific people against the heirs,100 debates concerning the compulsory share
always flare up. In the civil law systems that are treated as models, theoretical and philosophi -
cal questions occur from time to time. This is comprehensible because, behind the idea of this
question, there are significant contradictions. The question comes up again and again: does
the legislator have the moral basis to ensure, for one part of the deceased’s assets, who shall
be the owner, among specific close relatives and for the spouse against the deceased’s explicit
will, only considering the family relationship? The valid arguments for and against this
institution, are being searched for; moreover, the constitutional and human rights related
ramifications are nowadays being examined.
In France in the last third of the 19th century, there was an intensive political dispute, and
the standard opinion of the institution of the compulsory share, which is accepted by the Code
civil, was questioned for financial and social reasons. To understand this dispute, it has to be
taken into consideration that the original rules of the Code civil kept a defined amount of the
deceased’s assets (réserve) for those entitled to a compulsory share (héritiers réservataires) and
it did not define it as an obligatory claim against the successors, but as a real share of the estate.
This type of the compulsory share was considered as a harmful restriction of the owner’s
disposal rights and as one side of the deformation of the social structure in the dispute.101
The modification of the Code civil in 2006 made significant changes concerning the nature of
the compulsory share claim, but the basic idea of this institution remained.102
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One of the important legal disputes during the preparation works of the German BGB
concerned the compulsory share. Rejecting the arguments which maximally preferred the
freedom of testamentary disposal, the majority opinion accepted the institution of compulsory
share.103 The original rules in BGB (§§ 2303–2338) have essentially remained the same until
nowadays despite the later disputes and a few modifications.104 It has to be mentioned that the
German Constitutional Court – in one of its decisions of 2005 – not only did not consider 
the specific compulsory share guaranteed to a child as unconstitutional, noting that it does
not harm constitutional regulations which are defending the right to property and succession,
but it declared the assurance of the compulsory share to be protected based on these rules.105
Similar conceptual issues came up during the preparation works on the Hungarian Civil
Code106 and the Austrian legal reform in 2015.107
2. Despite the conceptual disputes, the decisive majority of the legal systems where the
succession regulation is applicable know and apply the institution of the compulsory share,
because their starting point is that the social changes did not make this instrument of familial
solidarity unnecessary. This is also true for those legal systems that apply other legal tools to
provide support inside the family where there is a death. In summary, the European legal
systems do not differ concerning the conceptual approach of the compulsory share but in the
details of its regulation. 
There are differences concerning the persons who are entitled to compulsory share. The
descendants and the surviving spouse usually belong to this group of persons, and their
mutual relationship is formed according to the rules of intestate succession. An increasing
number of European legal systems (but not every one) treat a registered partner the same
way as the spouse concerning the rules of compulsory share. The picture is more diverse
concerning the parents. For example, according to the HCC (similarly to the BGB), the parents
of the deceased are entitled to compulsory share, if they have been excluded from succession
by disposition mortis causa.108 On the other hand, the new Austrian law, with the modifica -
tion of ABGB § 762, eliminated the parent’s right to compulsory share. There are differences
between the amount of the compulsory share as well: in general half or one third of the
intestate share forms the quota for the compulsory share. Besides these, the legal systems’ 
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103 See Hans-Georg Mertens, Die Entstehung der Vorschriften des BGB über die gesetzliche Erbfolge und das Pflicht -
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rechts, BGBl I 2009, 3142–3144.
105 Grundgesetz Article 14. (1); BVerfG von 19 April 2005, BVerfGE 112, 332–363.
106 See Weiss Emilia, ‘Néhány gondolat a törvényes öröklés és a kötelesrész szabályainak reformjához’ in Liber
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different regulations concerning the determination of the relationship between the
compulsory share and the foundation, or the compulsory share and the contract of inheritance
can result significant differences. 
VII Summary
As we presented above, there are still many differences today in the substantive succession law
of those European legal systems where the succession regulation is applicable – despite
a spontaneous harmonisation – and these differences can have a significant impact on the
issue of the estate, the determination of heirs and many other questions which have to be
decided in many cases. According to this, it is very important that the Succession Regulation
– above the differences in substantive law – has made unity, unifying the rules in the majority
of the European states on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and enforcement of decisions
and the acceptance and enforcement of authentic instruments in matters of succession and
has introduced the European Certificate of Succession.
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According to the traditional theory, succession law is strongly influenced by cultural factors.
However, this widely held view is challenged today. Our aim is to give an explanation of how
culture and political factors influence succession law with the help of experience from the
recodification of succession law in Hungary. We think that lawyers overvalue the role of
culture (traditions) in succession law; however, the political views of the governments can
influence the regulation of succession what can make a future harmonization of succession
law in the European Union less likely.
I Introduction
It is a popular view that succession traditions and succession law are strongly influenced by
cultural circumstances.1 According to this aspect, succession law is similar to family law and
this fact explains ‘why most publications on the law of succession aimed at an international
audience are only meant to give information on one or more particular systems of succession
law, without offering a comparative legal analysis. A comparison of succession laws is quite
often seen as not fruitful in the light of the differing underlying social, cultural, economic and
religious aspects; it is considered to be a senseless exercise.’2 These circumstances are seen to
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be why ‘succession law does not develop by rapid and radical changes, as for example, does
contract law’.3
These articles do not explain what they mean under the terms culture and traditions. Of
course, we do not try to give clear definitions for these expressions because it is impossible
in the frame of a short paper. However, we guess that we should understand under these
expressions in connection with succession and succession law that people have a common
knowledge of succession rules in different societies and they accept these rules; they think
these rules are correct – and they do not want these rules to be changed.4
However, this widely-held view is challenged today – especially by Reinhard Zimmermann,
who expresses his doubts about the idea that the differences in the succession rules of some
legal systems are based on cultural diversity.5 Our aim is to give another explanation of how
culture and political factors influence succession law with help of the experience of the
recodification of succession law in Hungary. The importance of this question is clear: if there
are significant culture-based differences between the succession rules of the member states of
the European Union then the success of a future harmonisation of succession law is rather
doubtful. However, if these cultural differences are not real, a future harmonisation is possible.
II The Most Important Difficulty in the Evaluation of Cultural Factors
on Succession Law
Before the detailed presentation of the above-mentioned main theories on the connection
between culture and succession law, we would like to draw attention to one important
deficiency which hinders us from finding the correct answer in this debate, namely that it is
unknown why succession traditions are different in some legal systems. The best example is, on
the one hand, the prevalence of intestacy and, on the other hand, the testation rate. 
The prevalence of intestacy is quite varied around the world. For example, in France
‘fewer than 10 per cent of estates are transferred by will and, according to an opinion poll, only
3 per cent of French adults have ever envisaged disinheriting a member of their family’.6 In
Italy, scholars ‘have been speaking of a ‘crisis of the will’ since the 1970s. […] This trend is
confirmed by more recent figures, which reveal that in 2009 only about 16 per cent of all
declared estates were distributed on the basis of a will.’7
n ELTE LAW JOURNAL • BALÁZS TŐKEY
n 38
3 Urve Liin, ‘Laws of Succession in Europe and Estonia: How We Got to Where We Are and Where We Should Be
Heading’ (2001) 6 Juridica International <https://www.juridicainternational.eu/public/pdf/ji_2001_1_114.pdf>
accessed 8 November 2019, 114.
4 This interpretation – that people are fond of the habitual rules in the field of succession law – is popular in Hungary
as well. See Weiss Emilia, A  túlélő házastárs öröklési jogi jogállása történeti kialakulásában és fejlődési
tendenciáiban (Akadémiai Kiadó 1984, Budapest) 33.
5 Reinhard Zimmermann, ‘Kulturelle Prägung des Erbrechts?’ (2016) 71 (7, April) JuristenZeitung (JZ) 331.
6 Cécile Péres, ‘Intestate Succession in France’ in Kenneth G. C. Reid, Marius J. de Waal and Reinhard Zimmermann,
Intestate Succession – Comparative Succession Law, Volume II (Oxford University Press 2015, Oxford) 34.
7 Alexandra Braun, ‘Intestate Succession in Italy’ in Reid, de Waal, Zimmermann (n 6) 68.
ELJ-2019-1__1.korr.  2020.05.20.  23:14  Page 38
In other countries, testate succession is somewhat more popular (e.g. ‘between 25 and 35
per cent of the German population die testate’8 or Hungary where ‘around 30 per cent of
probates involve testamentary dispositions’).9 Moreover, testate succession is as common as
intestate succession or even more popular in some legal systems. For example, according to
a study from 2013, around half of the 19,103 Dutch respondents were found to have made
wills.10 Similarly, ‘although conclusive data are lacking, studies suggest that fewer than half of
all successions in Spain are intestate’,11 and ‘contrary to what seems generally to be assumed,
the vast majority of those who, in England and Wales, die leaving property of any significant
value choose to make wills. Intestacy, for those who have property of value, is very unusual’.12
We can find this mixed picture of the prevalence of intestacy not just in Europe, but all
around the world.13 For example, on the one hand, ‘testacy rates are quite low in Latin
America’, however Cuba is a notable exception;14 on the other hand, in Australia and New
Zealand, ‘most recent studies suggest a [testation] rate of 54 to 55 per cent for adults over the
age of 18. This may be increasing.’15
Despite all the data mentioned above, it is not known why the prevalence of testate
succession differs around the world.16 It is not known either why people write or do not write
a testament examining just one country. Ronald J. Scalise Jr. writes the following about this
question regarding the law of the United States where the rate of intestate succession is around
60 per cent: 
The exact reason for the prevalence of intestacy is uncertain. Some may feel they have too few
assets to need the services of an estate planner. Others may believe the laws of intestate succession
appropriately distribute their estate. Still others, no doubt, are hesitant to draft wills out of
a reluctance to contemplate their own mortality. Whatever the reason, the prevalence of intestacy
is clear, and only a detailed examination of the application and history of the rules of intestate
succession can shed light over the wisdom of its broadly applicable principles.17
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Of course, Ronald J. Scalise Jr. writes just about the law of the United States, but his thoughts
could be true for many other countries.18
We think that without answering this fundamental question we cannot close the debate
on the connection between culture and succession law. We thus hope that several legal and
sociological studies will soon deal with this problem, which could help us to answer the
question whether and why people write or do not write a will.
III Theories of the Cultural Influence in Succession Law
As we mentioned above, according to the traditional theory, succession law is strongly
influenced by cultural factors. The main argument that supports this concept is the tight
connection between family and succession, as well as between family law and succession
law.19 This theory is usually, accepted as an axiom, which does not need any explanation:
succession law is based on family relationships regulated by family law and the concept of
family and family law is influenced by cultural factors, and so succession law must be
influenced by them, too. 
However, Reinhard Zimmermann calls this theory, that cultural impacts would be that
important around succession law and these factors would be a real impediment in front of the
sense of comparative succession law and the harmonisation of succession law in the European
Union, into question. He collects several arguments in favour of his concept. We will
summarise the most important ones in the following paragraphs. 
First, he shows that there are important differences between the succession regulations
of similar legal systems – legal systems from the same legal culture – and there are important
similarities between the succession regulations of different legal systems – legal systems from
distinct legal cultures. However, if we accepted the theory of the important role of cultural
factors in succession law, it would mean that legal systems that are part of the same legal
culture should have similar succession regulations and legal systems that are part of distinct
legal cultures should have different succession regulation into question. Zimmermann gives
examples of the handwritten or holographic will: the legal systems of Latin America belong
to the same legal culture – these are part of the civil law systems with similar legal traditions
– but, on the one hand, the handwritten or holographic will is an orderly form of the
testaments in Paraguay, Panama and Peru; on the other hand, handwritten or holographic
wills are not acknowledged by the Uruguayan, Columbian and Bolivian law.20 It is also
interesting to notice the differences and similarities between the structure of intestate
succession in some legal systems. There are three different models: the ‘French’ system (e.g.
France and Italy), the ‘three-line system’ (e.g. Spain and Latin America) and the parentelic
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system (e.g. Germany and Switzerland). On the one hand, it is true that legal systems with
a similar legal culture often follows the same intestate succession model (e.g. Spain and Latin
American countries belong to the three-line system); on the other hand, it is also common that
legal systems with different legal cultures follows the same intestate succession model (e.g.
Germany as a civil law country follows the parentelic system, which is accepted by several
common law legal systems, see England and several states in the United States of America).21
Moreover, it has also happened in the recent history that a legal system changed the intestate
succession model as a result of the recodification of succession law. This happened in the
Netherlands in 2003: the Dutch Civil Code of 1838 followed the French Civil Code and its
intestate succession norms were close to the French model. However, the new Dutch Civil
Code of 2003 contains an almost pure parentelic model.22 Seeing these examples, we can
easily notice that fundamental succession norms could be different in similar legal systems and
could be similar in different legal systems.
As a second argument Zimmermann refers to the historical examples of (re)codifications.
For example, there was intense debate during the drawing up of the succession law norms in
the German Civil Code (Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch, BGB) at the end of the 19th century over
whether the model of handwritten or holographic will should be acknowledged, because this
testament form derived from French law and it was only known in that part of Germany that
was influenced by French law. It is not a surprise that lawyers argued against the handwritten
or holographic will by referring to cultural values. At last the concept of handwritten or
holographic will was incorporated by the legislator and, despite the heated historical debate,
this testament form is totally accepted in Germany and practically no-one knows that
handwritten or holographic wills have been imported from France.23
Finally, we emphasise that modern trends in the development of succession law in Europe
and in other parts or the world are quite similar as well. We should first mention that we notice
the liberalisation of the formal rules of testaments. Second, the circle of relatives who are
potential heirs is narrowing. The third trend is the elimination of the discriminative rules against
extra-marital and adopted children. Last but not least, we shall mention the strengthening of the
position of the surviving spouse.24 Seeing these trends, we shall ask: why would comparative
succession law and the harmonisation of succession law in the European Union be pointless?
If we consider all of these arguments, we have to admit that the role of cultural factors in
succession law is not evident. This conclusion seems to be weak but, as we mentioned before,
without the examination of some fundamental questions on the differences of succession
traditions between different societies, we cannot evaluate the importance of cultural factors
to succession law. It means that we shall not automatically accept these statements, that
culture and traditions have a significant influence on succession law, and we need to perform
wide quantitative research in this field before trying to answer this question.
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IV The Hungarian Example
As we presented above, the popular view that there is a tight connection between culture and
succession law is strongly questioned, especially by Reinhard Zimmermann. Reading his
convincing arguments, we could think that there are no serious impediments in the way of
a future harmonisation of succession law in the European Union. However, we must not forget
that there could be other factors than culture that could negatively influence legal harmoniza -
tion. The experience of the recodification of succession law in Hungary gives us good examples
for these possible impediments.
The Hungarian civil law was recodified at the beginning of the 21st century. The new
Hungarian Civil Code of 2013 (NHCC) entered into force on 15 March 2014. The Codification
Committee of the NHCC followed the principle of ‘minimalist’ recodification: only those
norms that had been questioned before, especially by the jurisprudence, were suggested as
those to be changed. 
First we would like to show that the importance of cultural factors in succession law was
clearly accepted by the Hungarian legislators. For example, this was the main reason for the
preservation of ‘lineal inheritance or succession’ ‘which, substantively, means that certain
properties are returned to the deceased’s family if the deceased leaves no children or
descendants, instead of going to the spouse’.25 As Lajos Vékás, the chairman of the Codification
Committee of the NHCC explains, the ‘reason for its retention was that the evidence from
both notarial and judicial practice indicated that this corresponded with the wishes of the
general population’.26 However, the need for this institution significantly decreased in 
the NHCC, which identifies the parents and the surviving spouse as the intestate heirs in the
absence of descendants – the former Hungarian Civil Code of 1959 (FHCC) identified just 
the surviving spouse as the only intestate heir in this situation. According to the new rules,
in the absence of descendants, the parents inherit together with the surviving spouse as
intestate heirs and ‘lineal inheritance’ only complete the rights of the parents. In contrast,
‘lineal inheritance’ was the only way for the parents to inherit after the deceased in the absence
of descendants in the frame of the FHCC. It means that, because of the belief in the rule of
culture in succession law, such a  legal institution, which was not really needed after the
amendment of other succession rules, was preserved.
We can see the same belief regarding compulsory share: the Codification Committee of
the NHCC did not want to change its main rules. It ‘has become an integral part of the
Hungarian private law culture; this cultural tradition practically survived the modifications of
the Civil Code [FHCC]’.27 However, the extent of the compulsory share – from half to one third
of the share the persons entitled to a compulsory share would receive as intestate heirs – was
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modified in the final version of NHCC because of an accepted amending proposal from
a member of parliament. Some lawyers protested at this solution – the justification for the
amending proposal was unknown – but there was no other reaction; the media did not pay
any attention.
We think that these two cases show that, if cultural factors in succession law are
overestimated, the belief in these factors is still strong among lawyers. And their beliefs highly
influence the legal harmonisation processes in the European Union.
Our second example for the possible impediments are political factors, which are
presented by the discussion of the legal position of cohabitants as intestate heirs28 in Hungary.
Cohabitation is increasingly common in Hungary: according to last census (2011), more than
910,000 Hungarians live in cohabitation. This number was about 250,000 in 1990.29 However,
cohabitants were not intestate heirs according to the FHCC and the Codification Committee
wanted to amend this rule because of these changes in Hungarian society. According to its
proposal, ‘a surviving extra-marital partner would have inherited a lifelong right to use the
residential apartment and the related personal chattels jointly used with the deceased. The
condition was that the partners shall have cohabitated for at least ten years, including the time
of the deceased’s death. However, this proposal was eventually not incorporated into the CC of
2013 [NHCC].’30 The explanation is that the original proposal was clearly supported by the
former socialist-liberal government – the earlier draft version of the NHCC from 2009, which
did not enter into force, finally incorporated this proposal – but after the 2010 elections the
new conservative government did not support the addition of cohabitants to the circle of
intestate heirs because of their rigid concept of family: it shall be based on the marriage
between a woman and a man. We therefore must not forget that not only cultural factors
could impede the harmonisation of succession law in European Union; there are other ones
as well. in the first place political factors. 
Finally, we would like to emphasise another interesting phenomenon in connection with
the recodification of succession law in Hungary. The NHCC does not follow some of the
international trends mentioned before. On the one hand, the ‘NHCC introduces one more
Parental with the great-grandparents of the deceased and their descendants’31 – according to
the FHCC, the descendants of the great-grandparents of the deceased could not be intestate
heirs. It means that the circle of relatives who are potential heirs has widened. On the other
hand, the position of the surviving spouse has weakened. As we mentioned before, she or he
is not the only heir in the absence of descendants – as was the case under the FHCC – but
must share the estate with the parents of the deceased.
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V Conclusions
First, we shall repeat that we will not understand the role of culture in succession law if we
do not know why succession traditions are different in some legal systems and what are the
reasons for the customs about succession by examining just one country, for example why
people write or do not write a testament. We cannot close the debate on the connection
between culture and succession law without legal and sociological studies dealing with this
issue.
Second, we shall make a distinction if we speak about culture: we can speak about the
culture of the population in a country and we can speak about legal culture or the culture of
the lawyers in a country. All the examples mentioned above show that culture in the second
meaning has a much more important role in succession law than in the first one. It means that
the population of the European Union could accept a new harmonised succession law quite
easily but the harmonising process would be very difficult because the lawyers working on it
would try to protect the values of their own national succession law as part of their legal
culture.
Third, we must not forget that several questions in succession law are not purely
professional-legal questions but political-ideological questions as well (e.g. the acceptance of
cohabitants or same-sex partners as intestate heirs). It means that the different political values
and views of the governments of the day could do more to hinder the harmonisation of
succession law in the European Union than the differences of legal cultures between the
member states.
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I A Selection of Practical Problems
For the fourth year now, the European Succession Regulation1 (hereafter the ESR) has been
applied, which has provided novel solutions from several points of view in inheritance cases
containing foreign elements, and at the same time requires a  different mind-set from
practising lawyers dealing with succession.
One such novel solution is the application of the principle of unity of succession in the area
of jurisdiction. Although the former Hungarian autonomous private international law was
based on this principle in the field of conflict-of-laws regulation of succession,2 the principle
of unity of succession in the area of jurisdiction had little opportunity to prevail. This was
because our former jurisdictional rules had already excluded domestic jurisdiction over
foreign immovable estate and also for the foreign property of those deceased with foreign
citizenship.3 In practice, however, even in respect of the foreign movable estate of the
deceased of Hungarian citizenship, conducting the succession proceedings was carried out in
Hungary relatively rarely, given the fact that there was only a limited scope for recognition of
the Hungarian decree on transferring the estate. In contrast to that, the ESR treats the estate
as a single asset in terms of jurisdiction, irrespective of the location and legal nature of each
of its assets. Thus, if domestic jurisdiction exists over the estate, it will, as a rule, cover the
entire estate, including the foreign immovable estate, which was previously unimaginable.
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This has created a completely new challenge in the legal settlement of inheritance cases: the
problem of ‘involving’ the estate assets located abroad in the domestic succession proceedings
(see below, Chapter V).
The practice has also been obliged to get used to the universal scope of the new
international succession regulation. In our earlier international inheritance law, there also
used to be international rules of jurisdiction and conflict-of-laws norms. However, although
they were given priority over the rules of the international private law code, they did not
entirely supersede it. A significant part of our bilateral treaties on legal assistance in civil
matters contains conflict-of-laws and jurisdictional norms for inheritance relationships;
however, their personal and material scope is limited to the estate of the deceased of the
nationality of the contracting states and to the estate of such deceased persons in the two
contracting states; in other cases, the rules of the international private law code prevailed.
Compared to that, the ESR has brought into the legislative framework governing succession
matters the phenomenon that Professor Lajos Vékás referred to as ‘the twilight of conflict of
laws of the Member States’4. The Regulation regulates both the issues of jurisdiction and
applicable law universally; that is, the scope of this regime also extends to those inheritance
cases where the facts are only linked to a third state and not to another EU member state.5
As far as conflict-of-laws rules are concerned, the ‘Rome-type’ regulations that were drafted
years ago also provide universal regulation.6 However the universal regulation of jurisdiction,
i.e. to cover the situations related to third countries by supplementary jurisdictional rules, is
a relatively new phenomenon in the EU legislative process itself.7
In many ways, the regulation of temporal scope is also a novum. A typical regulatory
solution to EU acts concerning jurisdiction and recognition is that the temporal scope of the
jurisdictional regime laid down therein covers proceedings starting after the application of the
given regulation begins. The ESR however, focusing on the date of the substantive legal
relationship to be considered, pursues the solution that the entire regulatory regime of the
Regulation, including the jurisdictional rules, extends to succession matters of those deceased
who have died after the application8 of the Regulation began. The consequence of this is that,
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tanulmánykötet a nyolcvanéves Bánrévy Gábor tiszteletére (Pázmány Press 2011, Budapest) 129.
5 The system of rules of the ESR answers e.g. the question whether it is possible to carry out domestic succession
proceedings for the estate of a deceased person of Swiss citizenship; or which law is applicable to the deceased’s
domestic estate who was an Irish citizen living in Ireland (also considered a ‘third state’).
6 See Art. 2 of the Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 on the law applicable to contractual obligation (hereinafter Rome
I Regulation); Art 3 of the Regulation (EC) No 864/2007 on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations
(hereinafter Rome II Regulation); and Art. 4 of the Regulation (EU) No 1259/2010 implementing enhanced
cooperation in the area of the law applicable to divorce and legal separation (hereinafter: Rome III Regulation).
7 Before the ESR jurisdictional regulation of universal scope only existed on matters concerning family law
maintenance obligations; see Art. 6–7 of the Regulation (EC) No. 4/2009 on jurisdiction, applicable law,
recognition and enforcement of decisions and cooperation in matters relating to maintenance obligations.
8 17 August, 2015.
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in succession cases, the period of time in which the conflict-of-law rules, as well as the
jurisdiction norms of the previous legislation, ‘coexist’ with the rules laid down in the EU
Regulation is relatively long. Although in decreasing numbers, there are still succession cases
arising that are only to start now for the deceased who died before 17 August 2015. As regards
such succession proceedings, Member States have continued to have their own legislation
on jurisdiction. This explains why our new Act on International Private Law (PIL Act) adopted
in 20179 explicitly upheld the jurisdictional rules for succession proceedings.10 Considering
the fact that even today, in practice, succession cases do arise from time to time in which
settlements must be made decades after the death of the deceased, we can expect that our
jurisdictional rules in the PIL Act will also be needed in the long term, even if they are
obviously losing their practical significance. 
Today, in view of the limited time-frame, I would like to deal with certain specific issues
related to some of the regulatory core points of the ESR. These are admittedly the result of
subjective selection, namely some issues that have been raised on a number of occasions
during the four years of application of the Regulation and where, in my opinion, EU legislation
leaves something to be desired, and can be considered less successful. Three of these issues
tackle conflict of laws and one of them relates to international succession proceedings.
II The Uncertainty of Determining the Law Applicable 
to the Admissibility of Joint Wills
It is well-known that the European legal systems have a markedly differing attitude to the
institution of a joint will. Certain legal systems categorically prohibit the making of a joint
will;11 in contrast to this, in other countries, the joint will is a widespread means of estate
planning; this is the situation in Germany in particular. German spouses very often use the
type of testament referred to as the ‘Berliner Testament’ in commentaries and other legal
literature sources;12 in which the testifying spouses can mutually appoint each other as sole heir
and also decide the order of succession to the estate of the surviving spouse. It was possible to
meet such joint wills of German spouses in the Hungarian practice of succession proceedings
relatively often, already years before the application of the ESR. It is also permitted to make
a joint will under the Nordic legal systems, where the circle of persons who can declare their
will in the same document is not even limited to spouses (or registered partners). 
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jurisdictional rules (in force before 17 August 2015) of the old PIL without any changes as to content.
11 As, for example French law (Art. 968 of the Code civil), Italian law (Art. 589 of the Codice civile), Romanian law
(Art.1036 of the Noul cod civil), and Greek law (Civil Code of 1940. Art. 1717).
12 Karlheinz Muscheler, Erbrecht Band I (Mohr Siebeck Verlag 2010, Tübingen) 1065; Dieter Leipold, Erbrecht
(19. Auflage, Mohr Siebeck Verlag 2012, Tübingen) 174; Dietmar Weidlich in Palandt Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch
(Kommentar) (75. Auflage, C. H. Beck Verlag 2016, München) § 2269, Rz. 1.
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Regrettably, the ESR has undermined this legal institution, since the law applicable to the
admissibility of joint wills cannot be established with sufficient certainty under the conflict-
of-laws rules laid down in the Regulation. 
1 Conceptual Incoherence in the Definitions of the ESR Regarding 
the Joint Will
The legal term ‘joint will’ is only mentioned in two places in the definitions of Article 3, but
none of the conflict-of-laws rules explicitly provides for this type of will. In the early stages of
the drafting of the Regulation, there was a text version13 that would have provided specific
conflict-of-laws rules for joint wills by appropriately applying the conflict-of-laws rules of
agreement as to succession regarding the succession of several persons. This rule disappeared
from the draft at a later stage of preparation for reasons that cannot be discovered. This is
presumably due only to a technical-editorial mistake, as there were no longer any serious
opponents from the Member States regarding conflict-of-laws rules on joint wills.
However, uncertainty remains as to which rule; Article 25 (concerning the agreements as
to succession) or Article 24 (concerning the disposition of property upon death ‘other than
an agreement as to succession’) applies to joint wills. The clarity on this issue is not exactly
facilitated by the definitions in Article 3 of the Regulation, either. 
The starting point is, in principle, the definition in Article 3 (1) d), which distinguishes
three categories of disposition of property upon death, namely wills, joint wills and
agreements as to succession. It can already be seen from this that the Regulation treats joint
wills as a self-contained sui generis type of disposition of property upon death in its autonomous
system of terms. 
Article 3 c) contains a definition of the ‘joint will’, despite the fact that the joint will is not
mentioned elsewhere in the rules of the Regulation. Accordingly, a joint will is ‘a will drawn
up in one instrument by two or more persons’. However, the definition of b) of the ‘agreement
as to succession’ makes the classification of joint wills completely uncertain. According to the
latter provision, an agreement as to succession within the scope of the Regulation ‘means an
agreement, including an agreement resulting from mutual wills, which […] creates, modifies
or terminates rights to the future estate or estates of one or more persons party to the
agreement’.
This definition under b) is quite confusing since it makes the boundary between joint
wills and agreement as to succession pliable within the scope of the Regulation. That is, it
leads us to the conclusion that at least certain types of joint wills may even be considered
agreements as to succession within its scope; namely, the cases of joint wills in which the
testators have made mutually beneficial provisions for each other. The dilemma can also be
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described as whether the definition in Article 3 c) of the ESR encompasses agreements as to
succession, in particular the wording of the phrase ‘including an agreement resulting from
mutual wills’ contained therein; and also the wills made by two persons in the same
instrument in which the benefits are mutual. 
2 Attempts to Find the Solution — Is Article 24 or Article 25 Applicable? 
This is the decision for which the ESR text does not provide further guidance. It is therefore
uncertain whether the disposition of property upon death on mutual benefits contained in the
same instrument may be classified as an ‘agreement as to succession’ and thus whether the law
governing the admissibility of such a disposition of property upon death is governed by the
conflict-of-laws rule under Article 25 (agreement as to succession) or Article 24 (‘a disposition
of property upon death other than an agreement as to succession’). That is, the two conflict-
of-laws rules may lead to a very different result, as illustrated by the following example: 
The testators are siblings. One of them lives in Finland and is a Finnish-Hungarian dual citizen. The
habitual residence of the other sibling is in Hungary and he is a Hungarian citizen. The siblings
mutually appoint each other as sole heirs; their dispositions of property upon death are made in
a joint will. (Note: It is not only spouses for whom Finnish law allows to make a joint will.) The
question arises as to whether the joint will of the siblings in question is allowed.
a) If we assume that this joint will with the testators mutually appointing each other as sole
heir can be classified as an agreement as to succession in the system of the ESR, the law
applicable to the issue of admissibility must be determined on the basis of Article 25,
subsection (2) regarding the agreement for the succession of several persons. In this case, the
cumulative assessment rule applies: the agreement as to succession of several persons is only
permitted if the legal conditions thereof are in accordance with the hypothetical succession
law14 of both parties (at the time of the disposition of property upon death). In this example,
the joint will of the siblings would only be permissible if it were allowed by both Finnish law
and Hungarian law. Although the Finnish law is in line with the joint will of the siblings, it can
get stuck in the prohibition under Hungarian law as provided for by Section 7:23 (1) of the
Civil Code. 
At the same time, Article 25 (3) provides for the freedom of choice of law as to the
admissibility (and substantive validity) of the agreement as to succession. The national law of
any one of the persons whose estate is involved can be chosen; thus, in the case of an
agreement as to succession containing a mutual appointment of each other as sole heirs, the
law of the nationality of any of the contracting parties may be chosen. If we also apply this
provision to the question of the admissibility of a joint will, then the siblings concerned may
place the issue of the admissibility of their joint will under the control of a single law instead
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of a cumulative examination: they may choose Finnish law; their joint will would have to be
considered admissible by their choice of law. 
Thus, the classification of the joint will as an agreement as to succession and the application
of the conflict-of-laws rule of Article 25 would have the above-mentioned result.
b) If, on the other hand, we assume that a joint will cannot be regarded as an ‘an agreement
as to succession’ and only the conflict-of-laws rule under Article 24 is applicable to it, the
determination of the law applicable to the admissibility of joint wills becomes much more
uncertain. The conflict-of-laws rule in Article 24 merely stipulates that the ‘disposition of
property upon death other than an agreement as to succession’ is governed by the hypothetical
succession law of the person making the disposition (at the time the disposition is made).
However, this conflict-of-laws rule does not unequivocally cover situations where the
disposition of property upon death involves the dispositions of several persons. It does not
answer whether, in such a case, the rule of cumulative assessment is applicable [as foreseen
in Article 25 (2)], or whether the admissibility of the same will is to be examined separately
for each testator. The latter solution, however, may lead to situations called ‘limping legal
relationships’ (hinkende Rechtsverhältnisse) where the dispositions of one of the parties in the
same document are valid and those of the other party are not. If, in the example of the above-
mentioned Finnish-Hungarian siblings, the admissibility of the joint will were to be examined
separately for the two testators, it would have the consequence that a joint will would be
permitted for the sibling living in Finland, so his disposition (if he were to die earlier) would
be able to produce legal effects. In contrast to this, that of his sibling living in Hungary would not,
as Hungarian law [being the hypothetical succession law of this sibling under Article 24 (1)]
does not allow siblings to draw up joint wills.
3 Standpoints in Legal Literature 
There is a marked contradiction in foreign legal literature on whether joint wills can be
considered as agreements as to succession for the purposes of the Regulation, i.e. whether
they are subject to the conflict-of-laws rule under Article 24 or Article 25. There is a consensus
on whether simultaneous joint wills (in which the testators’ dispositions of property upon
death are completely independent of each other in content and are linked only by being drawn
up in the same instrument) cannot in any way be regarded as agreements as to succession;
these are governed by the conflict-of-laws rule of Article 24. The debate is on the assessment
of joint wills with mutual provisions.
One part of the standpoints15 represents the ‘agreement as to succession’ approach,
according to which the types of joint wills that contain mutual or reciprocal provisions are
covered by the extended concept of an agreement as to succession under Article 3 (1) b).
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Once this concept encompasses the two testators’ wills in separate documents drawn up on
the basis of a reciprocal and mutual disposition (for example, mutual wills under English law),
it is difficult to see why the dispositions of the same content of two persons should not fall
under the concept of an agreement as to succession if they are included in the same
instrument.16 This position regards the formation of the agreement between the persons
declaring the disposition of property upon death and the resulting binding force thereof
(Bindungswirkung) as the decisive factor in the concept of the agreement as to succession. If
a joint will is binding on the testators (that is, none of the parties can unilaterally revoke or
modify its will) then it shall be considered an agreement as to succession for the purposes of
the application of the Regulation and therefore fall under Article 25; however, joint wills not
having such binding force are governed by Article 24.
Some of the authors who represent this position also raised practical aspects for the
applicability of Article 25: Article 25 (2) explicitly provides for a type of agreement as to
succession which includes the will of several persons (‘agreement as to succession regarding
the succession of several persons’), with this provision being more appropriate in terms of
content and structure for the conflict of laws handling of joint wills than Article 24, drawn
up for the sole purpose of one person’s disposition of his property upon death.17 The truth
of this argument is also accepted by authors who otherwise object to the applicability of
Article 25 to joint wills.18 Since Article 3 of the Regulation defines the agreement as to
succession in substantive terms [agreement between the parties, point b)], while the joint will
is defined purely on the basis of formal criteria [‘one instrument by two or more parties’ c)];
all cases of joint wills where dispositions are binding on the parties are excluded from the
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Article 24, 371.
16 Döbereiner (n 15) 438; Lechner (n 15) 27.
17 Hertel (n 15) Art. 25 Rz. 7.
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Gestaltungsmöglichkeiten nach der Europäischen Erbrechtsverordnung (Fallbeispiele nach der ZEV-Jahres-
arbeitstagung am 24. Oktober 2015 in München und 23. Januar 2016 in Berlin)’ Fn. 9. <https://www.stbk-koeln.de/
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definition under point c) and placed under the definition of an agreement as to succession
under b).19
Other views, however, categorically reject any extension of Article 25 to joint wills. This
‘will approach’ 20 starts from the grammatical interpretation of the ESR, emphasising that
Article 3 (1) d) distinguishes joint wills and agreements as to succession conceptually.
Representatives of this position consider it unjustified to make a distinction between the
various forms of joint wills on the basis of binding force. That is, the question of whether
there is binding force for the joint will, or whether the dispositions contained therein can be
regarded as reciprocal can only be answered on the basis of a particular legal system. The
standpoints following the ‘agreement as to succession’ approach, by including the types of
joint wills to which binding force is attached and which contain reciprocal provisions in the
concept of agreement as to succession, already start from the concept and rules of a given law
of succession (e.g. German law), although the law applicable to the legal effects of joint wills
and their interpretation can only be determined after finding the appropriate conflict-of-laws
rule. Consequently, according to this criticism, the ‘agreement as to succession’ approach
creates a kind of ‘vicious circle’, thus becoming inapplicable. According to the authors of the
‘will’ approach, in all events joint wills are in any case covered by Article 24; they are not
covered by the wording of Article 3 (1) b): ‘including the agreement based on mutual wills’. The
latter reference should be interpreted narrowly, covering only contractual agreements (in the
form of wills) in which the parties commit themselves to refuse to revoke it (‘not to revoke’). 
4 Summary
The legal institution of the joint will, from the conflict-of-laws regulation point of view, has
somehow ‘fallen between two stools’ during the drafting of the ESR. The uncertainty in the
regulation outlined above has unfortunately undermined a ‘well-established’ estate planning
tool widely used in many Member States. It is no mere chance that, in the years since the
adoption of the Regulation, legal advice, especially in Germany, for spouses who may have
a potential foreign element arising in their lives, due to the uncertainties in determining the
applicable law, has warned against making a joint will, recommending instead they form of
an agreement as to succession, which, at least under German law, is usually suitable for the
same effects. 
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III The Scope of the Law Governing the Substantive Validity of Wills 
As I have mentioned above, the ESR, along with the general conflict of laws rule of inheritance
(lex successionis) lays down specific rules on the law governing the admissibility and
substantive validity of disposition of property upon death in Articles 24–25. The latter legal
issues are subject to a special Private International Law rule, the law of the ‘establishing of the
last will’ (called the Errichtungsstatut). The law applicable to these legal issues is what is called
the hypothetical succession law of the deceased at the time of making the will. The latter, the
law which ‘under this Regulation, would have been applicable to the succession of the person
who made the disposition if he had died on the day on which the disposition was made’ is
nothing else than the law of the habitual residence of the person at the time of making the
disposition21 (unless he has specified the law of the country of his nationality to be applied).
The purpose of this regulatory solution is to ensure that the change of the applicable law after
the disposition due to the change of the testator’s habitual residence (Statutenwechsel) does
not affect the validity of the disposition already made. 
It arises as a fundamental question concerning the application of Articles 24 and 25:
exactly which inheritance legal issues fall within the scope of the special rules laid down in
these articles; what can be considered as a matter of ‘substantive validity’ in the system of the
Regulation? In other words, how can we distinguish between the scope of the special rule
concerning the ‘establishing of the last will’ and the scope of the general conflict-of-laws rules
in Articles 24–25? 
The answer seems to be simple: Article 26 lists the legal issues that are considered to be
those concerning the substantive validity of the disposition of property upon death; the article
identifies five such legal issues.22 At first sight, any other legal issue related to the disposition
of property upon death is normally governed by the law that usually governs inheritance,
unless it is a formal validity question according to Article 27. 
However, the question arises as to which law governs the validity of certain, particular
testamentary dispositions contained in the last will. This issue is particularly sensitive to the
kind of testamentary dispositions which are not considered valid by all legal systems, or which
are subject to distinctly different terms of validity under certain legal systems. This is the case
for example with the question of the validity of the appointment of a  subsequent heir
(Nacherbe, fideikommissarische Substitution). For example, the latter is allowed more widely
by Austrian and German law than by Section 7:28 of the Hungarian Civil Code. It is not at all
irrelevant whether the validity of the appointment of a subsequent heir is governed by the
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general conflict of law rule based on the habitual residence of the deceased at the time of
death [Article 21 (1)] or by the special rule concerning the establishment of a disposition
upon death based on the habitual residence at the time of making the disposition [Article 24
(1)]. This is also illustrated by the following example: 
The deceased was a German citizen who, in December 2015, when he was habitually resident in his
country of origin, made a public will before a German notary. He appointed his sibling as his sole
heir therein, with the stipulation that after the sibling’s death, the inheritance should be transferred
to a particular Catholic parish. Later, the testator settled in Hungary at the beginning of 2017, where
he bought a family house and had his habitual residence there until his death. The question is: which
law governs the substantive validity of the subsequent heirship appointed in the will?
If we accept the approach that the validity of particular testamentary dispositions should also
be classified as a matter of ‘substantive validity’, then the validity of the subsequent heirship
in question is governed by the special rule concerning the establishment of a disposition upon
death, referred to in Article 24 (1). In this case, the deceased’s appointment of a subsequent
heir will be considered as a valid testamentary disposition, since the heir was habitually
resident in Germany at the time of making the disposition; therefore, the hypothetical
succession law under Article 24 (1) is German law. The appointment of the subsequent heir
in question was in accordance with the provisions of German law.23
On the other hand, if we assume that the substantive validity of the particular testamentary
dispositions, since they are not specified among legal issues falling within the scope of
substantive validity by Article 26 of the ESR, falls within the scope of the general conflict-of-laws
(lex successionis) rule then the validity of the appointment of the subsequent heir in question
(similarly to most of the inheritance legal issues arising in succession cases) must be assessed
in accordance with the law of the habitual residence of the deceased at the time of his death,
i.e. Hungarian law in the present case. This then would lead to the invalidity of the appointment
of the subsequent heir, as the appointment of a  subsequent heir under the conditions
mentioned in the example does not comply with the requirements of Section 7:28 of the
Hungarian Civil Code. 
So we could ask the question in the following way: when Article 26 of the ESR enumerates
five types of legal issues, which are considered to be matters of ’substantive validity’ in the
context of disposition of property upon death, are these of an exhaustive or merely exemplary
nature? 
In the legal literature related to the regulation, contradictory positions have also emerged
on this issue. 
Some authors24 are of the opinion that Article 26 contains an exhaustive list and that all
other legal issues related to disposition of property upon death (with the exception of formal
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validity questions within the scope of Article 27) are governed by the general conflict-of-laws
rule, including the validity of particular testamentary dispositions encompassed in the disposi -
tion of property upon death. This view seems undoubtedly to be supported by the grammatical
interpretation of the Regulation, since Article 26, unlike Article 23 (2), which defines the
scope of the general conflict-of-laws rule, does not use the term ‘in particular’ to enumerate
legal issues related to the scope of validity. 
The vast majority of legal literary views,25 however, take the view that, despite the literal
wording of the Regulation, the list in Article 26 cannot be regarded as exhaustive; in addition
to the five types of law referred to there, there are issues that can be classified as ’substantive
validity’ ones and are therefore subject to the law of habitual residence at the time of making
the disposition. That is, the opposite solution, as these authors believe, would clearly
undermine the security of estate planning, as it would result in the disposition of property
upon death made validly at a given point in time, at the time of the establishing the last will,
becoming invalid due to the change of the applicable law (because of the subsequent change
of the testator’s habitual residence). The explicitly stated fundamental objective of the
Regulation, mentioned in several places in the Preamble,26 is the legal certainty of estate
planning. Thus, the majority position would, in essence, disregard the grammatical interpreta -
tion of the Regulation, bearing in mind a  superior maxima, the legal certainty of estate
planning. They would put the validity of certain testamentary dispositions that may be
included in the disposition of property upon death under the scope of the law referred to by
Articles 24–25, since this is the law that the testator may be expected to respect and take into
account at the time of making the disposition. 
There is no doubt that the distinction between the scope of the two conflicting statutes,
the general conflict-of-laws rule (lex successionis) and the ‘disposition of property upon death’
rule as a  special of conflict-of-laws rule has been less successful in the final text of the
Regulation. This can be attributed to the fact that the issue of the law applicable to the
substantive validity of the disposition of property upon death itself came to the fore at
a relatively late stage of the drafting and, as a result, the solution to the question is not yet
sufficiently mature. 
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25 See in particular Bonomi, Öztürk (n 15) Rz. 45–50; Bauer (n 15) Art. 26. Rz. 2.; Süß (n 20) Rz. 6.; Hertel (n 15) 
Art. 26 Rz. 3.; Celia M. Caamiña Domínguez in Caravaca, Davì, Mansel (n 15) Art. 26 p. 395; Ulrich Pesendorfer
in Alfred Burgstaller, Matthias Neumayr, Andreas Geroldinger, Gerhard Schmaranzer (Hrsg.), Die EU-Erbrechts -
ver ordnung (LexisNexis 2016, Wien) Art. 26 Rz. 15.
26 See recital (7) of ESR according to which ‘in the European area of justice, citizens must be able to organise their
succession in advance’, and recital (37) according to which ’in order to allow citizens to avail themselves, with all
legal certainty, of the benefits offered by the internal market, this Regulation should enable them to know in
advance which law will apply to their succession.’ The same is emphasized in the reasoning of the original proposal
drafted by the European Commission (14722/09 JUSTCIV 210 CODEC 1209; see point 1.2 of the Explanatory
Memorandum of the proposal).
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IV Renvoi in the Rules of the Regulation
The third issue I will address in this study still belongs to the subject of conflict-of-laws rule;
this is the problem of renvoi (reference). As is well known, the Rome-type regulations
consolidating conflict of laws exclude renvoi in its entirety.27 This concept was followed by the
original draft of the ESR.28 Accordingly, the law referred to by the conflict-of-laws rules under
the Regulation would have been ‘the rules of law in force in that State other than its rules of
private international law’, that is to say, the substantive rules of the legal system in question.
However, this changed during the drafting of this Regulation. The majority of the Member
States supported the view that, in some respects, it is justifiable to take account of the outcome
of the reference to the conflict-of-laws rules of the referred third-country legal system. The
outcome of the final compromise on the issue is shown in Article 34 of the adopted text,
according to which the reference to the conflict-of-laws rules of the referred third State has
to be taken into consideration insofar as it refers to either a law of a Member State or the law
of another third State which accepts this reference. (i.e. ‘which would apply its own law’). 
The main argument of the Member States supporting the renvoi to be taken into
consideration was that the circumstance that the rules of jurisdiction of the (intended)
Regulation would have universal effect must be taken into account; the uniform rules of
jurisdiction (including supplementary jurisdictional rules) also cover factual situations when
the habitual residence of the deceased was in a  third State. In such cases, however, the
coincidence of jurisdiction and applicable law as a goal29 becomes disintegrated.30 In the view
of the Member States with a majority support, this may be helped by requiring the renvoi to
be taken into account in cases where the third-country conflict-of-laws rule refers back to the
national law of a Member State. This is because considering this reference where appropriate
may also result in the Member State forum dealing with the succession case being able to
apply its own law. 
The regulation has not come out the best. In my opinion, the main disability is that it did
not take into account the fact that a significant part of the world’s legal systems observes the
principle of the scission system of inheritance in the field of conflict-of-laws rules of succession.
This, in effect includes the entire common law world. The common practice of Anglo-Saxon
legal systems is to apply different laws to succession in respect of movable and immovable
property: while the succession to movable property is to be governed by the law of the
deceased’s domicile, the succession to immovable property by the law of the country where
the estate is situated (lex rei sitae).
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27 See Article 20 of Rome I Regulation, Article 24 of Rome II Regulation and Article 11 of Rome III Regulation.
28 See Article 26 of the original proposal drafted by the European Commission (14722/09 JUSTCIV 210 CODEC
1209).
29 See recital (27) of ESR.
30 Thus, for example, if a Hungarian citizen had his habitual residence in the USA but he also left some domestic
estate then, under the subsidiary jurisdiction rules, the succession proceedings may be carried out in Hungary as
well. However, the applicable law (if renvoi is not taken into account) would be the law of the third country, the
country of the habitual residence (i.e. the law of one of the states of the USA).
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The provision in the final text, which requires taking the reference back to the law of
a Member State into account (but not necessarily the law of the forum!) has had the effect 
of returning ‘through the back door’ the scission system of inheritance to the conflict-of-laws
rules of the Regulation. That is so since, if the conflict-of-laws rules of the referred third-
country law in question, following this principle, renders a different connecting rule to govern
the inheritance of movable and immovable property, the reference to the law of the Member
State will in many cases be only partial. 
Such cases occur daily in domestic practice.31 For example, if the deceased was a British
citizen, who had always lived in England (his habitual residence and domicile were there), left
estate assets of different legal natures in Hungary, e.g. a flat purchased for investment purposes,
as well as domestic bank accounts, the law applicable to each asset will be different. The
Hungarian notary who has jurisdiction (limited to domestic inheritance) under Article 10 (2)
of the ESR, has to apply partly English law (in respect of movable property) and partly
Hungarian law (in respect of immovable property); due to the partial reference by the
common law conflict-of-laws rules. 
There is hardly any need for further explanation that such a result is not in line with the
stated goal. The fact that Article 34 of the Regulation, under pressure from the Member States,
provides for taking renvoi into account under certain conditions, would have had the practical
consequence of the acting forum being allowed to apply its own law; moreover, with some
luck, being able to avoid the application of foreign inheritance law. Far from that being
realised, it has even brought new problems in the event of partial reference. That is because,
in such cases, the acting authority (notary, court) should in principle treat the estate as two
(or more) legally separate part-estates, the inheritance of which will be governed by completely
different substantive succession regimes. What may be different in terms of the two asset
parts, for example are: 
– eligibility for the compulsory share (its conditions, scope of eligible persons, extent of the
compulsory share);
– the legal order of transferring two part-estates (e.g. ipso iure inheritance for one, while the
other one takes on ‘inactive status’ (hereditas iacens) for the time being, until acceptance or
transferring);
– rules of waiver (deadline, method, etc.);
– the extent and rules of liability for the debts under the succession;
– conditions of sharing-out; etc.
In such cases, taking renvoi into account, far from making it easier, makes it even more
difficult and very complicated to settle the succession case.
All in all, this, not the best-thought-out regulation for taking renvoi into account, has
essentially sacrificed the principle of unity of succession and has brought with it many
problems that are difficult to handle in practice.
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31 As it occurred in the jurisprudence before the ESR, during the application of the second sentence (which provides
for the reference back to be taken into consideration) of Section 4 of the old PIL.
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In the course of a future comprehensive review of the ESR, consideration should be given
to rethinking the regulation of renvoi and finding a  solution that is better suited to the
specificities of inheritance relationships. The Spanish (pre-ESR) judicial practice can be worth
paying attention to;32 this allowed the reference to Spanish law to be taken into account only
on condition that it would not disrupt the unity of law applicable to succession covering the
whole estate.33
V Procedural Issues
Among the issues of international succession procedures, the Regulation regulates jurisdiction,
the free circulation of decisions and authentic instruments among Member States, and the
procedural core points of a brand new institution, the European Certificate of Succession
(hereinafter: ECS). However, in the following I would like to briefly mention another segment
of succession procedures, namely the difficulties of international cooperation in obtaining
information on succession matters. Its institutional system is rather disordered; the ESR has
also failed to regulate it properly. 
For us, one of the central problems of obtaining cross-border information in inheritance
matters is obtaining information about foreign inheritance assets. It is a relatively recent
problem: as we have already mentioned in the introduction, the fact that the legal fate of the
inheritance assets located in a foreign country is also to be settled in domestic proceedings is
now a daily practice within the scope of the new jurisdictional rules of the ESR. In the period
prior to the Regulation, however, the Hungarian notary only rarely had to confront the
problem of foreign estate property.
The existence of foreign assets in the succession case is a multi-layered, complex problem
in itself. Obtaining information about the existence of the property itself and the fact that it
forms part of the estate is only one aspect of this. However, there are additional difficulties,
for example determining the value of the foreign asset (e.g. in the case of a foreign immovable
property); it is also necessary to clarify the precise requirements of the manner in which the
asset in question is to be properly marked in the decree transferring the estate (or in the ECS
issued) in such a way that it is accepted abroad, in particular so that its recording in a foreign
public register should not be a problem for the heir. 
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32 See decision STS 6401/1996 of 15 November, 1996 of the Tribunal Supremo (ECLI: ES:TS:1996:6401). The same
court ruled similarly in its decision STS 3532/1999 of May 21,1999 (ECLI: ES:TS:1999:3532), and in its decision
STS 6053/2002 of September 23, 2002 (ECLI: ES:TS:2002:6053).
33 Pursuant to Subsection 2 of Article 12 of the Spanish Codigo civil the reference under the conflict-of-laws rules
shall be interpreted solely as the reference of the substantive legal norms of the referred legal system; however the
reference back to Spanish law shall be taken into consideration. At the same time, pursuant to Subsection 8 of
Article 9 of the Codigo civil the domestic law of the deceased [was, before the ESR] applicable, ‘regardless of the
nature of the estate property and the state where it is located’ (cualesquiera que sean la naturaleza de los bienes y
el país dónde se encuentren). According to the standpoint of the Spanish courts this ‘universal nature’ (carácter
universalista) of the applicable inheritance should prevail over the rule providing for the reference to Spanish law.
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The domestic procedural regulation primarily places on the persons interested in the
inheritance the burden of proof of the existence of the foreign property assets and the fact of
their forming a part of the estate; but leaves open the possibility for the acting notary to take
steps to clarify this.34 In particular, the neuralgic point is the question of obtaining information
on foreign succession assets for which there is a duty of confidentiality, such as obtaining data
relating to a foreign bank account or other assets held with a foreign financial institution. For
the disclosure of information about such property, the person interested in the inheritance will
usually turn to a foreign financial institution in the course of the succession proceedings to
no avail. Since he is not able to provide authentic proof of his legal status as an heir at this stage
of the proceedings, the foreign financial institution will generally reject the disclosure of data
covered by bank secrecy (existence of the account, its balance at the deceased’s death and at
the time of submitting the application). In the established practice, therefore, in many cases,
the acting notary submits a request abroad to obtain data related to the account during the
succession proceedings; in many cases, however, granting a request for information made
directly by a notary to a foreign financial institution is also refused on the grounds that it can
only provide information to its own domestic courts or authorities. Thus, according to the
experience gained so far, obtaining data by a civil law notary is only possible indirectly, i.e. by
means of a request for international legal assistance when the notary requests the competent
court of the Member State where the account-keeping financial institution (or branch)
operates, to provide the information on the account for the purposes of the pending
succession case. In many cases, the practice of making such a request for international legal
assistance is based on the European Taking Evidence Regulation.35 Nothing in this Regulation
precludes its applicability in non-litigious proceedings or in succession matters; however, the
experience of using it in the succession proceedings is still rather mixed; not to mention the
time-consuming nature of obtaining information in such an indirect way.36
A reassuring solution to obtaining information on the deceased’s bank accounts left in
another Member State would, in my opinion, be the (partial) harmonization of the rules of the
Member States on bank secrecy, and that there would generally be a possibility for the Member
State body (succession courts, notaries) having jurisdiction over the succession case to obtain
information on the deceased’s bank accounts in another Member State’s financial institution
in the same way, indirectly, as on domestic accounts. 
There are also other aspects of obtaining information from abroad in succession
proceedings, which I mention only in an indicative manner: 
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34 See Section 43/A of Act XXXVIII of 2010 on succession proceedings (Hetv.).
35 Council Regulation (EC) No 1206/2001 on cooperation between the courts of the Member States in the taking
of evidence in civil or commercial matters.
36 On this topic, see for more detail Szőcs Tibor, ‘Az európai öröklési rendelet hazai alkalmazását érintő legújabb
rendelkezések – A  hagyatéki eljárási törvény egyes nemzetközi vonatkozású rendelkezései módosításának
hátteréhez’ [The most recent provisions related to the domestic application of the European Succession Regulation –
For the background of the amendment of particular provisions with an international dimension of the Act on
succession porceedings] (2019) (1) Európai Jog 3–4.
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– In many cases, it is necessary to obtain information on the existence of the disposition of
property upon death and obtain the disposition itself. There are already aspirations among
European states to create some forms of interoperability of the registers of wills. Such an
initiative is the European Network of Registers of Wills Association (ARERT);37 certain states
that have particularly close relations with each other (France and the Benelux countries) have
already interconnected their national registers of wills electronically. However, despite these
initiatives, it is still not self-evident that a Member State’s notary (or succession court) can
obtain data directly from the register of wills of any other Member State. 
– It is not uncommon for a notary to have to obtain information about the existence of
unknown heirs and their data in another Member State. Although a public notice issued
for the unknown heirs to come forward is published electronically,38 there is little likelihood
that the deceased’s relatives, possibly living abroad and entitled to the succession or a compul -
sory share, could be informed of the succession proceedings in this way. This is especially the
case if the deceased had his habitual residence in Hungary, but was a foreign national and
had spent most of his life abroad (e.g. a German, Dutch or Finnish deceased person who had
settled as a pensioner in Hungary), since in such cases there is reason to assume that the relatives
entitled to succession have remained in their country of origin. At the same time, there is no
international cooperation mechanism between Member States under which the cooperation of
the judicial authorities of the Member State of the likely residence of the potential heirs (i.e.
the Member State of origin of the deceased) could be requested in having the public notice
published there.  
– Articles 17–18 of the ESR lay down procedural rules on lis alibi pendens and related
actions; however, there is a  lack of an effective and reliable mechanism for allowing the
authorities of the Member States to obtain information in a fast and easy way on succession
proceedings related to the same deceased that have possibly started in another Member State.
The elimination of parallel proceedings is essential in order to prevent several decisions (or
European Certificates of Succession) certifying succession rights to the same estate of the
same deceased and issued in different Member States from getting into cross-border
circulation. Within the scope of this regulation, given the relatively pliable nature of the habitual
residence as the main grounds for jurisdiction, there is a greater risk that the authorities of two
Member States will reach a  different conclusion as to the whereabouts of the habitual
residence of the deceased.
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37 Association du Réseau Européen des Registres Testamentaires / The European Network of Registers of Wills
Association (www.arert.eu).
38 See Hetv., Section 59.
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VI Summary
This brief study may be outlining a darker picture of the first experience of the application of
the ESR in practice than reality would suggest. However, I deliberately wanted to highlight
some of the core points in which I believe the EU regulation has been unfortunate. There is
plenty of room for the Court of Justice of the European Union to find a solution to the afore -
men tioned neuralgic issues in a preliminary ruling procedure. At the same time, the future
comprehensive review of the Regulation39 will also provide an opportunity to develop more
mature solutions for some regulatory core points.
Overall, in my opinion, it can be considered a success in itself that, in circumstances
where there are considerable differences between the inheritance law of the Member States,
and perhaps even more so in their systems of succession proceedings, EU legislation has
succeeded in creating a single system of the conflict-of-laws in the field of inheritance covering
(nearly) all the Member States.
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39 This will be due in 2025; see Article 82 of the ESR.
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I Introduction
The aim of the paper is to provide an overview of the regulation of child marriage in Hungary,
also with regard to its legal historical context. In Hungary, the marriage of underage persons
does not occur very often, which may lead one to question the importance of this issue at all.
As only few Hungarian children marry, either with another child over 16 or with an adult, the
justification of the legal and social phenomenon of child marriage has only been queried
recently. The doubts about child marriage and the adequacy of its legal consequences, among
others the fact that a married child over 16 becomes of legal age, has become apparent from
the perspective of children’s rights, which seem to have been strengthened in the course of the
last decade. The sweep of children’s rights, which is a remarkable but in practice not too rapid
movement, is why I think that it is inevitably necessary to reveal some documentary corner -
stones of children’s rights in the international and European context, and especially some main
requirements of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC). I shed light on some
statistical data concerning child marriage with the aim of providing a deeper perspective of
child marriage and give some examples of pertinent regulations in some European countries,
which may prove that the issue of child marriage is not ‘settled’ and constant but it is changing
slowly. If it is admitted that to let children marry does not serve their real interests (as, among
others, this is not a suitable way of providing them a higher standard of living), it can be easier
to overcome some romantic beliefs about underage persons’ serious legal commitment. In the
summary of the paper, I mention the fact that the CRC uses the standard of ‘evolving capacities
of the child’ but it cannot be recited in a way that would be detrimental for the child.
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II Statistical Background — the Current State of the Problem 
also in Hungary
Child marriage, also referred to as early marriage, is any marriage where at least one of the
parties is under 18 years of age.1 According to the data 12 million girls are married before 
the age of 18 each year which means 23 girls every minute.2 (When child marriage is discussed
not only formal marriage but also informal marriage is taken into consideration. However, I focus
primarily on formal marriage, as formal marriage and informal marriage – cohabitation – can
be distinguished in the European countries better than in other, non-European legal systems.)
The numbers and data are mind-bending, as 1 in 5 girls in the world are said to be married
before 18 and over 650 million women alive today were married as children.3 The problem is
a global one, as child marriage occurs all over the world even if it happens more often in some
regions such as North Africa, South Asia and the Middle East. 
In Hungary, child marriage is not such a huge and complex problem as in the above-
mentioned regions, but it clearly occurs in Hungary as well and it is contrary to the
requirements of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) of 1989. The incidence
of married girls aged 15–17 was 0.24 % of all girls between 15 and 17 in 2016, according to
the data of the Hungarian Central Statistical Office.4 It seems to show a downward trend, as
this rate was 0.31 % in 2010.5 I have to add that children above 16 may only enter into a valid
marriage if it is authorised by the guardianship authority. We have no data on the rate of
cohabitants among children, which fact cannot be detached from the fact that the age when
anybody may cohabit with another person in a legally recognisable way is not defined in the
Hungarian Civil Code (HCC), namely Act V of 2013.6 The topicality of this issue is confirmed
by the latest concluding observations of the Committee on the Rights of the Child. The
concluding observations on the sixth periodic report on Hungary, which were adopted by
the Committee at its eighty-third session (20 January – 7 February 2020), urged that the
Hungarian Civil Code should be amended ‘to eliminate any exception to the minimum age of
marriage of 18 years for girls and boys’.7
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1 Joint general recommendation No. 31 of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against
Women/general comment No. 18 of the Committee on the Rights of the Child on harmful practices, UN
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women and Convention on the Rights of the Child,
2014.
2 Source of the data is UNICEF. These are published by a partnership, Girls Not Brides. <https://www.girlsnotbrides.org/
about-child-marriage> accessed 27 March 2019.
3 See <https://www.girlsnotbrides.org/about-child-marriage> accessed 27 March 2019.
4 0.24% on 1 January 2016; <http://www.ksh.hu/sdg/cel_05.html?lang=hu> accessed 16 February 2020.
5 0.31% on 1 January 2010, 0.28 % on 1st January 2011 and 0.26% on 1st January 2015; <http://www.ksh.hu/sdg/
cel_05.html?lang=hu> accessed 16 February 2020.
6 The definition of cohabitation is contained in Art 6:514(1) of HCC.
7 See <https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/Treaties/CRC/Shared%20Documents/HUN/CRC_C_HUN_CO_6_41507_E.pdf>
accessed 16 February 2020.
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III Child Marriage Internationally and in the European Context 
— Facts and Documents on Human Rights
Child marriage affects all children regardless of gender but boys are affected to a lesser degree
than girls.8 The main causes of child marriage are gender inequality, tradition, poverty and
insecurity. Poor families think that they can secure their children’s future with marriage and also
marriage will bring safety into the life of their child, as she will be saved from the risk of
harassment and physical or sexual assault.9 Child marriage’s impacts are tremendous. Married
children regularly finish their education, as these girls are expected to be mothers and wives
although they are not mature enough to perform these roles. Their health is endangered
among others by the early pregnancy and its consequences and most of them face a high risk
of remaining poor.10
Although in Europe we do not face child marriage as often as in some other regions of the
world, the national legislations typically let children – even if not very young children – to
marry. The problem of child marriage has come into the foreground in Europe for two
reasons, namely the rise in the standards of children’s rights’ and the fact that the European
population has been changing and the proportion of the population among the members of
which child marriage happens has been growing.11
When studying the human rights’ conventions, both on the international and European
level, the fact has to be borne in mind that a child marriage is often at the same time a forced
marriage, as children do not enter into it freely. The CRC declares clearly that, for the
purposes of this convention, a child means every human being below the age of eighteen
years.12 Although the second part of this sentence allows that the child may attain majority
earlier under the law applicable to the child, Article 3 has to be emphasised, according to
which in all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social
welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best
interests of the child shall be a primary consideration. From the children’s rights’ perspective
child marriage primarily cannot be in the child’s best interests.
According to Art 16 of the UN Convention on Human Rights (1948), men and women
of full age have the right to marry and to found a family and marriage shall be entered into
only with the free and full consent of the intending spouses. The UN Convention on Consent
to Marriage, Minimum Age for Marriage and Registration of Marriages (1962) urged that no
marriage should be legally entered into by any person under this age. The requirement of
marrying at a ‘marriageable age’ and the prohibition of forced marriage – no marriage shall be
entered into without the free and full consent of the intending spouses – is repeated in Art 23
of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1967) and partly also in Art 10 of
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8 See <https://data.unicef.org/topic/child-protection/child-marriage> accessed 27 March 2019.
9 See <https://www.girlsnotbrides.org/why-does-it-happen> accessed 27 March 2019.
10 See <https://www.girlsnotbrides.org/what-is-the-impact> accessed 27 March 2019.
11 See <https://www.pewforum.org/2017/11/29/europes-growing-muslim-population> accessed 27 March 2019.
12 Article 1 of CRC.
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the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1967). Although child
marriage is a problem of childhood, the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination against Women has to be mentioned, as it not only requires the free and full
consent of the intended spouses but Art 16 also declares that the betrothal and marriage of
a child shall have no legal effect. Besides, all necessary action shall be taken to specify a minimum
age for marriage and to make the registration of marriages in an official register compulsory,
according to this Convention. The general comment No. 18 of the Committee on the Rights
of the Child on harmful practices is clear, as it states that child marriage is considered to be
a form of forced marriage. 
The undesirability of child marriage (and forced marriage) shows up not only interna -
tionally but also on the European level, and the steps towards the direct prohibition of child
marriage have been strengthened recently. Art 12 of the European Convention on Human
Rights is in harmony with the international human rights’ requirement of entering into
marriage only at a marriageable age. The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe
adopted a recommendation on forced marriages and child marriages in 2005 (Recommenda -
tion 1723). It recommended, inter alia, that the member states should be encouraged to
inform pupils concerning their right to have their own decisions whether to marry, and should
help the victims of forced marriage, punish the persons who participate voluntarily in a forced
marriage or child marriage and to terminate child betrothals. In June 2018, the Parliamentary
Assembly adopted a resolution on forced marriage in Europe (Resolution 2233). It recited
that every day 39,000 young girls are married before reaching the age of majority and more
than one third of them are younger than 15. The resolution repeats the risks that children face
when marrying before their majority age and underlines that a child marriage is a forced
marriage as ‘a child cannot be considered to have expressed full, free and informed consent
to a  marriage’. It requires that forcing someone to marry should be criminalised; child
marriage should be prohibited without exception. It adds that the differences between girls
and boys in terms of the minimum age of marriage should be abolished and also civil law
measures should be adopted against forced marriage. The Parliamentary Assembly welcomed
the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals, as they intend to eliminate forced marriages by
2030. (The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and its 17 Sustainable Development
Goals13 was adopted in 2015 by 193 countries.) The European Parliament also raised its voice
against child marriage, stating that the child marriage rate was declining but ‘still too many’
child marriages happen.14
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13 See <https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/development-agenda> accessed 27 March 2019.
14 See <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ATAG/2018/623526/EPRS_ATA(2018)623526_EN.pdf>
accessed 27 March 2019.
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IV Child Marriage in Europe — Some Examples
In Europe, the marriageable age is 18 almost without exception as a main rule, but in several
countries a minor over the age of typically 16 may enter into a marriage. This is the case e.g.
in Bulgaria, where persons at the age of 16 may marry with court permission,15 in Poland,
where the guardianship court may permit a woman who has reached the age of 16 to marry,16
in Portugal, where the legal representative may authorise a person over 16 but below 18 to
marry17 and in Romania, where the approval of the parents or legal guardians and that of the
family court is needed for the marriage of minors.18 In Slovenia not 16 but 15 is the lowest
age for a valid marriage, as they can marry if they receive permission from the local social
services office,19 and in Spain the possibility of 14–15-year-old children to enter into marriage
was abolished only in 2015 and now the age limit is 16.20
There are, however, some European countries where it is impossible to enter into
a marriage under the age of 18. These developments happened recently, just as the consequences
of having to face child marriages among minor migrants. In Sweden, in the Netherlands and
in Denmark marriage under the age of 18 came to be prohibited in the last years (in Sweden
already in 2014, in the Netherlands in 2016 and in Denmark in 2017).21 In Germany, the
growing presence of married migrant girls resulted in the adoption of an Act to Combat Child
Marriages, which entered into force in July 2017.22 The aim of this Act was to prohibit all
marriage under the age of 18 and eliminate all exceptions under that age, but it tended to
reach the intended spouses under foreign applicable law when they enter into marriage in
Germany. The German legislation created complex rules with an impact not only on national
family and marital law but also on private international law.23
V Child Marriage in Hungary — Historical Embeddedness 
and Current Regulation
In Hungary the HCC replaced the earlier Civil Code of 1959 and also the independent Family
Act of 1952 and entered into force in March 2014. According to the family law rules of HCC
a man and a woman of full age can enter into a marriage. However, if a minor enters into marriage
CHILD MARRIAGE IN HUNGARY WITH REGARD TO THE EUROPEAN CONTEXT... n
67 n
15 Dimitar Topuzov, ‘Developments in Family Law – Year by Year, Bulgaria’ in Orsolya Szeibert (ed), Developments
in Family Law. Year by Year I (ELTE Eötvös Kiadó 2018, Budapest) 30.
16 Piotr Fiedorczyk, ‘Developments in Family Law – Year by Year, Poland’ in Szeibert (n 15) 117.
17 Rute Teixeira Pedro, ‘Developments in Family Law – Year by Year, Portugal’ in Szeibert (n 15) 134.
18 Marius Floare, ‘Developments in Family Law – Year by Year, Romania’ in Szeibert (n 15) 149.
19 Suzana Kraljič, ‘Developments in Family Law – Year by Year, Slovenia’ in Szeibert (n 15) 169.
20 Jordi Ribot, ‘Developments in Family Law – Year by Year, in Szeibert (n 15) 183.
21 Marc-Philippe Weller, Chris Thomale, Ioana Hategan, Jan Lukas Werner, ‘Das Gesetz zur Bekämpfung von
Kinderehen – eine kritische Würdigung’ (2018) 65 (17) FamRZ 1291–1292.
22 Nina Dethloff, ‘Child Brides on the Move: Legal Responses to Culture Clashes’ (2018) 32 (3) IJLPF 302.
23 Dieter Schwab, ‘Die verbotene Kinderehe’ (2017) 64 (17) FamRZ 1369–1370.
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in the absence of the prior permission of the guardianship authority then this marriage is
invalid [Art 4:9(1) HCC]. Although Hungarian family law distinguishes between non-existent
marriage and invalid marriage, the marriage of a  minor without the permission of the
guardianship authority shall not result in the same more serious legal consequence as non-
existence but only invalidity. The guardianship authority may grant permission for a minor
over the age of sixteen if this minor has limited capacity. The guardianship authority shall
decide to grant or reject the application after hearing the parent or the guardian. Those
parents who may not exercise their custody rights even in substantial matters affecting the
future of the child, or whose whereabouts are unknown or who cannot be heard due to other
irremovable obstacles need not be heard [Art 4:9(3) HCC]. A marriage concluded in the
absence of the guardianship authority’s permission or before one of the spouses reaches the age
of sixteen shall become valid retroactively to the date of its conclusion, after six months of the
spouse reaching majority if the spouse concerned does not challenge the validity of the marriage
within this term of preclusion, or the court, at the spouse’s request, terminates the action
brought on this ground earlier by another person entitled to do so. 
Government Decree No 149/1997 (IX. 10.) on the guardianship authorities and child
protection procedures contains the detailed rules on the permission of the guardianship
authority concerning the marriage of a minor over 16.24 The request for permission has to be
submitted by the minor over 16 and he or she has to attach the doctor’s certificate that the
child is physically and mentally mature enough to enter into marriage and the certificate or
statement of both intended spouses concerning their income, as the guardianship authority’s
task is to convince the court that the costs of living of the intended spouse under 18 and his
or her child or the child which is to be born before the intended spouse reaches his or her
majority are covered. According to the Decree, the minor has to attend counselling by the
family protection service and has to attach the certificate of attendance. The public
guardianship authority has to hear the intended spouses and the minor’s legal representative
and has to make a report about the future living circumstances of the minor. The guardianship
authority shall hear the intended spouses on the arguments in favour of permission, and,
according to Art 36 of the Decree, the guardianship authority permits the marriage of the
minor if it is in the child’s interest and the request for permission was submitted upon the free
will of the minor without their being influenced.  
The HCC contains almost identical rules to those of the Family Act of 1952 (Act No IV
of 1952) concerning the minor’s marriage. I would emphasise that, although the Family Law
Book (Fourth Book) of the effective HCC always uses the word ‘child’ for people under 18, 
its Book on the Individual as Subject of Law (Second Book) never say a word about children,
as it uses the term ‘minor’ in harmony with the traditional civil law rules. At the very end of
the 20th century, when the recodification of the Civil Code began (actually in 1998) the
children’s rights’ issues were not in the foreground and it can explain why the rules concerning
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the minor’s marriage were seen to be stable. The rules that were in force at the end of the
20th century concerning a child’s marriage in Hungary were in harmony with the European
trends regarding minors’ marriage options.
In the 19th century, children over 12 could enter into marriage in Hungary; if they married
they reached their full capacity to act, as this was an immediate consequence of the marriage.
In 1894, the Hungarian Marriage Act distinguished between mature and immature persons
and declared 16 years for women and 18 years for men as the lower limits for marriage.
However, a dispensation could be given for a minor over 12, regardless of it being for a girl or
a boy. It changed in 1953 when the unified age limit of majority became 18 but a child could
enter into a marriage with ministerial permission over 12 also at that time. Act I. of 1974,
within the framework of the first comprehensive reform of the Family Act, lifted the age limit
for marriage but applied a difference upon the basis of sexes. Men could marry from the age
of 18 and women could marry from the age of 16. The age limit of marriage with permission
was 2 years lower for both, which meant that men could marry with permission from the age
of 16, while women from 4. Act IV of 1986, the second comprehensive reform of the Family
Act, unified the marriageable age and lifted it to 18 for both men and women while it maintained
the possibility of entering into marriage over the age of 16 with permission.25
The recodification of civil law, which affected family law and marital law in their entirety,
would have given a chance to re-evaluate marriage involving the minors but it did not happen
at all. At that time, the very end of the 20th century and the very beginning of the 21st century,
the norms of children’s rights were not really strong and the Hungarian recodification of civil
law followed the aim of maintaining the then effective provisions if possible. Even the thought
of modifying the minor’s marriage or rather child marriage did not emerge. It was not debated
whether a minor – a child – is mature enough to enter into a marriage; even the need to
maintain of the then effective rules was accepted. Although the experts taking part in the
recodification process recognised that the marriageable age had earlier been one of the most
debated issues, they concluded that the requirements of marrying as a minor were well
established and applied in the practice of the guardianship authority.26 Some years later the
thought that the issue of marriageable age does not require any modification was reinforced.27
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25 Sipőcz László, A gyámsági törvény magyarázattal (Act on guardianship with explanations) (1882, Budapest), 10–13;
Nizsalovszky Endre, Magyar családi jog (Hungarian Family Law) (1949, Budapest) 19. Short summary in Hungarian:
Szeibert Orsolya, ‘Gyermektartás és szülőtartás – változások a  gyermeki jogállás és a  szülői kötelezettségek
alakulásának tükrében (Child maintenance and maintenance for parents – changes in the mirror of the shaping of
child’s status and parental obligations)’ in Szeibert Orsolya (ed), Család és családtagok. Jogági tükröződések (Family
and family members. Reflection in branches of law) (ELTE Eötvös Kiadó 2018, Budapest) 39–40.
26 Weiss Emilia, ‘A készülő Polgári Törvénykönyv családjogi könyvének a Kodifikációs Szerkesztőbizottság által
elfogadott koncepciója (The Concept of the Family Law Book of Civil Code under reconstruction being adopted
by the Codification Organising Committee)’ (2001) (4–5) Polgári Jogi Kodifikáció (Civil Law Codification) 22–23.
27 Weiss Emilia, ‘Néhány kérdés a készülő Polgári Törvénykönyv családjogi könyve koncepciója köréből (Some issues
concerning the concept of the Family Law Book of the Civil Code under elaboration)’ in Gyekiczky Tamás (ed),
Ami a múltból elkísér. A családjogi törvény ötven éve (What escorts us from the past. Fifty years of Family Act)
(Gondolat–Infonia 2005, Debrecen) 24–25. And also in 2013, Weiss Emilia, ‘A Ptk. Családjogi Könyvéről (About
the Family Law Book of Civil Code)’ (2013) (9) Jogtudományi Közlöny (Gazette of Legal Jurisprudence) 406–407.
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The fact that a child can marry at the age of 16 with the permission of the guardianship
authority was not questioned, even though the studies analysing and explaining the codifica -
tion underlined the importance of the child’s interests and the aim to protect the child’s rights
and interests in harmony with the CRC.28
VI Conclusion — the Child’s Evolving Capacities and Free Consent
Although the general comment No. 18 of the Committee on the Rights of the Child on
harmful practices would prohibit child marriage, it adds the following: 
as a matter of respecting the child’s evolving capacities and autonomy in making decisions that
affect her or his life, a marriage of a mature, capable child below 18 years of age may be allowed in
exceptional circumstances, provided that the child is at least 16 years of age and that such decisions
are made by a judge based on legitimate exceptional grounds defined by law and on the evidence
of maturity, without deference to culture and tradition.
On the other hand, it is tradition and multiculturalism in connection with a lot of issues that
can be mentioned as well.29
The prohibition of child marriage has the aim of protecting children as it has to be
assumed that they cannot have free consent just because of being underage. The CRC does
not work with ages, except for the age of 18, but uses the model of evolving capacities, which
have to be analysed for each child according to the special circumstances of the case. That is
what the above-mentioned option of the general comment emphasises – it is not the child’s
age alone that has to be taken into attention in the case of an underage marriage and tradition
or religion should not be a decisive factor. However, it does not seem to be easy to determine
whether a child between 16 and 18 has clearly free consent to marry. In my concluding words,
I would refer (again) to the main targets of goal 5, namely to ‘achieve gender equality and
empower all women and girls’ of the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals, and especially
5.3, as to eliminate all harmful practices, such as child, early and forced marriage. 
In sum, child marriage is a violation of human rights according to UNICEF.30 Both the
words ‘child’ and ‘marriage’ cause positive feelings; however, marriage is an institution for
adults and not for children. That is why the term ‘child marriage’ is held to be inappropriate.31
n ELTE LAW JOURNAL • ORSOLYA SZEIBERT
n 70
28 This child-focused attitude is shown in the codification studies of Emilia Weiss. These studies are included in
Szeibert Orsolya (ed), Weiss Emilia családjogi és öröklési jogi kodifikációs tanulmányai (Codification studies of
Emilia Weiss in the field of family law and succession law) (ELTE Eötvös Kiadó 2017, Budapest) 403.
29 Dethloff (n 22) 302. The cautiousness concerning the role of the state when children’s rights are at stake is
underlined from the perspective of Muslim jurisdictions – see Dörthe Engelcke and Nadjma Yassari, ‘Child law
in Muslim jurisdictions: The role of the state in establishing filiation (nasab) and protecting parentless children’
(2019) 34 (3) Journal of Law and Religion 332–335; doi:10.1017/jlr.2019.40.
30 See <https://data.unicef.org/topic/child-protection/child-marriage> accessed 27 March 2019.
31 Arthur van Coller, ‘Child Marriage – Acceptance by Association’ (2017) 31 (3) IJLPF 363.
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It is rooted in traditions and its right to existence often goes unquestioned – just as happened
and still happens in Hungary, as the Decree declares it is permitted if it serves the child’s
interest. How can marriage serve the child’s interest at all? A child needs protection, which
has to be provided by the parents, relatives, society and the state and there is no need for
a spouse at a child’s age to give that protection. It is not primarily the European continent
where child marriage occurs too often, but allowing children to marry transmits a message
to society. The study provides an overview of the Hungarian rules on child marriage and an
introduction to the international and European context of child marriage, with special regard
to the latest developments and requirements.
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The campaign preceding the referendum on the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the
European Union focused, among other issues, on the UK taking back control over immigration.
Nevertheless, the incorrect use of terminology regarding immigration, instead of free
movement of persons, could result in confusion as regards the extent to which the UK is
bound by EU migration acquis. This article therefore intends to clearly distinguish the debate,
on the one hand, on the retention of rights related to free movement and, on the other hand,
the issues related to migration and asylum. 
A unique aspect of this article is that it not only discusses the legal implications, but also
focuses on the practical implementations and the related concerns, as the complications of the
Brexit negotiations could even be exceeded by the challenges of the practical implementation
of the required actions, both by the UK and the 27 EU Member States. The article therefore
also draws attention to the risks posed by inadequate actions. Nevertheless, the future
relationship between the EU and the UK is also discussed, both as regards the future legal
migration of the citizens of the two parties, as well as possible close cooperation regarding
asylum and illegal migration.
I Introduction
Taking back control, including on migration, was one of the driving mantras leading to the
majority voting for Brexit in the referendum in 2016. Nevertheless, academics state that 
‘the perception that the UK has little control over immigration because of its EU membership
is erroneous.’1 This study intends to examine different areas of asylum and migration, partly
Ágnes Töttôs*
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* Ágnes Töttős (PhD) is a JHA Counsellor in the field of migration and asylum at the Permanent representation of
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1 Natascha Zaun, ‘Taking back control? The impact of Brexit on the immigration of third country nationals and
asylum seekers’ <https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/2018/05/11/taking-back-control-the-impact-of-brexit-on-the-
immigration-of-third-country-nationals-and-asylum-seekers/> accessed 6 June 2019.
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in order to see which perception is closer to reality; furthermore it also wishes to identify
questions that could be negotiated and settled as part of the future relationship in the
discussed policy areas.
The starting point should definitely be Protocol No. 21 of TFEU that clearly states that
‘the United Kingdom and Ireland shall not take part in the adoption by the Council of
proposed measures pursuant to Title V of Part Three of the Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union’. Only three Member States, i.e. the UK, Ireland and Denmark, enjoy such an
opt-out situation as regards harmonisation in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, yet
the UK and Ireland have the right to opt in, either at the early phase of negotiations, resulting
in the fact that their vote counts at the time of adoption and can therefore influence the
outcome of a vote. Even if they do not opt in pre-adoption, the UK and Ireland still can decide
to opt in any time after the adoption of a specific legal act in the Area of Freedom, Security
and Justice. 
The Area of Freedom, Security and Justice covers a number of policy areas in justice and
home affairs. Even the list of migration-related issues could extend from border management,
visa policy, legal migration and illegal migration to asylum issues. Although such policy areas
were not among those most debated during the Brexit negotiations, it is worth examining the
relevant EU acquis from a  Brexit perspective, as a  semantic shift from EU citizens to
immigrants could be observed in the UK, resulting in the terminology of free movement 
of persons and that of immigration of third-country nationals being muddled. This article
intends to focus on the issues of asylum and illegal migration as those policy areas have
recently been the main focus of the EU.2
However, it would be a mistake not to deal with citizens’ rights, as the Brexit negotiations
have definitely put this policy area in the centre of tensions, as the protection of the acquired
rights of both EU citizens in the UK and UK citizens in the EU27 turned out to be a key
concern for both parties.3 It actually also touches upon the policy area of legal migration, as
British citizens become third-country nationals as a result of withdrawal and therefore their
long-term stay will fall under the regulatory area of legal migration. 
All in all, the article ends up pointing out, through the examination of migration related
issues, why the following statement of MEP Ellie Chowns is a very vivid description of Brexit:
‘It’s a complex dish that’s never been cooked before, has no recipe, two chefs in different
kitchens, it’ll cost us a fortune and it risks giving us all indigestion for many years to come.’4
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2 See especially European Council Conclusions in June 2018 and December 2018, as well as the Statement on the
situation at the EU’s external borders adopted by the EU Ministers of Home Affairs on 4 March 2020.
3 See for in-depth background Éva Gellér-Lukács, ‘Brexit – a Point of Departure for the Future in the Field of the
Free Movement of Persons’ (2016) (1) ELTE Law Journal 141–162; <http://eltelawjournal.hu/brexit-point-
departure-future-field-free-movement-persons/> accessed 6 June 2019.
4 European Parliament, plenary debate on Implementing and monitoring the provisions on citizens’ rights in the
Withdrawal Agreement, 14 January 2020 <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/CRE-9-2020-01-
14-ITM-003_EN.html> accessed 19 January 2020.
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II Residence Rights: Immigration-Related Questions of Free
Movement Issues
1 Retention of Residence Rights according to the Withdrawal Agreement 
The UK’s decision to withdraw from the European Union has generated many questions on
the legal status of UK nationals living in an EU27 Member State and EU citizens living in the
UK. Brexit has raised a  number of concerns and resulted in diverging suggestions by
politicians and NGOs as well as academics for ensuring that all EU citizens who have
exercised their free movement rights will be able to retain their residence and equal treatment
rights.5
On 8 December 2017 a  joint report stated that an agreement has been reached in
principle across, among others, the area of protecting the rights of Union citizens in the UK
and UK citizens in the Union and declared the following: ‘The overall objective of the
Withdrawal Agreement with respect to citizens’ rights is to provide reciprocal protection for
Union and UK citizens, to enable the effective exercise of rights derived from Union law and
based on past life choices, where those citizens have exercised free movement rights by the
specified date.’6 In November 2018, the European Union and the United Kingdom endorsed,
at leaders’ level, the Withdrawal Agreement that would ensure an orderly UK withdrawal
from the EU on 30 March 2019, as well as a political declaration7 setting out the main
parameters of the future EU–UK relationship.8
Once the discussions aimed at bridging the gap between the UK and the EU positions had
been stepped up, a revised Withdrawal Agreement was reached and immediately endorsed
by the European Council on 17 October 2019, and in the meanwhile the Political Declaration
on the framework for the future relationship was also revised. Nevertheless, the new
agreement did not affect the provisions regarding citizens’ rights and the revised political
declaration did not modify Section IX on Mobility. On 13 December 2019, the European
Council in its Conclusions reiterated its commitment to an orderly withdrawal on the basis
of the Withdrawal Agreement, which was then signed by the two parties on 24 January and
entered into force upon the UK’s exit from the EU, on 31 January 2020 at midnight (CET). 
The WA is an extensive legal document aiming, among other things, to preserve the rights
of UK nationals living in the EU27 and EU citizens living in the UK. Importantly, the
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5 See Anne van der Mei, ‘Brexit and citizenship I: retention of EU citizenship’ <https://www.maastrichtuniversity.nl/
blog/2018/10/brexit-and-citizenship-i-retention-eu-citizenship> accessed 6 June 2019.
6 Joint report from the negotiators of the European Union and the United Kingdom Government on progress during
phase 1 of negotiations under Article 50 TEU on the United Kingdom’s orderly withdrawal from the European
Union, Para 6, <https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/joint_report.pdf> accessed 6 June 2019.
7 See<https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/37059/20181121-cover-political-declaration.pdf> accessed 
9 January 2020.
8 Whereas the withdrawal agreement, if ratified, would be a legally binding treaty, the political declaration is a legally
non-binding document; however, despite their different legal nature, they are considered as a package for the
purpose of the approval process in both the EU and the UK.
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agreement establishes a  transition period until the end of 2020, extendable once with
a maximum of two years, to help businesses and citizens to adapt to the new circumstances,
and the EU and UK to negotiate their future partnership agreements. During this time, the
UK applies the acquis and is treated as a Member State, but is not be able to participate in EU
decision-making or be represented in EU institutions. It also means that the Free Movement
Directive (2004/38/EC)9 continues to apply in this extended period. 
Part Two of the agreement sets out in legal terms provisions safeguarding most of the
essential guarantees of EU free movement law for those who made use of it, both UK citizens
in the EU27 and EU27 citizens in the UK. A stated priority for the EU and the UK, this part
was completely agreed by negotiators in March 2018. In particular, the WA defines the
categories of persons within its scope and contains provisions on residence and related rights,
coordination of social security, equal treatment and non-discrimination. Undoubtedly, the
most important result of the provisions is that the persons covered enjoy the rights set out in
Part Two for their lifetime, unless they cease to meet the conditions therein. 
Article 13(1) of the WA expressly states that ‘Union citizens and United Kingdom
nationals shall have the right to reside in the host State under the limitations and conditions
as set out in Articles 21, 45 or 49 TFEU and in Article 6(1), points (a), (b) or (c) of Article 7(1),
Article 7(3), Article 14, Article 16(1) or Article 17(1) of Directive 2004/38/EC.’ It therefore
provides the enforcement of the principle of acquired rights in this policy area, yet it does
not deny that conditions and limitations can also be applied; nevertheless, the agreement also
gives a closed list of them in order to avoid arbitrary application in this regard.
The personal scope of the agreement set out in Article 10 enumerates the categories of
persons who are covered by the WA and enjoy this continued preferential residence right.
Such categories are: (a)–(b) Union citizens or UK citizens who exercised their right to reside
in the territory of the other party in accordance with Union law before the end of the
transition period and continue to reside there thereafter; and (c)–(d) Union citizens or UK
citizens who exercised their right as frontier workers in the territory of the other party in
accordance with Union law before the end of the transition period and continue to do so
thereafter.
Apart from the citizens of the EU and the UK covered by points (a)–(d), points (e) and
(f ) also recognise the acquired rights of certain family members, regardless of their citizenship.
Family members, nevertheless, have to fulfil one of many conditions, yet the lengthy legal list
of conditions leads to the conclusion that family members also have residence rights if they
were already granted rights under EU law before the transition period (e.g. spouses, parents,
children, grandchildren and grandparents) or who will be able to join the EU/UK national in
the host state if they are living in a different country, but are already considered a family
member by the end of the transition period. 
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The WA also covers future children, wherever they are born or legally adopted. The right
to join the EU or UK citizen after the transition period for already existing family members
and future children is a declaration of the principle consistently confirmed by the CJEU that
the residence right of family members is derived from, and is dependent upon, but also
implied in the residence right, of the EU national practicing their free movement right.
However, citizens’ groups and the European Parliament10 have underlined the WA failed to
protect certain family reunification rights, especially those recognised by EU case law. 
Based on the Surinder Singh case11 a non-EU family member of an EU citizen moving to
another Member State then returning to that citizen’s home Member State must enjoy at least
the same rights as would be granted to him or her under EU law if his or her spouse entered
and resided in the territory of another Member State. The CJEU clarified that 
when a Community national who has availed himself or herself of those rights returns to his or her
country of origin, his or her spouse must enjoy at least the same rights of entry and residence as
would be granted to him or her under Community law if his or her spouse chose to enter and reside
in another Member State.12
Although such cases of returning mobile EU citizens are not regulated by the Free Movement
Directive, the family reunification rights ensured in the Directive should still be applied to the
returners according to the present EU acquis; this principle has been stipulated by the CJEU
in the O and B case,13 as well.14
Similarly, the agreement seems to fail to recognise the outcome of the Zambrano
judgement15 declaring the residence right of non-EU carers for minors who have not left their
Member State of birth.16 In this case it was not Directive 2004/38/EC, but Article 20 of TFEU
that was interpreted by the CJEU as meaning that it precludes a Member State from refusing
a third country national, upon whom his minor children who are European Union citizens are
dependent, a right of residence in the Member State of residence and nationality of those
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declaration’ European Parliament Brief, March 2019.  <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/
2019/635595/EPRS_BRI(2019)635595_EN.pdf> accessed 6 June 2019, 3.
11 Case C-370/90 The Queen v Immigration Appeal Tribunal and Surinder Singh, ex parte Secretary of State for Home
Department [1992] ECR I-04265. See for more, Gellérné Lukács Éva, Munkavállalás az Európai Unióban,
(Employment in the EU) (KJK Kerszöv 2004, Budapest).
12 Surinder Singh case, Judgment of the Court, para 23.
13 Case C-456/12 O. v Minister voor Immigratie, Integratie en Asiel, and Minister voor Immigratie, Integratie en Asiel
v B., [2014], ECLI:EU:C:2014:135.
14 See Laura Gyeney, ‘Same sex couples’ right to free movement in light of Member States’ national identities, The
legal analysis of the Coman case’ Iustum Aequum Salutare XIV. 2018. 2. <http://ias.jak.ppke.hu/hir/ias/20182sz/
11_GyeneyL_IAS_2018_2.pdf> accessed 6 June 2019.
15 Case C-34/09 Gerardo Ruiz Zambrano v Office national de l’emploi (ONEm) [2011] ECR I-01177.
16 See Ágnes Töttős, ‘Az Európai Bíróság legújabb ítélkezési gyakorlatának hatása az idegenrendészeti jogalkalmazásra
(The impact of recent case law of the European Court of Justice on the application of alien law)’ in Pécsi Határőr
Tudományos Közlemények XII. (2011, Pécs) 307–321.
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children, and from refusing to grant a work permit to that third country national, insofar as
such decisions deprive those children of the genuine enjoyment of the substance of the rights
attached to the status of a European Union citizen.
As for family members who are not yet in the life of mobile EU nationals or UK citizens,
but will be, only children born to, or legally adopted by, persons referred to in points (a) to
(d) after the end of the transition period are covered by the agreement. It therefore does not
extend the preferential rules to future spouses and their relatives. It is however not surprising,
given the fact that, on the one hand, the letter David Cameron wrote to the President of the
European Council on 10 November 2015,17 describing the UK’s concerns regarding EU
membership, specifically contained reference to marriages of convenience,18 and on the other
hand, the British legal provisions on family reunification with a third-country national follows
a restrictive approach.19
As regards administrative measures, the UK and the EU Member States can choose
between two systems, either requiring that Union citizens or UK nationals, their respective
family members and other persons who reside in their territory to apply for a new residence
status which confers the rights [Article 18(1)], or allowing that those eligible for residence rights
receive, in accordance with the conditions set out in Directive 2004/38/EC, a  residence
document that includes a statement that it has been issued in accordance with this Agreement
[Article 18(4)]. According to the European Parliamentary Research Service it means that 
the UK and the EU Member States can choose between a constitutive system (persons will be
required to apply for a new residence status to attest to their rights under the withdrawal agreement)
and declaratory system (those complying with the conditions automatically become beneficiaries
of the withdrawal agreement).20
Nevertheless, since creating a  new residence status in line with Article 18(1) does not
necessarily constitute residence and treatment rights equal to those that have already been
granted by the free movement acquis, it could be closer to the spirit of the agreement to
distinguish the two solutions based on whether they provide direct effect to the WA or not.
In any case, persons entitled to the rights under the citizens’ chapter have the right to
request from the host state a document, which may be digital, attesting that the person is
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17 Letter by David Cameron on a  new settlement for the United Kingdom in a  reformed European Union,
<https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/475679/Donald
_Tusk_letter.pdf> accessed 6 June 2019.
18 See Éva Gellér-Lukács, Ágnes Töttös, and Sándor Illés, ‘Free movement of people and the Brexit’ in Hungarian
Geographical Bulletin (2017) <https://doi.org/10.15201/hungeobull.65.4.9> accessed 6 June 2019. Gellérné Lukács
Éva, ‘Brexit – a Point of Departure for the Future in the Field of the Free Movement of Persons’ (2016) (1) ELTE
Law Journal 141–162.
19 See report of the UK National Contact Point of the European Migration Network on ‘Family reunification of
Third Country Nationals in the European Union National’ Contribution from the United Kingdom, Home Office
Science, March 2017 <https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/28a_uk_family_reunification_
final_en.pdf> accessed 6 June 2019.
20 European Parliamentary Research Service Brief, 3–4.
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covered by the WA. EU law safeguards apply to any host state decision against the restriction
of the residence rights of the persons covered. The host State may therefore not impose any
limitations and conditions other than set out in the WA; furthermore, there shall be no
discretion in applying the limitations and conditions, other than in favour of the person
concerned.
According to Article 18(1) Member States may require to apply for a new residence status
to attest to their rights under the withdrawal agreement. The WA also sets out the legal
conditions of such national regimes in order to avoid them becoming restrictive. The
Agreement specifically states that the sole purpose of such a procedure should be that of
verification. The administrative procedures should be smooth, transparent and simple. 
2 Retention of Residence Rights in the UK
The Home Office published the details of the EU Settlement Scheme (EUSS) in a Statement
of Intent on 21 June 2018,21 and has opened the scheme on a live trial basis, with the following
guiding principle: ‘A principle of evidential flexibility will apply, enabling caseworkers to
exercise discretion in favour of the applicant where appropriate, to minimise administrative
burdens.’22 The public beta test phase of the EUSS was launched on 21 January 2019 and the
scheme was fully launched on 30 March 2019. As of 29 February 2020, overall, the total
number of applications received up to 29 February 2020 was more than 3.3 million (3,343,700),
while the total number of applications was almost 3 million (2,998,300). Of these, 58% were
granted settled status and 41% were granted pre-settled status. Of the remaining applications,
19,100 received a withdrawn or void outcome, 6,800 were invalid and 300 were refused.23
As a result of a successful application24 in the EUSS,25 one is given either settled status or
pre-settled status. Applicants are not asked to choose which they are applying for; the granted
status depends on how long the applicant has been living in the UK when they apply. Settled
status is granted if the applicant who started living in the UK by 31 December 2020 has lived
in the UK for a continuous 5-year period.26 If the applicant does not have 5 years’ continuous
residence when applying, they will usually get pre-settled status. Even though the WA would
allow the extension of the transition period for a maximum of two years, the European Union
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21 UK Home Office, ‘EU Settlement Scheme: Statement of Intent’ 21 June 2018, <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/
government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/718237/EU_Settlement_Scheme_SOI_June_2018.pdf>
accessed 6 June 2019.
22 Statement of Intent on the EU Settlement Scheme, para 1.15.
23 EU Settlement Scheme Statistics February 2020 Experimental Statistics, 19 March 2020. <https://assets.
publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/873588/eu-settlement-
scheme-statistics-february-2020.pdf> accessed 26 March 2020.
24 Exceptions include those who have indefinite leave to remain, which is usually verified by a stamp in the passport
or a letter from the Home Office stating this, as well as frontier workers.
25 See <https://www.gov.uk/settled-status-eu-citizens-families> accessed 26 March 2020.
26 Five years’ continuous residence means that for 5 years in a row the applicant has been in the UK for at least
6 months in any 12-month period. The rules also include a number of justified exceptions.
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(Withdrawal Agreement) Act 202027 [Section 33] rules out extending the transition period,
even if a free trade deal with the EU has not been agreed.
Both pre-settled and settled status provide the right to work in the UK, use the National
Health Service (NHS), enrol in education or continue studying, access public funds such as
benefits and pensions if they are eligible for them, and travel in and out of the UK. However,
pre-settled status only provides a right to stay in the UK for a further 5 years from the date it
is granted, but they can apply to change this to settled status once they have 5 years’
continuous residence. Once the applicant received settled status, they can stay in the UK for
an indefinite period and will also be able to apply for British citizenship. 
Apart from concerns regarding the proper technical function of the newly created EUSS
or the possible bureaucratic burden it may mean for applicants to prove the length of their stay
in the territory of the UK, one of the major concerns is related to the solely digital nature of
certifying the new status as the UK does not issue a physical document under the system,
and so the status is only registered and certified digitally. Some of the citizens concerned are
afraid that, in the case of a solely digital registration, they will be at a disadvantage compared
to third-country nationals with documentary status (e.g. when it comes to renting a flat,
opening a bank account or getting access to health care);28 furthermore, online systems can
be temporarily offline or can be hacked.29 Nevertheless, requesting the UK to issue a residence
document would have required reopening this part of the Withdrawal Agreement, the
scenario of which was continuously rejected by the Commission as it may have generated
further requests for modification from the British side. 
The second major concern of EU citizens living in the UK is whether they will be given
the right status, so whether the British authorities will properly assess the duration of their
stay in the UK. The media reported stories of people who were given pre-settled status when
they had been living in the UK for far longer than 5 years as well as of a sharp rise in the
proportion of EU citizens not considered eligible for settled status, which has caused alarm
among campaign groups.30 The organisation ‘the3million’ also expressed its concerns about
EU citizens possibly being granted the wrong status, that is pre-settled instead of a settled
status, as all holders of pre-settled status face an individual hard deadline when their status
expires: if they do not apply for settled status before that expiry date, they lose all their rights
in the UK.31
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27 See <http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2020/1/contents/enacted> accessed 26 March 2020.
28 Access of third-country nationals to health care is a core issue not only in the UK. See for more Éva Gellér-Lukács,
Laura Gyeney, Gábor Kovács, and Sándor Illés, ‘Third-country nationals in the Hungarian public health care
sector’ (2015) (1) New Medicine 29–36.
29 See <http://static.wixstatic.com/ugd/0d3854_c5075db192444f74a6543588134a2731.pdf> accessed 8 January
2020.
30 Rise in EU citizens not getting UK settled status causes alarm, The Guardian, 30 August 2019. <https://www.the
guardian.com/politics/2019/aug/30/eu-citizens-uk-settled-status-alarm> accessed 8 January 2020.
31 The3million: European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Bill, A briefing on Pre-Settled Status under the EU
Settlement Scheme, January 2020 <http://0d385427-9722-4ee6-86fe-3905bdbf5e6e.usrfiles.com/ugd/0d3854_
be6c47d83faa483a841dae953e2bede6.pdf> accessed 8 January 2020.
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A third concern is whether the news on the required procedure of application will reach
all the EU citizens and their family members in time so that they will not miss the application
deadline of 30 June 2021. Some assume that hundreds of thousands of EU citizens who are
currently living lawfully in the UK – many of them vulnerable and long-term residents – will
not be able to apply on time, with serious consequences.32 A study33 has also examined which
EU citizens are at risk of failing to secure their rights after Brexit, which also pointed out that
one challenge facing any large-scale government programme is coverage. The study identifies
four groups of characteristics that may decrease the chance of people applying in due time:
people who may not be aware that they can and need to apply; people who are already
vulnerable or have reduced autonomy for some reason; people with difficulties accessing or
using the application; and people who could have difficulty demonstrating that they have
been living in the UK. 
If a significant number of eligible people do not apply, enforcing a strict deadline would increase
the illegally resident EU-national population in the UK. As a result, perhaps one of the most
important unresolved policy questions affecting the completeness of the settled status process is
what contingency plans will be in place for people who do not apply by the deadline.34
Even though the proposed amendments to the European Union (Withdrawal Agreement)
Bill 2020 for an automatic guarantee, a registration scheme and the provision of a physical
documented proof of that status were unsuccessful,35 the Independent Monitoring Authority
for the Citizens’ Rights Agreements (IMA) was established [Section 15] as required by the WA
and a  schedule to the act contains provisions relating to its constitution and functions.
Complaints can be submitted to this body by EU27 citizens about their treatment, and it can
launch inquiries or court proceedings as a follow-up. Nevertheless, according to Steve Peers
it might be questioned whether the body is really independent, given the influence which the
act gives the Home Secretary over appointments to it.36
On 15 January 2020, the European Parliament also adopted a resolution on implementing
and monitoring the provisions on citizens’ rights in the Withdrawal Agreement37 noting all
the concerns that have so far been identified and reiterating its commitment to monitoring
closely how the EU27 and the UK implement Part Two of the Withdrawal Agreement. When
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32 See <https://us13.campaign-archive.com/?u=9c20dec826b5110f3a7f5e9bc&id=f4c85ae13e> accessed 8 January
2020.
33 ‘Unsettled Status? Which EU Citizens are at Risk of Failing to Secure their Rights after Brexit?’ The Migration
Observatory, 12 April 2018, <https://migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/resources/reports/unsettled-status-which-
eu-citizens-are-at-risk-of-failing-to-secure-their-rights-after-brexit/> accessed 8 January 2020.
34 Ibid.
35 Amendments 5, 6 and NC5 to the European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Bill.
36 Steve Peers, ‘The Withdrawal Agreement Implementation Bill’ EU Law Analysis blog post, 22 October 2019.
<http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.com/2019/10/the-withdrawal-agreement-implementation.html> accessed 9 January
2020.
37 See <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/B-9-2020-0031_EN.html> accessed 19 January 2020.
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debating this subject, certain members of the EP practically blackmailed the UK that unless
the citizens’ rights will be properly ensured in line with the WA, they would not agree to the
trade deal that is to be negotiated by the end of the transition period.38
3 Retention of Residence Rights in the EU27
The Brexit preparedness website of the European Commission contains specific information
on measures by the 27 EU Member States ensuring the residence rights of UK nationals who
are legally residing in a Member State.39 Strangely, as of late March 2020 it still does not
contain information on the Member States’ choice on whether they apply Article 18(1) or
Article 18(4) of the WA, but only on what happens in the event of a  no deal scenario.
Nevertheless, the website also contains an overview table40 regarding the residence rights of
UK nationals in EU27 Member States in a no deal scenario that – contrary to its introductory
notes – also states plans and provisions applicable in case of Brexit with an agreement, and
the website also lists all the links to the national websites that also contain information as
regards the implementation of the WA. Planned preparatory measures in the Member States,
especially as regards the national approach chosen for offering a continued right to stay, the
administrative measures foreseen and the planned communication methods, as well as 
the timing of actions, can therefore be found from these sources, yet the pieces of information
are scattered and can be misleading as they do not properly distinguish between a no deal
scenario and Brexit based on the WA. 
It can be nevertheless be concluded that many of the Member States plan to exchange the
existing free movement documents to residence permits in line with Article 18(1) of the WA,
yet even Article 18(4) provides that those eligible for residence rights have the right to receive
a residence document that includes a statement that it has been issued in accordance with the
Agreement. Furthermore, Article 26 of the WA provides that the state of work may require
UK national frontier workers to apply for a document certifying their rights. In order to follow
a common approach, a Commission implementing decision41 set out provisions on documents
to be issued by Member States pursuant to the WA. Council Regulation (EC) No 1030/200242
lays down a uniform format for residence permits for third-country nationals containing all
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38 See <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/CRE-9-2020-01-14-ITM-003_EN.html> accessed 19
January 2020.
39 See <https://ec.europa.eu/info/brexit/brexit-preparedness/citizens-rights_en> accessed 26 March 2020.
40 See <https://ec.europa.eu/info/files/overview-table-residence-rights-uk-nationals-eu27-member-states_en>
accessed 26 March 2020.
41 Commission Implementing Decision of 21.2.2020 on documents to be issued by Member States pursuant to
Article 18(1) and (4) and Article 26 of the Agreement on the withdrawal of the United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland from the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community, C(2020) 1114
final.
42 Council Regulation (EC) No 1030/2002 of 13 June 2002 laying down a uniform format for residence permits for
third-country nationals [2002] OJ L 157/1.
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the necessary information and meeting very high technical standards, therefore, that format
should also be used for residence documents to be issued in line with the WA.
This implies that a certain transitory or grace period is foreseen by Member States to
carry out the required administrative procedures. While certain Member States (Luxembourg,
Croatia, France, Slovenia, Sweden and the Netherlands) aim at a relatively shorter transition
period depending on the final date of withdrawal, Hungary, on the other hand, decided to set
the end three years after the withdrawal date. The main justification behind the Hungarian
decision is not necessarily the increased workflow, but instead a substantive one, as Hungary
aims to directly exchange the free movement documents to national long-term residence
permits once the length of stay of a  UK citizen or family member in Hungary reaches
a continuous three years.
This Hungarian approach also leads us to another major question, as Regulation
1030/2002 only sets out provisions regarding the format of the document, but Member States
simply stating that they aim to issue this type of document does not give a hint of what
conditions will be required or what rights will be provided for those exchanging their status for
the specific national one. Based on the WA, Member States shall ensure that UK citizens and their
family members will continue to enjoy, among others, residence and employment rights.
One condition that Member States are expected to check with regard to all applications
is whether the applicant is a threat to public policy, public security or national security.43
Second, there is usually a requirement of a certain length of continuous residence set out not
only by the EU Long-Term Residence Directive,44 but also by national schemes that could be
applied parallel to the EU long-term regime. Member States may lift the national requirement
(this is not an option in the case of the EU Long-Term Residence Directive) as UK citizens and
their family members already enjoy the rights that such permanent residence permits usually
grant for third-country nationals. On the other hand, when exchanging the previous
document to a permit issued in the common format of Regulation 1030/2002, Member States
might still insist on verifying the required length of residence in order to avoid temporarily
staying UK citizens, such as students, acquiring a life-long residence right without the actual
intention to stay in the particular Member State permanently. This would be a similar option
to the one chosen by the UK by distinguishing between pre-settled and settled status.
As for administrative issues, with respect to lengthy transition periods, it needs to be
ensured that, apart from the issuing Member State, all other Member States recognise those
documents that serve as temporary residence documents during the transition period also as
residence permits verifying residence rights in the Schengen area when crossing external
borders. These documents could be those issued previously in line with Directive 2004/38/EC
but still declared valid during the transition, or new documents, even if they do not hold many
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43 See Töttős Ágnes, ‘A közrendre, közbiztonságra veszélyesség uniós szabályozása a legális migráció területén 
(EU law on threats to public order and public security in the area of legal migration)’ in Pécsi Határőr Tudományos
Közlemények XIII. (2012, Pécs) 285–297.
44 The EU Long-Term Residence Directive requires five years of continuous residence.
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security elements. Regardless of the wide ranging variations Member States may choose, such
documents need to be notified in line with Article 39(1)(a) of the Schengen Borders Code.45
4 Future Relationship
Free movement ends at the end of the transition period; therefore, unless the transition period
is extended or the UK and EU decide to sign a separate treaty as part of the future relationship
extending free movement in the future, much stricter immigration rules will apply to those
intending to gain new residence rights in the territory of the other party. Therefore, national
and EU rules need to be examined in order to see what happens when a national from the
other party intends to gain a new entry and residence right after the withdrawal.
Based on primary law [Article 79 (1)–(2) of TFEU] several sectoral Directives have been
adopted so far to harmonise the rules of entry and stay of third-country nationals aiming to
reside for purposes such as family reunification,46 long-term residence,47 studies, research,48
traineeship,49 seasonal work,50 highly-skilled work51 or being intra-corporate transferees.52
Nevertheless, on the one hand, Member States are provided with a degree of flexibility as
a result of the several optional clauses in the Directive, and on the other hand, Member States’
national competence is preserved where the purposes of stay are not harmonised at EU level.
Furthermore, a major national competence is guaranteed by primary law, as TFEU 79(5) sets
out the following: ‘This Article shall not affect the right of Member States to determine
volumes of admission of third-country nationals coming from third countries to their territory
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45 Regulation (EU) 2016/399 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 2016 on a Union Code on
the rules governing the movement of persons across borders (Schengen Borders Code), OJ L 77, 23.3.2016.
46 Council Directive 2003/86/EC of 22 September 2003 on the right to family reunification [2003] OJ L 251/12.
47 Council Directive 2003/109/EC of 25 November 2003 concerning the status of third-country nationals who are
long-term residents [2004] OJ L 16/44, amended by Directive 2011/51/EU of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 11 May 2011 amending Council Directive 2003/109/EC to extend its scope to beneficiaries of
international protection [2011] OJ L 132/1.
48 Researchers’ status has been dealt with under EU legislation since 2005. Illés, Sándor, Gellérné, Lukács Éva,
‘Towards researcher mobility’ (2007) (Special issue) Európai Tükör 139–155.
49 Directive (EU) 2016/801 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2016 on the conditions of
entry and residence of third-country nationals for the purposes of research, studies, training, voluntary service,
pupil exchange schemes or educational projects and au pairing [2016] OJ L 132/21.
50 Directive 2014/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on the conditions of
entry and stay of third-country nationals for the purpose of employment as seasonal workers [2014] OJ L 94/37.
See Ágnes Töttős, ‘The Past, the Present and the Future of the Seasonal Workers Directive’ (2014) (1) Pécs Journal
of International and European Law 45–60.
51 Council Directive 2009/50/EC of 25 May 2009 on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals
for the purposes of highly qualified employment [2009] OJ L 155/17.
52 Directive 2014/66/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 on the conditions of entry
and residence of third-country nationals in the framework of an intra-corporate transfer [2014] OJ L 157/1. See
Ágnes Töttős, ‘Negotiations in the Council’ in Paul E. Minderhoud, Tesseltje de Lange (eds), The Intra Corporate
Transferee Directive. Central Themes, Problem Issues and Implementation in Selected Member States (Wolf Legal
Publishers 2018, Oisterwijk) 5–17.
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in order to seek work, whether employed or self-employed.’ Consequently, the actual
management, especially that of labour migration, is primarily in the hands of individual
Member States, and therefore UK citizens will have to face 27 diverging systems when trying
to figure out the future rules should no preferential immigration system be set up between the
UK and the EU for newly arriving citizens of the other party.53
As regards the British plans, the UK already made it clear in July 2018 that it would design
a system that works for all parts of the UK and that UK would welcome workers because ‘This
will be crucial to supporting its public services, as well as enhancing the UK’s attractiveness
for research, development and innovation.’54 In its paper in December 201855 the UK
confirmed its intention to base its future immigration system on skills. In December 2019,
Prime Minister Boris Johnson told Sky56 that the UK intends to use an Australian style points
based system in which there would be three categories of visas in the future – one for highly
skilled that is ‘exceptional talents’; one for skilled workers with job offers in sectors including
the NHS; and a time-limited visa for lower-skilled migrants who will ‘come to do particular
jobs and stay for a while.’ 
Presently non-EEA citizens wanting to move to the UK to work or study need to apply for
one of a number of visas that range from Tier 1, preserved for investors and ‘exceptional talent’,
to Tier 5 visas for short-term voluntary and educational programmes. The two most common
are the Tier 2 skilled worker visas and Tier 4 student visas. Some of these visas allow people to
apply to bring dependants, such as children and partners. Visas work on a points-based system,
in which people get more points for higher salaries or if their job is on the list of shortage
occupations, and most visas come with other conditions, including knowledge of English, the
need for a sponsor and agreeing not to claim benefits for a period of time. The criteria have
become tougher in recent years: for example, for a Tier 2 ‘experienced skilled worker’ visa,
people now need to be paid at least £30,000 to apply, up almost £10,000 from 2011.57
The Migration Advisory Committee (MAC) published its report on salary thresholds
and points-based systems on 28 January 2020,58 then a policy paper on the UK’s points-based
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53 On 29 March 2019 the outcome of the Fitness Check on the EU Legislation on Legal Migration was adopted, the
relevant documents are available here: <https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/legal-migration/
fitness-check_en> accessed 9 January 2020.
54 UK Government, ‘Political declaration on the future relationship between the United Kingdom and the European
Union’ July 2018, <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_
data/file/786626/The_Future_Relationship_between_the_United_Kingdom_and_the_European_Union_120319.pdf>
accessed 6 June 2019, para 74–75.
55 UK Government, ‘The UK’s future skills-based immigration system’ December 2018, <https://assets.publishing.
service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/766465/The-UKs-future-skills-based-
immigration-system-print-ready.pdf> accessed 6 June 2019.
56 Sophy Ridge on Sunday, interview with Boris Johnson, 8 December 2019, <https://www.skygroup.sky/
corporate/media-centre/articles/en-gb/Sophy-Ridge-on-Sunday-Boris-Johnson> accessed 8 January 2020.
57 ‘UK immigration: No preference for EU workers after Brexit, cabinet agrees’ 25 September 2018,
<https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-45634901> accessed 6 June 2019.
58 See <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/migration-advisory-committee-mac-report-points-based-
system-and-salary-thresholds> accessed 26 March 2020.
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immigration system59 was presented on 19 February 2020. A number of MAC’s recommenda -
tions were accepted, including to lower the general salary threshold to £25,600, while under
the points-based system for skilled workers, applicants will be able to ‘trade’ characteristics
such as their specific job offer and qualifications against a lower salary. There will continue
to be different arrangements for a small number of occupations where the salary threshold will
be based on published pay scales, and the UK intends to set the requirements for new entrants
30% lower than the rate for experienced workers in any occupation. On 5 March 2020 the
UK Government presented the Immigration and Social Security Co-ordination (EU With -
drawal) Bill60 paving the way for ending free movement system with the EU, strengthening
border security, and laying the foundation for a new UK points-based immigration system.
In an Annex to Council decision authorising the opening of negotiations with the UK for
a new partnership agreement the EU dedicates a complete chapter to mobility (Chapter 9),
although the aim of setting out a close relationship as regards legal migration between the
departed parties cannot be found in the document. Instead, the EU’s negotiation mandate
only talks about envisaged partnership that should aim at setting out conditions for entry and
stay for purposes such as research, study, training and youth exchanges.61 Nevertheless, the
UK’s approach to negotiations contains no foreseen partnership regarding legal migration.62
III Issues of Illegal Migration and Asylum
1 The Return of Illegally Staying Migrants
At the end of 2010, the common rules on return were set out by the so-called Return Directive
(Directive 2009/52/EC),63 which provides for clear, transparent and fair common rules for
the return and removal of irregularly staying migrants, the use of coercive measures, detention
and re-entry, while fully respecting the human rights and fundamental freedoms of the
persons concerned. On 12 September 2018 the Commission proposed the recast64 of this
Directive as a part of a package of measures following up the European Council of 28 June
2018 that underlined the need to step up the effective return of irregular migrants significantly,
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and welcomed the intention of the Commission to make legislative proposals for a more
effective and coherent European return policy. 
Nevertheless, the UK is not bound by the present Return Directive either, as a result of its
opt-out. The United Kingdom did not opt into the previous version of the Directive, adopted
in 2008, on the basis that it did not deliver the strong returns regime required by the UK and
made the process overly bureaucratic according to its official position.65 The UK believes this
continues to be the case though it recognises that the recast seeks to establish clearer returns
procedures and includes a number of additional provisions to those set out in the previous
version of the Directive. Nevertheless, in its justification not to opt in, it is stated that UK return
procedures have continued to be a success in comparison to those of other EU Member States,
with strong relationships with third countries and new initiatives such as biometric returns. 
One of the reasons for the low rate of effective return among migrants who have been
ordered to leave the EU is the lack of cooperation from some third countries in identifying and
readmitting their nationals. This is why the EU cooperates very actively with the home
countries of irregular migrants, in particular through so-called readmission agreements. The
4 December 2018 Communication of the Commission on the ‘Progress under the European
Agenda on Migration’66 acknowledged that the EU’s return policy would not be effective
without operational cooperation with third countries and ‘although readmission is a sensitive
political topic in many countries of origin, a cooperative approach has helped operationalise
third countries’ obligations on readmission.’67 In line with this cooperative approach, the EU
has been negotiating formal readmission agreements as well as less formal operational
arrangements with the more reluctant third countries. As a result of these efforts, the EU
presently has 17 readmission agreements68 and 6 operational arrangements.69
The LIBE Committee of the European Parliament had a brief study prepared on ‘The
implications of the UK’s withdrawal from the EU on readmission cooperation’70 that examines
the consequences of the UK’s decision to withdraw from the European Union (EU) on the EU’s
readmission policy, as well as the framework for relevant future cooperation between the UK
and the EU in this area. The study concludes that while the UK’s withdrawal will have a limited
effect on the EU as regards readmission, the implications for the UK of its withdrawal from
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the EU are far greater, as EU readmission agreements and mixed agreements containing
readmission clauses will cease to apply to the UK following its withdrawal. 
This implies that the UK not only needs to negotiate its own readmission agreements
with the relevant third countries, but the geographical proximity and migration patterns will
necessitate continuing cooperation between the EU and UK on readmission. It also suggests
that a readmission clause pertaining to the readmission of their own nationals should be
included in the future EU–UK relationship agreement alongside an EU–UK readmission
agreement covering third country nationals and stateless persons.
2 Asylum Policy
UK is signatory to the 1951 Geneva Convention on the Status of Refugees71 and the 1967
Protocol,72 and has ratified both. The Maastricht Treaty had made asylum an EU matter,
albeit within the framework of intergovernmental cooperation, yet under the Treaty of
Amsterdam, asylum became an area of supranational EU competence, thereby establishing the
foundations for a Common European Asylum System (hereinafter also referred to as CEAS).
The CEAS is a  legislative framework established by the EU. Based on “accordance” with the
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (Refugee Convention) as amended by its 1967
Protocol, the CEAS regulates and sets common standards in the field of international protection
with a view to developing common concepts and criteria, and harmonising the interpretation and
application of asylum law among EU Member States.73
The first phase of the CEAS included secondary legislation enacted between 2000 and 2005
based on defining common minimum standards to which Member States were to adhere in
connection with the reception of asylum-seekers (Reception Conditions Directive);74
qualification for international protection and the content of the protection granted
(Qualifications Directive);75 and procedures for granting and withdrawing refugee status
(Asylum Procedures Directive).76
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The issue of secondary movement was first addressed in legislative form by the 1990 Dublin
Convention, which set criteria for determining the State responsible for examining asylum
applications lodged in one of the Member States of the European Communities. The Dublin system
presupposed a  similar treatment of asylum applicants and refugees in Member States. Such
harmonisation of Member States’ asylum law was first pursued through intergovernmental
cooperation under the 1992 Maastricht Treaty (Title VI on cooperation in the field of Justice and
Home Affairs).77
Nevertheless, the first phase of CEAS also reformed the Dublin Convention, resulting in the
so-called Dublin II Regulation;78 furthermore, legislation was also adopted that established the
Eurodac database for storing and comparing fingerprint data in order to provide a successful
implementation of the Dublin system.79
However, the Hague Programme80 in 2004 already declared that the first phase of the
CEAS should be quickly followed by a  second phase of development, with a  change of
emphasis from minimum standards to a common asylum procedure on the basis of a uniform
protection status. Consequently, the recast of all the elements of the CEAS was negotiated and
adopted by 2013. Nevertheless, when it comes to EU asylum policies, the UK currently
combines the best of both worlds. On the one hand, it has not opted into most of the second
phase reforms. While the UK had opted into the first round of legislation (2000-2005), it
decided to not opt into the recast of these directives (2008–2013),81 in order to maintain its
national rules the UK chose not to participate in the corresponding second phase CEAS
instruments due to concerns over the limits they would place on its national system. As
a result, the UK remained bound by the directives adopted as part of the first phase of the
CEAS, as these directives established minimum standards and allowed Member States a large
degree of flexibility in implementation. EU asylum harmonisation had indeed entailed
liberalisations against the will of some Member States, and the UK made use of its right to opt
out, in part to protect restrictive practices, such as ‘detained fast track’, which would not have
been in line with the EU’s policies.
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On the other hand, the UK opted into the recast Dublin Regulation (Dublin III).82 It was
an essential interest of the UK to cooperate with the Member States regarding the fight against
illegal secondary movements and the phenomenon of asylum shopping. The UK has therefore
participated in the Dublin system since it was inaugurated as a Convention in 1990. The most
recent iteration of the agreement, Dublin III, decides which nation is responsible for
processing asylum claims, which is usually the first country of entry in the EU. With asylum-
seekers usually coming from the Middle East and Africa, being geographically located in the
North-West of the EU entailed a very favourable position for the UK under the Dublin
Regulation. Unless an asylum-seeker has close family in the UK or a visa from the UK, the UK
is not in charge of processing an application.
It is, of course, difficult to predict what the exact implications of leaving the Common
European Asylum System will be for the UK. Even when the UK has left the EU, it will still
‘benefit’ from restrictive border policies, such as the EU–Turkey deal,83 the closure of the
Balkan route and Frontex operations aimed at deterring irregular migrants and asylum-
seekers. However, leaving the Dublin Regulation might imply that the UK is less able to control
the immigration of third-country nationals, particularly asylum-seekers; therefore leaving
Dublin leaves the UK in a position of weakness vis-à-vis its European partners.
While the role of the Dublin Regulation as an effective instrument for controlling the immigration
of third country nationals has often been questioned, given the wave-throughs from border
countries, policy-makers from North-Western EU Member States, including the UK, have always
wanted to keep it. They usually highlight two reasons for doing so. First, they felt that Dublin sent
a signal to asylum-seekers that they would not be able to choose where to apply for asylum. Second,
policy-makers argued that Dublin would also send a signal to voters that governments are in control
of migration.84
3 Implications of the UK Leaving the Common European Asylum System
‘Overall, the international asylum law rules are fragmented in various ways: the UN Refugee
Convention only applies to certain issues, and has no enforcement mechanism; the ECHR
case law is ad hoc and indirect; and while the EU asylum laws are potentially more coherent
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than the other two sources, only some of those EU laws apply to the UK.’85 Even if the UK has
a selective relationship regarding CEAS, leaving the EU could still have significant implications
for British asylum policy, as was also extensively examined by the European Union Committee
of the House of Lords.86 The Committee’s report identified two main areas where concerns
arise: one related to the UK’s departure from the Dublin system, the other one is the potential
impact of Brexit on the UK’s bilateral relationships, especially as regards effective cooperation
with French and Belgian border agencies. 
As regards the UK’s participation in the Dublin system, the figures87 show that a larger
number of Dublin transfers to the UK were under Articles 8 and 9 of the Regulation: under
certain conditions, the applications of some of those in EU countries, whose relatives are
already in the UK, should be dealt with by the UK. In contrast, a larger number of transfers
out were under Article 13, which mandates that asylum seekers who move on after being
registered in a country of first arrival can be returned to that country. The Committee’s report
points out the negative consequences regarding both directions of Dublin transfers: 
UK withdrawal from the Dublin System after Brexit would result in the loss of a safe, legal route for
the reunification of separated refugee families in Europe. Vulnerable unaccompanied children
would find their family reunion rights curtailed, as Dublin offers them the chance to be reunited
with a broader range of family members than under current UK Immigration Rules. […] After
Brexit, the UK is also likely to find it more difficult to enforce the principle that people in need of
protection should claim asylum in the first safe country that they reach. Without access to the
Eurodac database, it is unclear how the UK would be able to identify asylum applicants who have
already been registered in another European country. And a new returns agreement (or agreements)
would be needed for the UK to be able to send asylum seekers back to their first point of entry to
the EU.88
In a reference for preliminary ruling,89 even the potential impact of Brexit on the present
implementation of the provisions of the Dublin III Regulation before the withdrawal was
examined. S.A. and M.A. challenged the transfer decision before the International Protection
Appeals Tribunal of Ireland, primarily on the basis of Article 17 of the Dublin III Regulation and
on grounds relating to the withdrawal of the UK from the EU. By way of derogation from
Article 3(1), Article 17(1) of that regulation provides that each Member State may decide to
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examine an application for international protection lodged with it by a third-country national
or a stateless person, even if that examination is not its responsibility under the so-called
Dublin criteria. In its judgement,90 the CJEU finds it clear from the wording of Article 17(1) of
the Dublin III Regulation that that provision is optional in so far it leaves it to the discretion
of each Member State to decide to examine an application for international protection.
It therefore implies that, regardless of a fear that might exist in certain applicants that their
rights may be in danger because of being transferred to the UK that is in the process of
withdrawal from the EU, no Member State could be forced to apply the discretionary clause
as it is the exclusive right of the Member State. We could also add to the reasoning of the
Court that such fears are not necessarily justified by the withdrawal of the UK, as we could
see that the UK is already bound by a lower level of guarantees under EU law.
4 Future Relationship
‘Irregular migrants and asylum-seekers will encounter a lot of practical and legal barriers
when trying to enter the UK. Some of the practical obstacles – such as geographic location –
will obviously remain, but some of the legal obstacles, especially those resulting from the
Dublin Regulation, will disappear, and potentially make the UK less able to control the migration
of third-country nationals.’91 Nevertheless, at least in the short term, Brexit has an impact on
illegal movements, as border officials had noticed a  clear trend during interviews with
recently-arrived asylum seekers and migrants, who said smugglers had warned them that the
window of opportunity to cross into Britain would close after Brexit.92 In the future, the UK
will not only have to put much diplomatic effort into negotiating readmission agreements
with third countries, but it may also wish to include the issue of return and readmission in the
area of its future relationship with the EU. The European Parliament also recommended93
that it would be beneficial for the EU to include a readmission clause in the future relationship
agreement alongside the negotiation of an EU-UK readmission agreement, which would
extend not only to own nationals, but to third-country nationals as well.
In its paper on several areas of the future relationship94 the UK dedicated a separate sub-
section to issues of asylum and illegal migration (2.5.1), while stating that ‘it is vital that the
UK and the EU establish a new, strategic relationship to address the global challenges of
asylum and illegal migration.’ The UK also proposed a  ‘comprehensive, “whole of route”
approach that includes interventions at every stage of the migrant journey and to ensure that
no new incentives are created to make dangerous journeys to Europe.’ According to the British
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paper, it should, inter alia, cover ongoing operational cooperation, for example working with
Frontex to strengthen the EU’s external border, and Europol to combat organised immigration
crime; a new legal framework to return illegal migrants and asylum-seekers to a country they
have travelled through or have a connection with, based on a clear legal structure, facilitated
by access to Eurodac or an equivalent system; new arrangements that enable unaccompanied
asylum-seeking children in the EU to join close family members in the UK, where it is in their
best interests and vice versa; a continued strategic partnership to address the drivers of illegal
migration by investing and building cooperation in source and transit countries; and
continued UK participation in international dialogues with European and African partners.
It therefore seems that the UK wishes to maintain active cooperation with the EU, and
even more so wishes to somehow be a part of the implementation of certain elements of the
EU acquis. This was also confirmed in July 2018 by the Political Declaration on the future
relationship, which states that 
The Parties will cooperate to tackle illegal migration, including its drivers and its consequences,
whilst recognising the need to protect the most vulnerable. This cooperation will cover: 
a) operational cooperation with Europol to combat organised immigration crime; b) working with
the European Border and Coastguard Agency to strengthen the Union’s external border; and 
c) dialogue on shared objectives and cooperation, including in third countries and international
fora, to tackle illegal migration upstream.95
The House of Lords European Union Committee in its report in November 2019 was also of the
opinion that ‘it is vital that refugees and asylum seekers are considered in any agreement on
the future UK–EU relationship’ and highlighted that this ‘asylum cooperation should take the
Dublin System as its starting point and would ideally be based on continued UK access to 
the Eurodac database.’96 However, as regards the involvement of the UK in the implementa -
tion of the Dublin system and Eurodac, I see two major obstacles. First of all, the Dublin
system and access to Eurodac is only provided to non-EU states that are Schengen associate
states, but not to other third countries. Second, the modification of the Dublin system,97 as
one of the key elements of a wider asylum reform package, is presently being negotiated,
although unsuccessfully.98
The UK Government, exactly because of the most debated element, the relocation system,
has decided not to opt in to the EU proposal for the Dublin IV Regulation as ‘the proposed
Dublin IV Regulation binds Member States to participate in a quota-based distribution
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scheme.’99 The House of Lord European Union Committee nevertheless suggests that the UK
Government should reconsider participating in a responsibility sharing mechanism for asylum
seekers, yet even this recommendation makes it conditional on the system operating on
a voluntary basis.100
However, there is one particular issue in which the UK aims to negotiate with the EU as
part of the future relationship. Section 17 (Family unity for those seeking asylum or other
protection in Europe) of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act adopted in 2018 set out the
obligation for the minister to negotiate an agreement with the EU under which, after Brexit,
an unaccompanied child who has made an application for international protection to
a member State may, if it is in the child’s best interests, come to the UK to join a relative who
is a lawful resident of the UK, or has made a protection claim which has not been decided,
and an unaccompanied child in the UK, who has made a  protection claim, may go to
a Member State to join a relative there, in equivalent circumstances.101 Nevertheless, the new
European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Act 2020 removes the obligation to agree a deal
and only requires a government minister to make a statement setting out policy on the subject
within two months.102
In line with the UK’s situation described above, the negotiation mandate of the UK sets
out its interest regarding two issues related to future relationship with the EU in the area of
asylum and illegal Migration. First, the UK makes a specific commitment to seek to negotiate
a reciprocal agreement for family reunion of unaccompanied children seeking asylum in either
the EU or the UK, with specified family members in the UK or the EU, where this is in the
child’s best interests [Section 54]. Second, the UK indicates its openness to an agreement
regulating asylum and migrant returns between the UK and the EU, or alternatively with
individual Member States, underpinned by data sharing, to help counter illegal migration and
deter misuse of our asylum systems [Section 55].
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IV Conclusions
After a detailed examination of the extent to which EU acquis on asylum and migration
applies to the UK, it is easy to agree with the following statement of Professor Peers: 
While some in the 2016 referendum campaign falsely claimed or implied that the UK has no control
over its borders as an EU Member State, in fact the UK has an opt out from the EU’s Schengen
system of (in principle) open internal borders, as well as an opt out on EU law on asylum,
immigration and criminal law. In practice, the UK only opted in to some EU asylum laws: all of the
first phase laws, but only some of the second phase laws (Dublin, Eurodac and the asylum
agency).103
On the other hand, as the mobility of EU citizens does not belong to the EU policy on Justice
and Home Affairs, but instead is a key component of the internal market, where the UK does
not presently enjoy opt-out rights, the control the UK actually wished to take back was not
in the realm of immigration. It was in the field of free movement of persons, a cornerstone of
the EU, and as a  result the UK is even in the process of giving up on its membership.
Nevertheless, only ‘new immigration’ could be covered by a more restrictive policy by the
EU, while EU citizens already in the territory of the UK and their family members have
acquired extensive residence and equal treatment rights that need to be preserved. 
Consequently, extensive tasks arise on both sides of the English Channel as regards
protection of citizens’ rights: designing, legislating, administering communicating and
enforcing. A number of concerns regarding the UK’s Settlement Scheme have already arisen,
such as the lack of physical document attesting the status, the ambiguity of proper assessment
of the length of stay, and whether the procedure is properly available for all EU citizens and
family members, especially the most vulnerable ones, and consequently, how harsh
consequences would those not applying in due time need to face. 
While it is true that about half of the EU27 Member States also opted for requiring the
change of status to a national one similarly to the UK, their aim is supposedly to be able to
issue a  document with biometric data used for third-country nationals in the EU, thus
safeguarding the effective retention of rights in line with the WA. 
Apart from ensuring the future enjoyment of acquired rights and designing and
implementing its national system accordingly, the UK and the EU27 should also start
envisioning the elements of a future relationship in the area of migration and asylum. The
UK and the EU will not stop facing common challenges in this regard, and the lack of
European solutions will inevitably affect the situation of the UK. Therefore, the area of fighting
illegal migration and the abuse of asylum systems while protecting the most vulnerable ones
could be a policy area where close cooperation would have major significance for both the EU
and the UK. 
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Nevertheless, a divorce is a major change in any partnership, regardless of the parties’
good intentions, as Commission President Ursula von der Leyen also expressed it:
The bonds between us will still be unbreakable. We will still contribute to each other’s societies, like
so many Brits have done in the EU, and as so many EU citizens do here every day in the UK. […]
But the truth is that our partnership cannot and will not be the same as before. And it cannot and
will not be as close as before – because with every choice comes a consequence. With every decision
comes a trade-off.104
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I Introduction
As the EU Commissioner for Security Union, Julian King, remarked in June 2018,1
maintaining the closest – and as efficient as possible – police and security cooperation after
Brexit is undoubtedly a  key interest of both the European Union (EU) and the United
Kingdom (UK), with a view to safeguarding the security of UK and EU citizens in a world
constantly threatened by international terrorism.2 Latest events have demonstrated that
negotiations in the field of security cover one of the ‘hottest’ areas in the Brexit process.3 As
known, a treaty between the EU and the UK on security matters may represent the future
scenario, but its concrete framing is not free from doubts, uncertainties and debatable issues
that are being discussed at the political and institutional level.
As early as in December 2016, the European Union Committee of the UK House of Lords
published a report4 in which it already pointed out the outstanding areas for future security
cooperation between the UK government and the EU at the end of the UK’s exit process. Such
key issues are agencies and mechanisms to share crucial intelligence and information on criminal
activities (such as Europol and Eurojust); data sharing systems for law enforcement purposes (the
main reference here is to the second Generation Schengen Information System, Passenger
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Name Records and the Prüm database); and criminal justice tools (the European Arrest
Warrant is certainly the major one, but others can be mentioned, such as the European
Investiga tion Order).
This paper focuses on the first mentioned area and, specifically, on the sharing of
intelligence information and how it might be dealt with after Brexit. To this aim, this research
is divided as follows. 
Section II engages in the examination of the state of the art with regard to the UK’s role
in security cooperation. The aim of this Section is to provide the reader with a clear idea of
how crucial the issue is and how decisive the UK’s involvement proved to be over the years.
In doing so, particular attention is paid to activities pertaining to the Europol area. 
Section III focuses on feasible patterns of cooperation in the Europol initiative after the
final exit deal. It considers potentially applicable schemes of Europol-third country
partnerships with a view to a critical assessment of whether (or not) they could suit the UK’s
position after Brexit. In doing so, a number of factors are taken into account, such as the fact
that the UK is a major contributor of data to Europol; the accountability of Europol to the
Court of Justice of the EU (ECJ); the need to take EU legislation and case law on data
protection and budgetary issues into account. 
Section IV hence assesses what is concretely being done. As is generally known, the UK
government proposed to negotiate a treaty with the EU, aimed at providing a legal basis for
future security cooperation. The way in which security issues may be influenced by the general
Withdrawal Agreement, still at the draft stage, is considered as well. 
Finally, some concluding remarks take stock of the findings that emerged in Sections
I, II and III and consider them in light of concrete potential effects in the future. The
claim of this paper is that the framing of mechanisms aimed at accessing and sharing
security information through participation to agencies such as Europol should be
prioritised even over other – undoubtedly vital – areas of security cooperation. This need
appears to be shared also by the UK political environment. Hence, is the negotiation of
an ‘omnibus’ treaty the best solution possible to serve such an aim? Would there be more
efficient – and equally feasible – ways to ensure the maintenance of the UK’s role in
intelligence sharing in the aftermath of its exit from the EU? Such questions are discussed
in this research, which tries to answer them and highlights some points that cannot be
set aside if the UK wishes to avoid a decrease in its own and the EU’s level of security after
its departure. 
II The UK and Security Cooperation: The State of the Art
The main EU tool aimed at protecting security by countering trans-border criminal activities
is cooperation in the area of Justice and Home Affairs (JHA). Cooperation on such issues has
existed since 1975, when member states established an intergovernmental committee aimed
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at coordinating counter-terrorism policies after the attacks perpetrated by terrorist
organisations during the Olympic Games held in Munich in 1972.5
In 1993, what used to be a mere working group established by interior ministers of the
member states6 was institutionalised through the Treaty of Maastricht, bringing Justice and
Home Affairs Cooperation within the Third Pillar.7 Further developments can be traced to the
entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam that, in 1999, renamed the Third Pillar ‘Police and
Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters’ and shifted issues such as immigration, border
control and asylum to the First Pillar. As is widely known, the Treaty of Lisbon, which entered
into force in 2009, abolished the previously existing pillar structure and substantively re-
structured the EU Treaties, now existing in their consolidated version.8 The main innovation
that the Lisbon Treaty brought with regard to JHA cooperation is that many of its areas are
now addressed through the ordinary legislative procedure with the qualified majority voting
of the Council and full co-legislative role of the European Parliament (EP). It has not been
always like that, since, before 2009, such issues were dealt with through a procedure in which
the EP had only a consultative role and member states could exercise a veto on such matters.
Even more importantly, the Treaty of Lisbon subjected JHA matters to the judicial review of
the ECJ. This was not possible before, since they used to escape the review of the ECJ as well
as the Commission’s powers – meaning that the Commission had no way of triggering an
infringement procedure if member states failed to comply with such measures. Notably,
‘Europol’s structure, operation, field of action and tasks’ are among the JHA matters that the
Treaty of Lisbon subjected to the ordinary legislative procedure.9
Since this paper focuses on the UK, some remarks on such country’s stance with regard
to JHA are essential. Together with Ireland, the UK decided that its participation to JHA
measures should not be automatic. To this aim, it negotiated Protocol 21 to the Lisbon
Treaty.10 Protocol 21 is defined as an ‘opt-in’ instrument. Pursuant to it, the UK can choose
on a case-by-case basis whether it wants to participate in the adoption and application of any
proposed JHA measures. This decision is not a prerogative of the government, since procedures
ensuring parliamentary scrutiny are envisaged. The UK government traditionally took
a positive stance towards JHA cooperation,11 recognising it as a key initiative to enhance
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security and tackle issues such as immigration and cross-border crimes. This is demonstrated
by the high number of opt-in decisions in JHA initiatives taken by the UK in recent years.
Nonetheless, in July 2013, the UK government decided to opt out from all measures
connected to this field adopted before the Lisbon Treaty12 and simultaneously re-join 35 of
them, accepting both the enforcement powers of the European Commission and the
jurisdiction of the ECJ on their implementation.13
1 EU—UK Cooperation in Security Matters Nowadays: A General Overview
Focusing on the tools and mechanisms related to cooperation in the area of security to which
the UK currently takes part, the following can be considered as the most important ones: the
EAW;14 Europol and Eurojust; the Schengen Information System; the European Criminal
Record Information System; the Prüm system; and the legal instruments aimed at the transfer
and management of Passenger Name Record (PNR) data, both with regard to the EU scheme
– i.e. Directive 2016/68115 – and agreements with third countries.16
As stated before, the UK decision to join such measures and initiatives, although it had
the chance to avoid involvement in them – by way of Protocol 2117 – was based on a positive
evaluation of their beneficial effect on the UK itself. Additionally, there is clear evidence18
that benefits are mutual: other EU countries derive significant advantages from the UK’s
participation in police and security cooperation. These are all factors that deserve to be taken
into account in assessing the effects of the UK’s departure on the ‘security rate’ of the European
area. Moreover, this evidently shows that cooperation between the EU and the UK on these
matters should be perpetuated and, if possible, kept to the same level as nowadays. And
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indeed, in September 2017, the UK Prime Minister, Theresa May, suggested the possibility of
a ‘transition period’,19 immediately after exit, in which all security measures entered into by
the UK would not cease to apply. Although the Withdrawal Agreement20 takes this view into
consideration and provides for a  transition period, its concrete framing looks more like
a situation in which the UK would retain burdens associated with being part of these measures
without enjoying privileges deriving from them. Such circumstance will be better explained
further in this analysis. 
Before focusing on the UK’s role within Europol, it is worth setting the general context
of the UK’s involvement in EU security policies. This is instrumental in understanding the
added value of having the UK has a contributor to the above-listed measures regarding
security cooperation. In oral evidence held before the UK House of Lords, a number of experts
shed light on the importance of the UK’s role in security and police cooperation in each of
these areas. Their findings, synthesising why the UK’s withdrawal would result in a significant
loss for the EU’s security framework, can be divided into two main groups. 
First, from a general perspective, such reports revealed that some of the measures adopted
within the security cooperation framework were strongly influenced by the UK approach, which
played an outstanding role in shaping them. A clear example is the PNR Directive,21 which was
adopted in 2016. In such context, the rapporteur was Lord Kirkhope of Harrogate – who is
a former MEP for Yorkshire and the Humber – and the UK was a great source of inspiration
for the framing of the EU PNR system. As a matter of fact, in 2011, i.e. when the Commission
issued its draft proposal for the directive, the UK was the only EU country having its own
national system for the collection and analysis of PNR data. It is not difficult to understand
that, as soon as the UK is out of the EU, it will no longer be able to exercise such influence in
debating forthcoming measures and set strategic objectives to be pursued through EU
legislation and policies regarding security matters. 
Second, the UK has great expertise in discovering threats to security – not comparable
to that of other EU member states – and is undoubtedly in a privileged position, being part
of the powerful ‘Five Eyes’ network.22 In other words, due to its participation in such a well-
known intelligence-sharing alliance with Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the US, it has
access to information that other EU countries are not able to retrieve by relying only on their
own capacities and sources. And, indeed, the director of the Government Communication
BREXIT AND SECURITY n
103 n
19 Rt Hon Theresa May MP, speech on ‘A new era of cooperation and partnership between the UK and the EU’
September 2017, <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pms-florence-speech-a-new-era-of-cooperation-
and-partnership-between-the-uk-and-the-eu> accessed 24 March 2019.
20 On the Withdrawal agreement and how it will be dealt with by UK domestic law, Marta Simoncini, ‘Part I: The
Uncertain Application of the EU Withdrawal Act 2018: From the Great Repeal to the Contingency Plan?’ IACL-
AIDC Blog, 6 August 2018, <https://blog-iacl-aidc.org/blog/2018/8/6/part-i-the-uncertain-application-
of-the-eu-withdrawal-act-2018-from-the-great-repeal-to-the-contingency-plan> accessed 24 March 2019.
21 See n 15.
22 David Jenkins, ‘The handling and disclosure of sensitive intelligence’ in Genevieve Lennon, Clive Walker (eds),
Routledge Handbook of Law and Terrorism (Routledge 2015) 266.
ELJ-2019-1__1.korr.  2020.05.20.  23:14  Page 103
Headquarters (GCHQ, i.e. one of the main British intelligence agencies),23 Jeremy Fleming,
has recently remarked that, only in the last year, the UK supplied essential information to
disrupt terrorist attacks that would have otherwise taken place in Europe.24
2 Focus on Europol Activities 
From the findings presented above, it is very clear that the UK’s core contribution to the field
of security – and so, in parallel, major losses that would derive from its exit from the EU – is
linked to intelligence information sharing. As a matter of fact, British advanced intelligence
expertise and privileged relations – thanks to its affiliation to the Five Eyes network – provide
major support to prevention activities carried out by EU agencies tasked with fighting
transnational crime and safeguarding EU citizens’ security. 
At the EU level, the most important body in charge of supporting and coordinating
intelligence gathering and sharing among EU member states is Europol. This agency allows
information exchange through a very sophisticated and secure platform (called SIENA and
working as a messaging facility) and it performs intelligence and forensic analyses. The main
database on which such information is located is called the Europol Information System (EIS).
Over recent years, Europol’s activities have increasingly been relying on cyber-intelligence.25 The
crime areas on which it focuses are multiple: from terrorism to piracy, to money laundering and
many other criminal activities that may need transnational cooperation if they are to be combated. 
Europol is headquartered in The Hague and was established in 1995 with the signing of
the Europol Convention in Brussels. The Convention came into force in 1998, after ratification
by all the EU member states. Europol became an EU agency only in 2009, when Council
Decision 2009/371/JHA26 replaced the 1995 Convention. This Decision was then superseded
by a new Europol Regulation, entered into force in May 2017.27
Although the UK had opted out from Europol in 2013 – as a consequence of the ‘block’
opt-out from pre-Lisbon JHA measures – it re-joined it immediately after, in December
2014.28 In 2016, the British government also decided to opt in to the new Europol Regulation,
mentioned above. 
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The latest available data on the UK’s contribution to Europol policies, projects and
operations was disclosed by the UK National Crime Agency in written evidence given to the
UK Parliament in February 2018.29 This data displays that in 2016 the UK was the second
highest contributor overall (Germany being the first) and the highest contributor in some
specific projects.30 Furthermore, Europol operational projects are very often led by the UK
itself.
III Existing Models of Cooperation Between Europol 
and Non-EU Partners 
After Brexit, the UK will become a fully-fledged non-EU country and so it will fall within the
category of ‘third countries’. According to the Europol Regulation,31 only EU member states
can be entitled to membership of that agency and, consequently, enjoy the privileges
stemming thereof. Nevertheless, the Regulation provides for two modalities aimed at building
relationships between Europol and third countries. The choice depends on the relationship
that Europol has with the third country at issue.32 These two forms of partnership are strategic
agreements and operational agreements. Indeed, a third option does exist. It is a unique
arrangement that Europol negotiated with Denmark, for reasons that will be clarified later. 
It is now necessary to focus on how these two categories of agreements – plus the ‘hybrid’
model represented by Europol-Denmark relationship – work. This analysis is essential in
order to assess whether they could be applied to the UK after Brexit to maintain efficient and
feasible cooperation with the ultimate aim of ensuring security. 
1 The ‘Third Country’ Model: Strategic Agreements and Operational
Agreements
The two above-mentioned forms of partnership represent two different schemes and,
although they may appear very similar, they differ as to the kind of the information that can
be accessed pursuant to each of the two categories. They can be described as follows. 
The conclusion of strategic agreements is the most basic form of cooperation. It allows
the exchange, between Europol and the third country at issue, of general intelligence
information. It could be information of a strategic or technical nature. Europol has strategic
agreements in place with China, Israel, Russia, Turkey and the United Arab Emirates. 
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The latter approach, consisting of operational agreements between Europol and third
countries, is more extensive. It allows the exchange of information to the same extent as
strategic agreements do, but also personal data is included among the information that can be
shared. Moreover, Europol’s operational partners can access most Europol services, such as
SIENA, and they can also have liaison officers at the Europol headquarters. Operational
agreements in place between Europol and third countries include those with Australia, Canada
and the US. According to Article 25 of Regulation 2016/794 – reforming provisions on
Europol’s activities, structure and governance –, operational agreements can only be concluded
when one of the following circumstances is met. The first scenario that makes operation
agreements possible is that the European Commission adopted a  so-called adequacy
decision,33 finding that the third country guarantees an ‘adequate level’ of data protection.
Alternatively, such deals are possible if the third country concluded an international
agreement on the basis of Article 218 TFEU34 ‘adducing adequate safeguards with respect to
the protection of privacy and fundamental rights and freedoms of individuals’. Article 25 also
states that existing operational agreements, concluded pursuant to the previous framework
– represented by the 2009 Decision – and before the entry into force of Regulation 2016/794
continue to be valid. Notably, all of the agreements between Europol and its operational
partners – being at present more than 20 – have been signed according to the 2009 rules.
Therefore, the provisions that entered into force in May 2017 have not yet been applied to
conclude these kinds of deals. 
2 ‘Tailor-Made’ Cooperation: The ‘Hybrid’ Model and the Danish Example
The two patterns for Europol-third country cooperation addressed in the previous point
represent the so-called third country model, which can be articulated in the two alternative
schemes of strategic agreements and operational agreements. Nonetheless, over the years,
Europol also set what can be defined as a ‘tailor-made’ model of cooperation. Indeed, this
exceptional event happened only once and in a very peculiar circumstance, not being the
country at issue – i.e. Denmark – a fully-fledged third country. This apparently odd situation
needs further explanation.
As known, Denmark is a member state of the EU. Nonetheless, its relationship with the
JHA area has never been smooth from the beginning for several reasons. With the Edinburgh
Agreement of December 1992, Denmark announced four opt-outs with regard to measures
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introduced by the Treaty of Maastricht. It opted out of monetary union; EU defence policy;
EU citizenship; and JHA cooperation. Nonetheless, Denmark was part of Europol for as long
as it operated under Council Decision 2009/371/JHA, to which it had decided to opt in.
However, after the Lisbon Treaty entered into force, Denmark negotiated Protocol No 22,
which represents a particularly strong form of opt-out, which can be defined as an ‘all-or-
nothing’ approach.35 According to Protocol No 22, Denmark does not take part in the
adoption of any post-Lisbon measures in the area of freedom, security and justice, unless it
notifies other member states that it wishes not to avail itself of the Protocol (thus accepting
the whole acquis of measures in this area). Since such an option had not been exercised when
the new Europol Regulation – repealing the 2009 Council Decision – was proposed, it became
evident that Denmark could no longer enjoy Europol membership, at least if it maintained the
existing opt-outs. Thus, in 2015, a national referendum was held in Denmark. Specifically,
people were asked whether they intended to keep the Danish opt-outs as they were, or they
preferred to convert such an inflexible clause to a case-by-case scheme, substantively similar
to the one adopted by the UK. Had people chosen the second option – i.e. a ‘flexible’ opt-out
regime – the Danish government could have decided on a  case-by-case basis whether
Denmark should participate in each proposed measure. However, Danish voters determined
that existing opt-outs should not be changed. At the same time, they rejected participation in
the new Europol regulation. Consequently, Denmark could no longer be a member of Europol,
having deliberately dismissed any possibility for its membership. 
That decision by the people of Denmark put the Danish government in a quite awkward
situation. On the one hand, the popular referendum was a legally binding one and its results
could not be overcome nor disregarded by the government; on the other hand, being cut off
from Europol represented an undeniable disadvantage for Denmark’s security.36 It should also
be borne in mind that in 2015 Denmark had been especially affected by the threat of terrorism
due to February 2015’s attacks in Copenhagen.37 Hence, Danish authorities immediately
sought an agreement with Europol. The deal was concluded in a very short timeframe:38 The
Europol Management Board authorised negotiations on 17 February 2017 and the agreement
was signed on 29 April 2017.39
Actually, the agreement concluded between Europol and Denmark is peculiar and may
resemble full membership to some extent, but it is not free from conditional clauses. For
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example, Denmark has to continue its membership in the EU and in Schengen. Moreover, in
order to maintain the agreement in place, Denmark is bound to keep accepting the ECJ’s
jurisdiction and the competence of the European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS). It has
to ensure continued implementation of the Directive on cooperation in police matters40 as well.
Any failure to perform any of these obligations shall result in the termination of Denmark-
Europol deal as currently framed. 
As to advantages that the agreement between Europol and Denmark carries with it, they
can be summarised as follows. First, Danish officers have the chance to access Europol data
through a 24-hour ‘contact point’. The exchange of information shall take place ‘without delay’.
Second, Denmark may be invited to Europol Management Board meeting. Nonetheless, it
cannot be provided with a right to vote. Third, Denmark has the power to assign up to eight
Danish-speaking staff to handle Danish requests. Fourth, is able to input and to retrieve data
from Danish authorities in the Europol processing systems.
3 The Applicability of Existing Patterns to the UK after Brexit
The Section above disclosed the ways available to Europol in order to manage its relationships
with third countries when cooperation is considered reciprocally vital. Yet are these schemes
applicable to the UK, once it will be out of the EU? And to what extent are they suitable to
meet the UK’s and EU’s need for security in a world at struggle with terrorism, but also with
other very serious crimes? The answer to the first question is quite predictable if one refers
to the third country model. Since the UK will become a fully-fledged third country, from
a legal point of view there is no reason why the two mentioned patterns – strategic and
operational agreements – could not be applied to it, as long as consensus is reached between
the British authorities and the Europol Management Board. Nevertheless, as to the feasibility
of a model similar to the one in place between Denmark and Europol, the following analysis
shows how some difficulties may arise, although it would not be impossible to negotiate such
a kind of deal. Answering the second question – i.e. the effectiveness of such a solution in
terms of ensuring security – is a much more challenging task. To try to give an answer, two
separate scenarios have to be considered. The first consists of assessing what would happen
if the UK negotiated an agreement according to the ‘third country model’. The second
evaluates how a deal similar to the one between Denmark and Europol would work, should
the UK and Europol decide to engage in the negotiation of a similar tool. 
Focusing on the ‘third country model’ – i.e. strategic or operational agreements –, there
are a number of aspects showing that such cooperation would not be sufficient to keep (at
least the essence of ) existing standards of interaction between the UK and Europol. This
proves true even if one takes into consideration that the most likely case would be the
conclusion of an operational agreement, which is a stronger and more extensive form of
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cooperation compared to strategic agreements. The inability of operational agreements to
ensure an adequate level of UK contribution to Europol is for a variety of reasons. First, although
third countries engaged in operational agreements do have a certain extent of access to Europol
information, this is not full access. Third countries can only channel information and
interrogate databases. Such limited access results in a delay in receiving information. Second,
no third country can lead an operational project, although it has been showed how crucial the
UK’s role is in coordinating such initiatives. Third, in spite of having some form of access to
information, third countries are never allowed to sit on the Europol Management Board.
Hence, the UK would be deprived of the possibility to contribute to setting strategic objectives
and priorities to be reached through Europol. It could not retain its right to vote either. Fourth,
keeping the UK out of the operational and management activities of Europol would mean
a decrease in the financial resources of the agency, since the UK’s contribution would be less
significant.
In sum, considering the UK as any other third country – Australia, the US and many
others – engaged in an operational partnership with Europol would result in a sharp decrease
of security for the whole European area.41
So, what about negotiating a ‘tailor-made’ agreement, as Denmark did? The legal feasibility
of an identical deal deserves more discussion than that necessary in relation to operational
agreements. As a matter of fact, such a kind of ‘bespoke’ agreement with Denmark was deemed
possible, since Denmark was ‘not leaving the EU’42 and was subject to a number of conditional
clauses, to which Denmark consented, such as the jurisdiction of the ECJ. Within the Brexit
negotiation process, the role of the ECJ is a very contested issue.43 The most controversial
point in this regard is that the ECJ is entitled to rule on any dispute between Europol and its
members.44 If the UK is freed of the ECJ’s review powers, the Court would lose any chance to
review such cases. It is quite unlikely that the Luxembourg court would be ready to accept
such a diminishment of its jurisdictional reach. In addition, since the agreement would have
to be preceded by an adequacy decision, this means that the UK should keep respecting the
core of EU data protection law at least, as interpreted by the ECJ’s recent decisions.45 Moreover,
BREXIT AND SECURITY n
109 n
41 Chloé Brière, ‘Cooperation of Europol and Eurojust with external partners in the fight against crime: what are
the challenges ahead?’ DCU Brexit Institute Working Paper no 1/2018.
42 Wainwright (n 38).
43 See on this issues Steve Peers, ‘Dispute settlement and the ECJ in the draft Withdrawal Agreement’ EU Law
Analysis, 9 March 2018, <http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.com/2018/03/dispute-settlement-and-ecj-in-draft.html>
accessed 24 March 2019. Rt Hon Theresa May MP, ‘Speech at Munich Security Conference’ 17 February 2018,
<https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pm-speech-at-munich-security-conference-17-february-2018>
accessed 24 March 2019.
44 Art 49, Regulation (EU) 2016/794 (n 27).
45 See the following landmark decisions on data protection and exchange: Joined Cases C-293/12 and C-594/12
Digital Rights Ireland Ltd v Minister for Communications, Marine and Natural Resources and Others and Kärntner
Landesregierung and Others [2014] ECR I-238; Case C-362/14 Maximillian Schrems v Data Protection
Commissioner [2016] 2 CMLR 2; Joined Cases C-203/15 and C-698/15 Tele2 Sverige AB v Post- och telestyrelsen
and Secretary of State for the Home Department v Tom Watson and Others ECLI:EU:C:2016:970; Opinion 1/15
ECLI:EU:C:2017:592
ELJ-2019-1__1.korr.  2020.05.20.  23:14  Page 109
even the Danish model would allow the UK to have direct access to databases, although
mechanisms are set to ensure that information is transmitted without delay. Additionally, and
more importantly, no right to vote would be afforded to the UK representatives, in the same
way as if an operational agreement were stipulated. 
In spite of such weaknesses and practical issues, some scholars46 argued that a ‘Danish
style’ agreement may represent at least a benchmark for the path to be followed by the UK.
Before trying to give some insight into patterns of future cooperation, it is worth
providing an overview of what the UK government is concretely doing and how it is planning
to cope with post-Brexit security issues.
IV The UK Government’s Solution: An EU—UK Security Treaty?
On 2 August 2018, the EU Commission’s Chief Negotiator for Brexit, Michel Barnier, stated:
‘[o]n security, the EU wants very close cooperation to protect our citizens and democratic
societies. We should organise effective exchanges of intelligence and information and make
sure our law enforcement bodies work together’.47 Some months before, in January 2018, 
the Commission had listed ‘the security interest of the EU27’, ‘fundamental rights’ and ‘the
equivalence of data protection standards’ among the factors that determine EU cooperation
with third countries48 and the European Council reaffirmed them as outstanding points to be
considered in the March 2018 guidelines on future relations after Brexit.49 Therefore, the EU
is particularly adamant about maintaining the closest possible relationship with the UK on
security issues and of ‘effective exchanges of data with Europol’. 
The British government’s approach is not far from this view. In September 2017, the UK
government published a ‘Future Partnership Paper’, in which it explicitly claimed the need to
react with arrangements going ‘beyond the existing, often ad hoc arrangements for EU third
country relationships’.50 The most recent stance of the UK government is represented by
negotiating a  security treaty, giving the legal basis for continuing judicial and police
cooperation in criminal matters, as announced by Theresa May in Florence in September
2017. The next Section explores such a prospective agreement, its features and legal issues. 
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1 Current Status of Negotiations and Legal Issues
When Theresa May first announced the intention to deal with post-Brexit security issues
through a  specific agreement, Theresa May remarked that it would respect ‘our shared
principles, including high standards of data protection and human rights’.51
What the government envisages would be a comprehensive treaty on security between
the UK and the EU, to be concluded within the second part of the Brexit negotiations. The
main purpose of such a treaty would be to provide a ‘legal basis’ for cooperation. The UK
government stated that the security treaty would respect both the decision-making authority
of the EU and the sovereignty of the UK. According to the executive, forthcoming cooperation
has to be based on three ‘pillars’, i.e. internal security, external security, and other forms of
wider cooperation. The agreement should reflect the UK’s new status as a third country and,
at the same time, minimise the loss of mutual capability and consequential decrease in
citizens’ security. The treaty would replicate current arrangements on the following matters:
the European Arrest Warrant, some access to the Schengen Information System and
participation – it is not stated precisely under which form and conditions – in Europol,
Eurojust and the PNR Directive. 
There are a number of legal issues connected with stipulating an omnibus treaty on
security between the UK and the EU. However, this paper focuses on four of them: the
jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice; governmental accountability in stipulating it
and transparency towards public opinion; the level of specificity and precision that might be
reached through it; and mechanisms to deal with future measures. Each of these matters
deserves separate analysis. 
First, the jurisdiction of the ECJ has been a controversial point in Brexit discussions since
the beginning. In January 2017 Theresa May, in announcing a ‘hard’ Brexit, seemed very
convinced of the need to end the Luxembourg Court’s jurisdiction over the UK, saying that
‘laws will be interpreted by judges not in Luxembourg, but in courts across this country’.52 This
stance was mitigated in February 2018,53 when the Prime Minister left some room for the
ECJ’s case law, saying the UK would respect the ‘remit’ of the Court in its participating to EU
agencies (among which Europol is included). Nonetheless, the approach of the government
still casts doubt on the UK’s willingness to accept the ECJ as a dispute resolution mechanism
in potential issues arising from the interpretation and application of the new security treaty
– a role that the Court of Luxembourg would definitely claim. And, in any case, the treaty would
be negotiated by the UK and the EU pursuant to Article 218 TFEU, which sets the procedure
for the conclusion of international agreements between the EU and any third country.
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According to this provision, the ECJ can be called to rule on the compatibility of the envisaged
agreement with EU law and, in the event of a negative opinion, the draft text cannot enter into
force in its current form. Hence, it is likely that the ECJ will exercise its jurisdiction in some
way, at least ‘through the backdoor’. 
Second, some experts54 questioned the extent of governmental accountability on the
issue. According to this view, the fact that negotiations of this kind of measure is usually not
submitted to the public opinion – for example, through public consultation or referendum –
would undoubtedly damage the transparency of the government’s action in a very high
number of fields, given the omnibus nature of the future treaty. 
Third, it seems very complicated to encapsulate all issues connected to security in a single
legal instrument. This is likely to require a very long negotiation phase and a wide range of
expertise, given the extensiveness of the security cooperation field. In other world, negotiating
on Europol is different and requires dissimilar steps, skills and procedures than negotiating on
PNR, for example, and other matters. Therefore, this treaty runs the risk of needing too long
a time to be arranged or, alternatively, being rushed into the necessary steps for its conclusion
without a proper and in-depth examination of the miscellaneous issues that it is expected to
include. 
Fourth, the treaty would cover measures in the security area in place until the moment it
enters into force. What about the future? Of course, the EU institutions will continue working
on security cooperation in the future. Consequently, new tools will be in place as well as others
amending or replacing the existing ones. This aspect should be very well regulated in the
treaty, in order to avoid a gap or a lack of updates in the UK–EU cooperation policy. 
2 The Influence of the Withdrawal Agreement 
As declared at the beginning, the Withdrawal Agreement does have some influence on the
post-Brexit management of security cooperation with the EU, specifically with regard to
Europol. The Withdrawal Agreement will be the legal tool through which, pursuant to Article
50 TEU, consensus reached on exit conditions will be consecrated. 
The Withdrawal Agreement provides for a ‘transition period’. In this time, the UK will
remain subject to EU law, including participation in justice and home affairs – limited to the
existing opt-ins. Nonetheless, such participation will not be full and the regulation of the
relationship with Europol clearly demonstrates this. As a matter of fact, the UK will be allowed
to continue cooperation with Europol, but it will not be permitted to participate in the
governance of the agency and to setting its strategic objectives. This appears to be nothing but
a ‘diminished’ form of membership, based on the very models addressed above, i.e. the third-
country pattern (specifically, in the form of an operational agreement). 
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That clause – currently represented by Article 122 of the exit deal’s text – poses two 
main problems. First of all, after a transitional period following this framework, it could be
more complex to regain a status as close as possible to ‘full’ membership. Second, even if
a more extensive deal is achieved in the future, there would still be a ‘gap’ in cooperation,
represented by that period of ‘diminished’ membership. Actually, the rationale behind the
transition period could be the need to take time and give political actors on the scene the
necessary timeframe to negotiate the acceptable conditions of such a unique relationship.
This is undoubtedly a necessary and desirable step. Nonetheless, the transition period will
undoubtedly create a  gap in intelligence-sharing, with many consequences in terms of
security. Even if just for a short period, restricted participation by the UK – i.e. such a key
contributor – could cause major drawbacks, should security threats emerge during that phase. 
V Conclusion
This paper has explored the key role that the UK has played, since its initial opt-in in Europol,
in the exchange and management of intelligence information at the EU level, due to both its
privileged position in the ‘Five Eyes’ network and its enhanced intelligence expertise.
This research also showed that Europol cooperation is probably the most efficient tool,
nowadays, for the exchange of strategic information in the European area. The – nearly obvious –
consequence is that excluding the UK from Europol would put the EU – both as an institution
and with regard to its member states – in an extremely worrying situation. As a consequence,
careful and efficient planning of Europol–UK relations should be regarded as a priority over
the next months. 
The analysis of potential forms of cooperation between Europol and third countries
revealed that – as argued by many experts in the field – none of them would be entirely
appropriate to meet the current needs in relation to the UK situation after Brexit. In parallel,
the examination of the Danish model clarified that, although it is commonly considered as
a  peculiar form of participation that is not far from membership, its concrete features
demonstrate that this model is still far from resembling the relationship existing among
Europol members and the agency itself. Moreover, the Danish model seems far from
achievable by a state that, in the future, will no longer be within the EU. As underlined above,
it was considered possible in relation to Denmark for the very reason that such country,
notwithstanding its complicated history of opt-outs, is still an EU member. Instead, the
situation with regard to the UK is quite tricky. On the one side, a higher level of interaction
than the one reached by Denmark would be required. On the other side, there are legal
constraints – first and foremost the fact that, unlike Denmark, the UK will leave the EU –
making even reaching a Denmark-style agreement quite problematic. 
Two possible solutions could be conceived for addressing this complicated situation. Both
of them are not straightforward nor easy to negotiate from a legal and strategic point of view.
The first would be an amendment to the provision in Europol’s existing regulations allowing
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only EU member states to be full members in order to open the door to former EU member
states as well. This option, albeit conceivable in theory, is very difficult to achieve in practice.
As a matter of fact, a fully-fledged amendment to an act of EU secondary law would be
needed, according to all the procedural steps to be followed. This would mean a long process
and it would be unlikely to find easy consensus on the issue among the bodies involved in EU
legislation making. The second alternative would be a bespoke agreement, similar to that
with Denmark but with more extensive clauses – allowing, for example, the UK to participate
in the Europol Management Board and the right to vote. Difficulties due to the UK’s ceased
membership of the EU could be overcome in light of the fact that the UK was such. In other
words, the speciality of clauses contained in such a hypothetical agreement – i.e. giving the
UK the right to vote – could be justified by mutual trust based on relationships when the UK
was still an EU member state and, hence, a full Europol member. This second option could
be the most feasible one and could also be reconciled with the UK solution consisting of
signing a security treaty, since such ‘bespoke’ agreement could be a part of that deal. 
From a general perspective, what should be taken into account by both EU and UK bodies
in framing their future security cooperation, is protecting the safety of EU and UK citizens by
respecting their individual rights. The former can be accomplished through framing efficient
intelligence exchange mechanisms; the latter can only be ensured if, in arranging feasible and
well-functioning tools to maintain security cooperation, issues such as data protection
standards and fair data processing are considered as guiding principles. Therefore, this paper
also demonstrated that even an apparently technical issue, i.e. intelligence exchange through
highly specialised agencies as Europol, is indeed a manifestation of the intrinsic tension
between rights and security that the fight against terrorism carries with it.
n ELTE LAW JOURNAL • CHIARA GRAZIANI
n 114
ELJ-2019-1__1.korr.  2020.05.20.  23:14  Page 114
I Introduction
For many years, the limitation of the protection of the personality rights of public figures in
Hungary was not based on statutory provisions. The point of departure for distinguishing
between the personality rights of public figures and those of ordinary citizens was Decision
36/1994. (VI. 24.) AB of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Hungary, which laid
down certain fundamental principles. The Constitutional Court identified two outstanding
constitutional interests, the possibility to criticise the activities of bodies and persons fulfilling
state and local government tasks in public and the ability of citizens to participate in political
and social processes without uncertainty, compromise or fear. As such, while the
constitutionality of protecting the honour and reputation of individuals in the public sphere
by means of criminal law may not be excluded, the freedom of speech pertaining to such
persons may only be limited to a rather narrow extent in comparison to speech concerning
private persons, and then only in order to protect persons exercising state powers.
Furthermore, the Constitutional Court laid down certain ‘constitutionality requirements’ as
to the applicability of libel and defamation in criminal law:
An expression of a value judgement capable of offending the honour of an authority, an official or
a politician acting in public, and expressed with regard to his or her public capacity is not punishable
under the Constitution; and an expression directly referring to such a fact is only punishable if the
person who states a  fact or spreads a  rumour capable of offending one’s honour, or uses an
expression directly referring to such a fact, knew the essence of his or her statement to be false, did
not know of its falsehood because of his or her failure to pay attention or exercise the caution
reasonably expected of him/her pursuant to the rules applicable to his or her profession or
occupation, taking the subject matter, the medium and the addressee of the expression in question
into account.1
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This test establishing the liability of the perpetrator for deliberate lies or in the event of
negligence is rather similar – but not identical to – the Sullivan rule developed by the US
Supreme Court in 1964 in the New York Times v Sullivan case.2 The codification of the Civil
Code and its taking effect in 2014 was a major milestone on the road to limiting the protection
of the reputation and honour of public figures under civil law, as a result of which the legislator
adopted statutory provisions on the limitation of the protection of personality rights of public
figures and for the freedom of public affairs to be taken into account in private law disputes
(Section 2:44). The following parts will provide an overview of the jurisprudence of the
Constitutional Court and high courts in relation to the Civil Code, focusing exclusively on
the weightiest questions of detail.
II The ‘Public Affairs General Clause’ in the Civil Code and its Initial
Constitutional Interpretation
The original draft of the Civil Code submitted to the National Assembly also contained
a general clause on the limited protection of the personality rights of public figures. However,
the text finally adopted and promulgated, which differs from the proposal in several aspects,
read as follows:
Section 2:44 [Protection of the personality rights of public figures]
The exercise of the fundamental rights ensuring a free discussion of public affairs in the legitimate
interest of the public may limit the protection of the personality rights of public figures to an extent
that is necessary and proportionate and is without prejudice to human dignity.
The adopted text, in conformity with the original proposal, leaves broad latitude for the courts
as entities applying the law, but it raises several awkward issues. The question arises of exactly
which personality rights are affected by the rule; in practice, beyond the protection of
reputation and honour, these may include the protection of the right to private life, image,
sound recording, and possibly private secret and personal data as independent personality
rights and therefore, in certain cases, these rights of public figures may be enforced only to
a limited degree.
The Commissioner for Fundamental Rights contested the wording ‘legitimate public
interest’, stipulated as one of the preconditions for reducing the protection of personality
rights, prior to the entry into force of the provision via a motion to the Constitutional Court.
However, following this, the Constitutional Court deleted the text concerned in decision
7/2014. (III. 7.) AB. The decision stated that the protection of human dignity may constitute
a limitation to the freedom of speech; nevertheless, no violation of human dignity ‘can justify
the restriction of the freedom of speech. If it could, the very content of the freedom of speech
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would become void. […] The right to the protection of human dignity is unrestrictable, but
only as a legal determinant of human status.’3
The constitutional problem and the quite narrow latitude available to the Constitutional
Court can easily be identified. Both the Fundamental Law and the Civil Code expressly protect
human dignity, the former also declaring its inviolability, which does not mean unrestrictability
at the same time.4 The freedom of speech, similarly to human dignity, is a constitutional
right,5 albeit not an unrestrictable one, although its restriction is admissible only within
a limited scope, similarly to all other fundamental rights.6 The constitutional collision of
human dignity and freedom of speech is, in itself, not an insoluble issue when applying the
law. Neither can this collision be considered a recent problem.
However, Section 2:44 of the Civil Code seeks to provide extra protection for the freedom
of speech (by ensuring a wider freedom for discussing public affairs), inter alia, by prohibiting
the publication of opinions violating human dignity, as one of the objective limitations to
a  wider protection. Accordingly, if we assume that the latter provision does not render
exercising the freedom of speech impossible (since any injurious opinion may necessarily
violate human dignity at the same time, so it could be sanctioned), then a constitutional
interpretation, which can provide guidance for those applying the law in terms of the application
of the examined provision, must be assigned to the protection of human dignity.7
The Constitutional Court chose that solution and expressly drew the attention of the
courts to their responsibility to interpret it in a manner which complies with the constitution.8
The decision makes it clear that ‘the unrestrictable aspect of human dignity constitutes the
absolute limit of the freedom of speech only with respect to that extremely narrow range of
expressions of speech which deny the very foundations of the human status.’9 As a general rule,
opinions and value judgements cannot be grounds for either criminal or civil law prosecution;
in this respect, the decision of 2014 referred to one of the most important elements of
Decision 36/1994. (VI. 24.) AB, namely the total impunity of opinions. However, in contrast
to the decision of 1994, in 2014 the Constitutional Court did not consider value judgements
to be constitutionally protected all the time; ensuring that the freedom of debating public
affairs in public:
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[…] does not result in the protection of human dignity, privacy and good reputation of the parties
concerned […] becoming void. The persons exercising state powers and politicians acting in public
are entitled to the protection of their personality rights if the given value judgement relating to
their person does not concern their public affairs-related activity, within the scope of a discussion
of public affairs, but their private or family life. Hence, civil law prosecution might be justified in
that narrow context when the expressed opinion, being a total, explicit and severely disparaging
negation of the human status of the person concerned, does not violate the personality rights named
under Section 2:43 of the new Civil Code, but the unrestrictable aspect of human dignity specified
under Section 2:42. Taking into account the arguments expressed above, even public figures can
demand legal protection against false statements of fact.10
The decision highlights certain persons exercising state powers, such as judges, who, due to
their special position, in line with the case law of the European Court of Human Rights
(ECtHR), can be granted extra protection in terms of their personality rights as compared to
other public figures, although this is still below the level of general personality rights
protection.11 In this way, the body also responds to the question of the constitutional
interpretation of Article IX(4) of the Fundamental Law, according to which ‘the exercise of 
the freedom of expression may not aim to violate the human dignity of others’. Based on the
interpretation of the Constitutional Court summarised above, this constitutional provision
cannot be considered an absolute limit on the freedom of speech.
A notable merit of the decision is that it tried to provide an independent interpretation
of the personality right of human dignity, which so far has only been used in the application
of the law in a very fragmentary manner. In this respect, the following conclusions can be
drawn from the decision of the Constitutional Court: (1) opinions and value judgements
concerning public affairs and public figures are to be granted special protection; (2) however,
this shall not include value judgements concerning the private or family life of public figures
(if those are not related to public affairs); (3) furthermore, the protection does not include
those opinions which represent an obvious and seriously disparaging negation of the human
status of the concerned person (i.e. opinions which question or doubt that the person
concerned is a human being, or disparages or reviles the person concerned in their human
quality, and not in relation to public affairs). In the latter case, it is not the right to honour as
per Section 2:45 of the Civil Code that is violated (the protection granted for opinions relating
to public affairs under Section 2:44 may also totally exclude the possibility of violating this
right to honour with regard to outstanding public figures, such as politicians and persons
exercising state powers) but the right to human dignity [Section 2:42(2) of the Civil Code]. In
other words, based on the decision of the Constitutional Court – contrary to the former
approach of civil law courts – human dignity has a unique and independently applicable
content above and beyond the right to honour and good reputation. At the same time, this
means supplementing and rejecting the stipulations of the decision of 1994, as far as the
comprehensive and total protection and unrestrictability of opinions are concerned.
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Regarding statements of fact, the decision stipulated that ‘demonstrably false facts in
themselves are not protected by the constitution’,12 thereby hinting that in certain cases, even
false statements of facts can receive protection under freedom of speech. Later, the decision
establishes that ‘even for those facts having no constitutional value which later turn out to be
false, it is justified to take into account the interest of ensuring as free conditions for discussion
of public affairs as possible when determining the extent of imputability (attribution of
liability) and the possible penalties in the course of the legal proceedings.’13
In connection with the ‘necessary and proportionate extent’, the decision established that
the ‘restricted nature of the protection of the personality rights of persons exercising state
powers and public figure politicians is deemed “necessary and proportionate” over a much
wider scope than for anyone else’.14 However, this condition, which is specified in the Civil
Code, is not unconstitutional since ‘although it is linked to general terms used not in private
law but in constitutional law, it nevertheless ensures the necessary and sufficient latitude for
the application of the law to specify the tests used for the limits of the expression of political
opinion.’15 The decision categorises different groups of persons concerned and sets the level
of protection afforded to criticism of each group, which comprise (1) public figures involved
in public affairs, consciously undertaking public life, including persons exercising state powers
and politicians with public standing; (2) ‘non-ex officio’ public figures involved in public
affairs; and (3) persons exercising state powers who are not able to protect themselves publicly
due to the nature of their service, such as judges. As we go down this list, the level of protection
afforded to personality rights increases, whereas the extent of protection given to freedom of
speech decreases.16
The expression ‘legitimate public interest’ would seem to be an unnecessary restriction
of the freedom of speech and freedom of the press: 
As far as the discussion of public affairs is concerned, the restriction of the protection of the
personality rights of public figures for the purpose of guaranteeing freedom of opinion is
a constitutional interest and requirement in all cases. Hence, there is no need to justify the existence
of a ‘public interest’, which may not be specified more precisely, not to mention the justification of
the ‘legitimate nature’ of this public interest. […] This condition of the new Civil Code would
narrow the scope of free expression of opinion to an unjustified extent since, in addition to the
ever-present social interest in the discussion of public affairs, it would only allow a wider criticism
of public figures if further public interest could be ascertained.17
The decision highlights the necessity to assess three important questions of detail, of which
we will make an overview, drawing on a body of jurisprudence that has been growing since
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2014. The first question is whether identifying someone’s status as a public figure is the most
suitable point of departure when establishing the scope of the protection of their personality
rights, or it could be more important to establish whether the matter in hand is of a ‘public’
nature (Chapter III, infra). The second question is how to differentiate between statements of
fact and statements of opinion when the distinction is not clear (Chapter IV, infra) The third
question is how much narrower the scope should be if we think that the special rule is to be
applied to an expression, i.e. as the scope in which the protection of personality rights needs
to be applied becomes narrower: at what point is the limit of tolerance of those concerned in
such cases (Point V, below)?
III Public Affairs and/or Public Figures?
The operative part of Decision 36/1994. (VI. 24.) AB refers to authorities, officials and
politicians acting in public. However, the justification for the decision also mentions public
figures, entrusting the courts to define the scope of this latter category. Decision 57/2001.
(XII. 5.) AB – describing the ECtHR case law on this issue – also refers to the category of
‘persons acting in public’. It is not primarily a lower level of protection of the reputation 
of public figures that the ECtHR prescribes but rather the broadest protection of debates on
public issues, i.e. the decisive factor is not the status of the person who is the subject of an
allegation, but the extent to which the debate serves the public interest. Naturally, the ECtHR
soon extended the principle of permitting higher levels of criticism of politicians to all
authorities.
In Thorgeirson v Iceland,18 the complainant, an Icelandic journalist, turned to Strasbourg
because, after publishing several articles on the brutal practices of the Reykjavík police 
– without mentioning the names of any actual policemen – he had been sentenced for
defamation. In its reasoning in favour of the complainant, the Court stated that the statements
made in all cases of relevance to public debate are to be awarded special protection, rather
than just ‘political cases’. This principle has since become generally accepted. In Nilsen and
Johnsen v Norway,19 the complainants were two police officers who had criticised a university
professor acting as the chairman of a committee investigating police brutality, and who had
voiced offensive statements about him after he had sharply criticised the actions of the Police
several times. The Norwegian court sentenced the police officers to a fine: According to the
ECHR, however, public and at times heated replies to public criticism may be legitimate, and
in the circumstances, both the two complainants and the professor qualified as public figures.
The sharp criticism formulated by the police officers had not transgressed the limits of
freedom of speech. In Bladet Tromsø and Stensaas v Norway,20 statements on the cruel
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practices of seal hunters and the violation of fishing rules qualified as pertaining to issues of
public interest, so the mandatory threshold of the tolerance of individuals concerned in the
case was raised. In Bergens Tidende v Norway,21 the ECtHR ruled that statements on the
inappropriate treatment methods of a plastic surgeon were in the public interest.
The ECtHR case law seems reasonable, in that it is not the status of public figures 
– meaning the personal scope – that should be defined clearly and in advance in order to
decide these legal disputes. The exact personal scope is impossible to define exhaustively; its
boundaries are uncertain, it is in a permanent state of flux and depends on the context.
A further important consideration is that, except when they are acting in public and engaged
in debates on public affairs, the personality rights of public figures are also granted full
protection. As such, even in indisputable cases – with regard to a political figure – it is not
clear which test must be applied and when, because it has to be decided on a case-by-case
basis whether the debated affair qualifies as a ‘public affair’ or not. Defining the situations in
which reduced protection is to be granted to personality rights is a more reasonable approach
than drawing up a list of the persons concerned. In other words, the fact of appearing publicly
(‘public matter’) is of primary importance, not the public figure (the person) him- or herself.
The scope of activities and information about public figures, persons exercising state powers
and persons carrying out public functions that may be disclosed to the public may be defined.
The protection of the personality rights of such persons may be limited occasionally, even
beyond the scope of carrying out their public functions and public appearances. For example,
the family life of a Member of Parliament may be regarded as information of public interest
if it may influence the decisions of voters. 
On the question of public affairs and public figures, the jurisprudence of the Constitutional
Court in recent years and the ensuing case law have produced some important positions,
which predominantly confirm the interpretation according to which the primary consideration
when defining the reduced protection of personality rights is that the affair affected by the
expression of opinion is deemed a  ‘public affair’. However, the practice is not free from
contradictions, which may introduce an element of uncertainty.
Decision 7/2014. (III. 7.) AB stipulates the primacy of identifying public affairs;
nevertheless, it also indicates that the status of the public figure is also important, though it
is secondary to ascertaining whether an affair is public in nature when establishing the scope
of the protection of personality rights. Public affairs have an impact on the enforcement of the
personality rights of those concerned, and if, in addition to that, the actors also qualify as
public figures, their rights might be reduced even further; the scope of this limitation depends
on the nature of their status as public figures (from politicians to celebrities).22
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The judiciary must take into account first and foremost the fact that, since it is public affairs
themselves and not the public figures that can be found in the focus of the freedom of political
speech, all speeches related to public affairs are under extra protection, which restricts the
protection of the personality rights of those affected by them. It means that the restricted character
of the protection of personality rights applies not only to those who are professionally engaged in
appearing in public, as debating public matters can affect a wider scope of individuals in the
framework of a concrete debate in a society. However, the status of the person affected by the
speech must also be taken into account: in the case of persons exercising state powers and
politicians acting in public, the restricted nature of the protection of their personality rights is
considered ‘necessary and proportionate’ to a wider extent than with regard to any other person.23
This approach is confirmed in Decision 14/2017. (VI. 30.) AB: ‘[t]aking all these into account
[…] the activity which is the basis of the labour dispute, i.e. the content of the Internet portal
and the texts published there, is predominantly of a professional nature and does not show
any link to public affairs, which would render this activity clearly as one that belongs to the
freedom of discussing public affairs.’24 This aspect is reflected in a similar way in regular
judicial practice: ‘[w]hen deciding whether the person concerned has the obligation to tolerate
the opinion and/or criticism, in the first place it has to be established whether the contested
expression was related to a debate of public affairs.’25 Important additional information on the
concept of ‘public affair’ is provided by the statement of reasons in Decision 3030/2019. (II. 13.)
AB. In the criminal proceedings relating to the main case, the accused person repeated and
indeed extended his opinion on the complainant before the court, expressing new, strongly
critical value judgements (‘heap of shit’, ‘shame, blight on civilisation’, ‘public ghoul’). In the
main case, he was sentenced for defamation, but in the new case launched due to the publication
by the accused of the expressions he used at the trial – on his own social media surfaces – he
was acquitted by the Court. The Constitutional Court rejected the relating constitutional
complaint on the grounds that information on criminal proceedings qualifies as a public affair:
Based on the constitutional criteria drawn up, the Constitutional Court takes the position that the
public nature of the debate can be established because the accused provides information on criminal
proceedings that makes the public aware of the criminal law boundaries of the judgments of
a television presenter due to his personal and professional conduct during his interviews. The status
of the complainant as a public figure may not be disputed, since he makes his living as a television
journalist. Compared to the previous case, in which the accused was found guilty of defamation,
the current situation is different in terms of the purpose of the speech and the absence of the self-
serving nature of it, compared to the previous, protected expression of opinion.26
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At this point, it is worth making a short detour and discussing issues of the protection of
an individual’s image, which also is also illuminating in respect of judging the protection of good
reputation and honour, as well as for the interpretation of Section 2:44. Pursuant to Section 2:48
of the Civil Code, ‘(1) Recording a person’s image or voice and using such a recording shall
require the consent of the person concerned. (2) The consent of the person concerned shall not
be required for recording his image or voice and for the use of such a recording if the recording
was made of a crowd or of an appearance in public life.’ From the text, it seems that it is not
the identification of public affairs but public figures, more precisely acting in public life, that
is the only important consideration and, outside the context of a public appearance, it is not
possible to apply a reduced protection of the personality rights and here the application of
Section 2:44 might be of some assistance. In contrast, the practice of the Constitutional Court
in the ‘images of policemen’ cases27 disregarded Section 2:44 when concluding that the
freedom of speech and the right to information also provide guidance in the interpretation
of Section 2:48. Therefore, images of policemen may be published freely, ‘[an] image taken in
a public area and showing the subject in a non-offending and objective manner may generally
be published without consent, if it relates to a news report of high interest to the public and
forms part of free information provision on current affairs.’28
The Curia, after lengthy deliberations, finally accepted this approach: ‘[if ] the person
exercising state powers acts in the course of events influencing the public sphere, the exercise
of his personality rights relating to his image and their restrictability might be subjected to
rules that are different from those pertaining to the general protection of the personality rights
of private persons solely participating in public events.’29 Hence, although the policeman
taking action is not yet a public figure, however, his activity is related to public affairs – and
there is a strong assumption that the policeman discharges his tasks as the representative of
public authority – the interpretation of the Civil Code must then take constitutional criteria
into account, which is a  step towards recognising the horizontal scope of fundamental
rights.30 In individual cases, the consideration given to this criterion by the Constitutional
Court and the Curia is not completely uniform, as shown by more recent Constitutional Court
decisions handed down after specific constitutional complaints, which repeatedly confirm
the significance of taking the aspect of public interest into account.31
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In the meantime, the case law of regular courts in relation to the protection of one’s image
has applied this principle appropriately in several different situations and restricted the
exercise of the right to one’s image accordingly:
If somebody accompanying a public figure participates in an event that is financed from public
funds, he might expect the media to report on that, even using his image.32
I. If the representatives of the press are not granted access to an event with limited access to the
press and the related prohibition is communicated by the designated person representing the press
department of the public authority in the lobby of the building, the press reporting on this by
publishing audio and video recordings shall not be obliged to pixelate the face of the civil servant
speaking on behalf of the public authority. 
II. The pixilation of the face may essentially impact on the credibility of the news report worthy of
public attention of the event, therefore it would disproportionately restrict information on current
events and the freedom of the press. 
III. The civil servant performing communication-related tasks shall be obliged to tolerate the
publication of his image and recorded voice with respect to an event worthy of public attention in
order to ensure the freedom of discussing public affairs. The fundamental right of the press to the
freedom of expression may restrict – to the necessary and proportionate degree – the personality
rights of the representative of the public authority to his image and recorded voice.33
At the same time, the public sphere and the interests of the media may not restrict the
enforcement of personality rights disproportionately. Recordings made with hidden cameras
may be legitimate only in exceptionally justified cases, and public figures may be subjects of
recordings only ‘in situations that are of high interest to the public’.
I. The information obligation of the press does not give rise to excess rights; linear media services
are obliged to conform to legislative provisions in the course of meeting this obligation and, as
a main rule, their activities may not infringe upon others’ personality rights. In the case of a video
or audio recording made of a public figure without his consent in a public place, the collision
between the freedom of opinion and the protection of personality rights needs to be resolved by
weighing up interests, even if the statement or publication otherwise contributes to informing the
public of an affair which is of high interest to them.
II. The usage of a recording made with a hidden camera violates the right of the public figure to his
image and recorded voice if the statements recorded do not contribute to the debate of the affair
of high interest to the public, or if they are not informative in a way that would stimulate this
debate.34
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I. The publication of a recording made of a public figure may restrict the right of the public figure
to his image protected by law only to the degree necessary and proportionate in order to debate
public affairs.
II. An image of a public figure taken in a situation which is not of interest to the public may only
be published with the consent of the person concerned. In the absence of such consent, the image
taken of him and published violates the right of the person concerned to his image, in the protection
of which the injured person may file a lawsuit to enforce this right expressly.35
Similarly to the protection of an individual’s image, the protection of private life as
a personality right newly specified in the Civil Code [Section 2:43.b)] is also to be interpreted
through the interest linked to the public debate of public affairs.
I. The right of politicians acting in public to a private life may also be restricted on the grounds of
a legitimate public interest and only if the interference is related to the public activities, ideas spread,
acts and statements of the person concerned who has an impact on public life.
II. The rebuttal of a statement made in relation to an insignificant element of a public event of high
interest to the public does not constitute adequate grounds for the press to publish an event of the
most intimate private sphere of the public figure, an artificial intrusion into the private sphere:
Exercising the freedom of the press in such a manner is not proportionate to the violation of the
personality rights of the public figure concerned in terms of privacy.36
So far, a more or less harmonious picture has emerged, which provides adequate grounds for
making proper judgments in issues relating to public affairs and public figures and which will
also spare the interpreter of an issue the obligation to define or make a list of public figures.
In this context, the Civil Code is more of a pretext than the real reason for the developments
in recent years; the introduction of a constitutional complaint in 2012 is of higher significance in
this respect than the new provisions of the Civil Code. Similarly, an image taken of a political
figure in the courtroom as an accused person, even if he was acquitted in subsequent
proceedings, may be of high interest to the public and is related to the status of the accused
as a public figure. The media may objectively – visually – also report on the state of play of
criminal proceedings, providing the news coverage reflects the current state of play of the
given proceedings and respects the assumption of innocence as a fundamental constitutional
principle.37 If the image shown in the news report does not depict the complainant in
a humiliating situation, which would violate an essential aspect of their human dignity, its
publication shall not be considered an abuse of the freedom of the press.38
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However, as two decisions make clear, the case law of the Constitutional Court is not free
from contradictions. In the case preceding Decision 1/2015. (I. 16.) AB, the contested opinions
were expressed in a private debate, i.e. the test applicable to discussing public affairs did not
have to be applied in this case. This is one more reason that it is disturbing to see that the
Constitutional Court did not examine the context of the contested opinion in the first place
but the status of the injured person. With respect to the injured party working as a lawyer, the
Constitutional Court concluded that ‘[the] person acting as a lawyer may not be considered
as a person exercising state powers only due to his status as a lawyer, neither does he qualify as
a public figure politician.’39 Indirectly, it follows that the Constitutional Court had returned
to the more narrow definition of a public figure included in Decision 36/1994. (VI. 24.) AB,
though it is not primarily the status of the person but the nature of the affair that needs to be
examined in order to see whether or not the contested opinion is related to a ‘public affair’ 
– as the concurring opinion of Péter Paczolay pointed out.
The statement of reasons of Decision 3145/2018. (V. 7.) AB to some extent mixes up the
relationship and sequence of considerations relating to public affairs and the public figure. On
the one hand, the decision – in line with Decision 7/2014. (III. 7.) AB – stipulates that:
[41] […] when qualifying a public statement, the point of departure shall typically not be the persons
concerned, but it needs to be examined whether the statement is related to the debate of public
affairs and issues of public interest. Essentially, this circumstance, i.e. debating public affairs – to the
extent of the specific debate – is the consideration which typically determines how the persons
concerned are to be classified. Therefore, the status of a public figure is linked to the fact of acting
in the public sphere, which goes together with the debate of public affairs, which always needs to be
evaluated in a specific situation and based on the criteria laid down in Decision 13/2014. (IV. 18.) AB.
[42] The Constitutional Court therefore underlines that, in democratic decision-making processes,
public debates of public affairs are indispensable and so are the surfacing of diverging positions, and
discussing them driven by the values of a pluralist democracy. This is valid even if the debate
concerned is a heated one and the persons concerned in the debate are exposed to sharp attacks,
criticism or judgement. Therefore, the essential feature of the status of a public figure emerging
from one’s acting in the public sphere is that, depending on the specific situation, it covers all and
every person who appears in a public debate of public affairs as a person shaping opinions. Taking
these considerations into account, the Constitutional Court underlined that the protection of the
freedom of opinion in the context of the debate of public affairs does not focus primarily on the status
of the persons concerned, but on whether the speaker expressed his views on a social or political
issue [Decision 7/2014. (III. 7.) AB, Statement of Reasons, Paragraph 47].40
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According to the logic of previous decisions, the body should have analysed the
individual’s ‘public figure status’, not as a necessary precondition for restricting the scope of
the protection of personality rights, but – taking this restriction as a given, due to the public
affairs being discussed – as a circumstance with a bearing on the degree of the restriction of
this protection. However, the statement of reasons identified public figure status as an equally
necessary precondition, in addition to public affairs being discussed. What follows from this
is that it is not sufficient for a media report or expression of opinion to concern a public affair:
to reduce the scope of the protection of their personality rights, it is also necessary for the
persons concerned to qualify as public figures.
[44] 2.2. If the public speech affects the freedom of debating public affairs, it is necessary to further
examine whether or not the person affected by the speech is a public figure in the given situation
and only after this examination can the constitutional test be applied. The fact that a public speech
is related to public affairs per se shall not automatically lead to a  reduced protection of the
personality rights of the persons concerned. Establishing the public figure’s status is always up to
a case-by-case evaluation. […]
[48] However, the subject-matter of the speech (public affair) is not the only criterion when judging
the status of those affected by the public statement or speech. It is also indispensable to examine
whether the person concerned decided in a voluntary manner to become someone who has an
influence on public affairs. The enforcement of the right to free expression may exclusively be
justified in cases in which participants became more active shapers of public affairs based on their
own decisions, and thereby undertaking their exposure to evaluations and judgements in front of
the public eye in the community concerned. Therefore, they are obliged to have an increased
threshold of tolerance in respect of speeches and opinions in the context of the debate of public
affairs that concern them, or classify them or might be offensive towards them. […]
[50] The due consideration of the above criteria is indispensable in deciding the extent to which the
debate of public affairs determines the personal status of those participating in this public debate
on public affairs. The Constitutional Court therefore underlines that, when establishing public
figure status, the status of the person concerned is not of decisive importance. What is of decisive
importance is whether those participating in the public debate of public affairs have become shapers
of public life, making regular or occasional public appearances based on their own decisions.41
The statement of reasons, beyond making an erroneous judgment regarding the relationship
between a public affair and public figure criteria, identifies with the approach taken by the
Curia in the cases concerning the images of policemen, according to which ‘based on the
definition of jurisprudence and legal literature, appearance, more specifically public appearance,
shall be any political, social or artistic activity based on the voluntary decision and
autonomous decision of the individual for a specific purpose, wishing to influence the life of
the local community or society, in a narrower or broader sense’.42 In the decisions taken in the
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cases concerning the images of policemen, the Constitutional Court avoided, finally, rebutting
the necessarily voluntary nature of appearance in public, and did not consider the reduced
right of policemen to the protection of their images as justified pursuant to Section 2:48(2)
of the Civil Code describing an appearance in public life, but it based these decisions on the
constitutional consideration of public interest. This does not mean that this approach,
according to which appearance in public is always based on a voluntary decision, is right; this
approach is overly restrictive as is clearly justified in the concurring opinion of Judge Schanda,
who refers to an illuminating example from the case law of the European Court of Human
Rights as an illustration.
[103] Therefore, when deciding whether the expression of an opinion belongs to the sphere of
discussing public affairs, i.e. it is to be granted increased constitutional protection, it is important
to judge what role the consideration of public appearance plays. The statement of reasons of the
current decision at some points refers to the fact that, in order to provide strong protection to the
freedom of speech, following the decision on whether a statement belongs to the category of public
affairs, we also need to decide whether the person concerned was a ‘public figure’ voluntarily
affected by the statement. However, this logic of the constitutional law evaluation would not be in
line with either domestic jurisprudence or the interpretation provided by the ECtHR.
[104] The status of public figure is one of the criteria within the constitutional law evaluation of
whether the speech concerned belongs to the sphere of the debate of public affairs. This evaluation
is based on various considerations, as shown by Decision 13/2014. (IV. 18.) AB (Statement of
Reasons, [39]). The complexity of the test elaborated there in detail – which in reality is an appeal
to give due consideration to all the factors of the individual case – very well illustrates that whether
a statement qualifies as a public affair depends much more on individual social circumstances than
on normative definitions. The basic theory mentioned earlier, namely that the question focuses on
the nature of public affairs rather than the status of those concerned, shows that the public figure
(and exercising state powers) qualification is one of the important but not, by itself, decisive
elements of this categorisation. […]
[105] The logic of the evaluation is relevant. According to the statement of reasons of the decision,
after the categorisation, the public figure status needs to be decided upon in the subsequent process,
because the enforcement of free expression may be justified “exclusively in those instances in which
participants became active influencers of public affairs based on their own decisions, thereby
undertaking their exposure to evaluations and judgements in front of the public eye in the
community concerned.” (Statement of Reasons [48]). This, however, is not so. It has already been
confirmed by domestic case law that the increased protection of the freedom of speech is applicable
to a broader spectrum than ‘official public figures’ only [see Decision 7/2014. (III. 7.) AB]. The
guidance of the Strasbourg case law sheds light upon the fact that, in certain cases, specific
standards may be applied without having to identify any condition or circumstance which would
render those concerned at least an ad hoc voluntary public figure: The Norwegian seal hunters in
the case previously referred to did not have the faintest intention of voluntarily making a public
appearance or becoming affected in a public debate; nevertheless, the protection of their personality
rights in the legitimate social debate on the cruelty of seal hunting became more restricted [ECtHR, 
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Bladet Tromsø and Stensaas v Norway (21980/93), 20 May 1999]. Whether the protection of
personality rights may be restricted to a varying degree depending on those concerned is a different
question but this is already the question regarding tests within the realm of the debate of public
affairs and it is not an evaluation to delineate area of the freedom of speech that is to be granted
increased protection.
[106] In summary, those applying the law need to take a decision based on all the circumstances of
the given case – including those concerned, if they exercise public authority or have (official or ad hoc)
public figure status – whether the expression of opinion to be judged falls under the category of
public debate of public affairs or not. If the answer to this question is yes, the constitutional
considerations of the freedom of speech will be amplified and the protection of the personality
rights of those affected by the expression of opinion will by all means – i.e. irrespective of factors
referring to the voluntary appearance in public – be more restricted. In the case of politicians who
appear in public or media personalities permanently seeking the limelight, it will of course be of
a much greater extent than for the seal hunters, but this is already the question of fine-tuned tests
within the realm of the debate of public affairs and not an issue of the initial categorisation.43
The concurring opinion, as opposed to the opinion adopted by the majority, is so far fully
aligned with the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court. Placing primary emphasis on the
‘public affair’ category, accompanied by the ‘public figure’ as the secondary consideration,
ensures the proper balance of the freedom of speech and the enforcement of personality
rights. However, giving the same priority to both and thus making them the conjunctive
condition for the restricted protection of personality rights would bring about an unjustified
restriction of open public debates. It would not result in a stronger protection of the rights of
public figures, who would enjoy the level of protection granted to private persons;
furthermore, debates of public affairs in which non-public figures participate would be less
protected. This is an unwelcome development, and contradicts the principles that are derived
from the case law of the Constitutional Court.
IV The Distinction Between Statements of Fact and Statements 
of Opinion
Pursuant to Decision 36/1994. (VI. 24.) AB, when judging statements liable to damage one’s
good reputation and honour, a distinction needs to be made between statements of fact and
statements of opinion. This distinction is in turn based on further criteria. It is already
enshrined in the Civil Code thus, pursuant to Section 2:45, that violation of good reputation
means in particular misrepresenting or reporting untrue facts concerning and offending
another person or misrepresenting true facts. Decision 7/2014. (III. 7.) AB also stipulates that
the freedom of untrue facts and extreme opinions and their restrictability is to be established
through the application of different constitutional tests. 
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According to the Constitutional Court’s decisions on statements of fact, a distinction
must be made between true statements of fact (that have been proved before the court) and
untrue (unproven) statements of fact. A further distinction may be drawn up in the context
of untrue statements of fact due to the different evaluation of intentional statements or
statements where the speaker failed to exercise the caution reasonably expected of him
pursuant to the rules applicable to his profession or occupation, and statements made while
observing the rules of his profession. Although the decisions of the Constitutional Court did
not prescribe making such distinctions, the jurisprudence does draw a distinction between
opinions based on facts and opinions, which, due to their character, lack such grounds (such
as opinions generated by passion, reflecting emotions or containing an individual subjective
value judgement). If, in the case of the former, the reality of the facts, which serve as the
grounds for the opinion, is proved before the courts then the person expressing the opinion
shall not be prosecuted, no matter how extreme or offensive his or her opinion is. On the
other hand, opinions that have no factual grounds will remain restrictable if they are unduly
offensive, insulting and humiliating (disparaging) as described by the judicial terminology.
Decision 13/2014. (IV. 18.) AB established criteria with a general scope and beyond the
boundaries of criminal law, based on which the courts must take into account the following
when differentiating between statements of fact and statements of opinion in cases of
defamation:
[The] proceeding courts need to respond to the question of whether publicism (topical editorials)
qualifies as a statement of fact or as a value judgement. In the course of this, attention must be paid
to the fact that the full meaning of the incriminating sentence is available only in the context of a full
text, the objective of which was to criticise the asset management practices of the municipality, i.e.
the writing criticised the asset and financial management of the city with irony and exaggeration as
[rhetorical] devices. Furthermore, it is necessary to evaluate the opinion context of the essay, which
drew public attention to material inequalities and wasteful budgetary management experienced
within the local community. On the basis of this, the question can be decided as to whether the essay
contains any specific element at all, the truthfulness of which may be verified, or whether the writing
is a  value judgement expressing criticism, the opportunity and fact of which is protected,
irrespective of its content.44
The above set of criteria is also applicable in private law disputes. Even with all the above
taken into account, making a distinction between statements of fact and statements of opinion
is a daunting task in specific cases. Such a task faced the Constitutional Court in respect of
a  debate between two historians.45 The defendant in the main proceedings said, of the
complainant, that what he said is ‘extreme right-wing political provocation, which […] would
be punishable with lawful tools, because it relativises the Holocaust, and it is on the verge of
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Holocaust denial. The complainant has ‘two fundamental objectives in mind: […] they are
related to the new ideological considerations of the new institution; the new authoritarian
regime needs to whitewash its predecessor, the Horthy regime. It is absolutely obvious that
this is what the issue is about and it tries to whitewash even Horthy himself from the crime
of genocide, but it is an impossible endeavour’. The defendant, referring to the complainant,
claimed that ‘only people who are professionally, morally and politically open to the extreme
right, and ideologically think in terms of the restoration of the Horthy regime may be
appointed as directors of such government institutes’. The above utterances are half-way
between statements of facts and statements of opinions, and the Constitutional Court itself
was divided on the issue of how to classify them. However, the majority regarded them as
statement of facts, because:
the Constitutional Court took into account the context and purpose of the sentences at issue in the
statement of the defendant, as well as the context and purpose of the statements in their entirety.
Based on these criteria, it may be established that the defendant criticised and amplified the position
of the complainant as expressed in the interview in a  way that draws attention to it, using
generalisation and exaggeration as legitimate tools, occasionally in an agitated tone; it questioned
its scientific foundations and, drawing conclusions from the aforementioned, questioned in general
the aptitude of the complainant to work as the institute’s director and criticised the ideological bias
of the historical research institute established by the government.46
The element of criticism, with the nature of a judgement, made the statement an opinion
according to the majority of the Constitutional Court and, as such, a less stringent test had
to be applied to it and so the constitutional complaint was rejected by the body. The opinion-
like character of the statement in respect of relativising the Holocaust, which qualifies as
a crime, may be disputed, as five Constitutional Court judges did dispute it. However, even
in this case, its qualification as an opinion is acceptable, taking the formulation and the
opinion-character of the statement into account.
In order to further illustrate the difficulties posed by differentiating between statements
of fact and statements of opinion, it is worth making a short detour to examine the case law
of courts and the Constitutional Court in respect of the Act on Electoral Procedure, which is
linked in an interesting way to the constitutional interpretation emerging in respect of the
Civil Code.
In Decision 31/2014. (X. 9.) AB, the Court used its own case law as a basis with regard to
the protection of personality rights of public figures as a given; in the present case, it primarily
referred to Decision 7/2014. (III. 7.) AB: ‘In an election campaign, the freedom of expression
and its restrictions need to be interpreted and judged in the personal relationship of public
figures.’47 This justification is disputable, at least. The section of the Act on Electoral
Procedure concerned prescribes exercising of rights ‘in good faith in accordance with their
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purpose’,48 i.e. in the cases discussed, its test must be found (when is it possible to make an
untrue statement in good faith, is it possible in theory to publish extreme and offensive
opinions in good faith and within the limits of the purposeful exercise of rights during an
election campaign period). The personality right tests invoked in the cases (protection of
good reputation and honour in private law and defamation and libel in criminal law) are
related to the application of other facts; therefore, at first sight, it is not absolutely clear
whether they may be applicable in the context of the Act on Electoral Procedure. However,
it is logical to some extent that the Curia, as well as the Constitutional Court, drew upon
these tests, given the civil analogies in the statement of facts; for example, those tests related
to which public figures are affected, to the necessary distinction between statements of fact
and opinion and to the debate or discussion of public affairs. In the specific case, the
Constitutional Court essentially overruled the court of appeal:
The judicial decision did not take into account that the complainant made a statement expressing
his opinion. The distinction between a value judgement and a statement of fact may also have
constitutional relevance. […] Therefore, the freedom of expression is given increased protection in
relation to value judgements which surface in a collision between opinions on public affairs, even
if they are perhaps exaggerated and heightened.49
Overruling without giving an actual statement of reasons is problematic. The Constitutional
Court should have defined the constitutional criteria for the distinction between a statement
of fact and a statement of opinion; what the court may consider a fact and what it may regard
as an opinion? In addition, the range of choices available is not merely limited to one between
facts and opinions and therefore a more differentiated approach is necessary: statements of
fact need to be distinguished from one another (they may be true or untrue), while opinions
may have a factual ground that may be examined (the factual ground of which may be true
or untrue) or be fully subjective opinions and value judgements that have no factual basis. 
The complainant in Decision 5/2015. (II. 25.) AB called himself the only left-wing candidate
on 1 February 2015 at the demonstration in Kossuth tér in Budapest. He stated: ‘Fidesz has 11
candidates wearing 11 different shirts. The Fidesz team has fake candidates, dividing the voters
of the opposition and adventurers who are in preparation. […] On 22 February, I will defeat the
Fidesz candidates in Veszprém.’ The constitutional background to the decision in this case was
again Decisions 36/1994. (VI. 24.) AB and 7/2014. (III. 7.) AB, relating to the protection of the
reputation and honour of public figures. Again, in terms of classifying the statements as facts
or opinion, the Constitutional Court came to a different conclusion to the court: ‘[The] decision
taken by the judge in the current case seized on the direct content of the statement and stuck
to it, ignoring the fact that the complainant expressed his ideas as his opinion.’50
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No substantive reasoning was attached to the decision of the Constitutional Court. It
may be assumed that the Constitutional Court was right in deciding that the speech in
question was an opinion, but they should have given arguments in favour of this position.
True, if we take the expressed statement word for word, it included untruths, but this strict
interpretation may also be misleading. It was obvious that the words must not be interpreted
in their strict sense. The same would seem to apply to this case, because it is obvious that
one party cannot have 11 different candidates in the same constituency competing with one
another.
A nominating organisation in another case shared a video on its social media site on 29
March 2015, according to which one of the rival candidates running in the by-election for
a seat in the National Assembly, who was a member of the supervisory board of MAL Zrt. at
the time when the red sludge disaster occurred, might be liable for the accident. According
to the video, ‘P.F. was sitting among the management of the company’; furthermore, ‘P.F. would
have been responsible for preventing the disaster, but he did not do anything.’ The Curia
deemed these words as a misrepresentation of facts, and elaborated in detail, with legal
references, that a member of the supervisory board may not be considered as a ‘manager’ of
the given company. Decision 9/2015. (IV. 23.) AB rejected this, and judged the statements in
the video to be an opinion:
Taking into account the circumstances, subject matter and purpose of the specific statement, the
Constitutional Court established that the video shared in the election campaign, and the statements
it contains clearly belong to the sphere of the free discussion of public affairs, which is to be granted
increased protection in order to ensure the freedom of expression. Therefore, this means that the
Curia, when taking its decision, did not take into account the fact that the local organisation of the
nominating organisation represented by the applicant shared this video as a political opinion in
the course of an election campaign.51
The claims relating to Decision 5/2015. (II. 25.) AB are also valid here. It is not only the
constitutional criteria applied to the statement of fact and opinion that are not identified in
the decision, but it is also not clear why the Constitutional Court considered the statement
in question as an opinion (which I think is erroneous). Undoubtedly, in certain cases, the
differentiation between statements of fact and of opinion is difficult and presupposes
a necessarily subjective decision, but the Constitutional Court, in its decision, should have
provided an explanation of why it provided an interpretation that is different from that of the
Curia; all the more so because in this decision, it had made genuine efforts to provide reasons
for the claims being interpreted as a statement of facts.
Decision 3107/2018. (IV. 9.) AB was handed down in respect of a leaflet featuring the
following claim: ‘T.B., your MP, has uttered the name of Fót [one of the towns in his
constituency] in the Parliament once since 2014.’ The Constitutional Court had the following
to say on whether the statement was regarded as a fact or an opinion: 
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[26] […] The Constitutional Court has consistently considered an election campaign as a situation
in which arguments for a free debate of public affairs are the strongest, and where opinions on
political programmes and the suitability of candidates may be expressed even in an exaggerated
and agitated manner, taking account of the fact that, during this period of time, there are also ample
opportunities to express rebuttals or counter-opinions. […]
[28] 3.2. Confirming all this, the Constitutional Court emphasises that in political debates, which
are especially heated during the time of the election campaign, statements of fact may not be
defined by automatically applying the provability test in the ordinary sense of the word, i.e. it may
not be restricted only to evaluating the verbatim content of the statement examined. To establish
the legal liability of those participating in an intensive debate on public affairs, it is not sufficient to
show that certain elements of the examined statement may be rebutted objectively. The statement
at issue has to be evaluated in the special situation of the election campaign and in the light of its
real message for the addressees of the campaign slogans, the message for voters. The approach
taken by this evaluation is determined by the fact that, in a democratic debate on public affairs,
those who are concerned with the debate are citizens interpreting political events in their own
context, who are aware of the specific features of opinions expressed by political parties, especially
aware of the special features of campaigning, which are to attract attention and which have
a tendency to exaggerate. […]
[29] When deciding whether or not a statement is a fact from the constitutional law perspective,
all this needs to be taken into account. If taking into account the debate on public affairs, and
especially the specific features of the campaign then it is reasonable to attribute a meaning to the
statement according to which the voters will interpret this statement as a political opinion of the
past or future policy of the party concerned, or the aptitude of the candidate, and not take it word
for word, this, then, has to be the point of departure in order to ensure the freedom of the most
intensive sphere of a public debate. This evaluation, therefore, clearly goes beyond an examination
of the elements of the statement and applying the provability test, and requires the evaluation of
all the conditions relating to the case. If the statements expressed concern different public figures
and relate to their political activities, programme or credibility and suitability, it may be assumed
that voters will deem these statements to be opinions, even if these statements were formulated in
the indicative mood. The exaggerated and shocking formulation of criticism might also be granted
protection, even if the exaggeration might affect a fact as well. In doubtful situations, the evaluation
may rely on the fact that there is ample opportunity in the campaign to rebut certain details or
elements factually.52
It is clear that, in individual cases, the freedom of debating public affairs and the differentiation
between statements of fact and statements of opinion require a flexible decision, which takes
into account the general state of public speech and the context of the statement. In the long
run, in election-related questions, it may be worth contemplating whether, in the context of
the Act on Electoral Procedure, the analogy of the generally valid rules of personality rights 
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protection is justifiable and applicable to the debate of public affairs, or, due to the character
of an election (referendum) procedure, it is possible to identify specificities which justify
a derogation from them. This is not an easy task, because applying the analogy seems natural,
as in both cases public figures and public affairs are concerned; what is more, public affairs,
which are the most likely to give rise to vigorous views, are the subject of a running debate in
an election campaign, in which the parties state facts and formulate opinions. Even on this
basis, in theory, it is possible to interpret the tests of good faith and exercising rights in
accordance with their purpose as prescribed by the Act on Electoral Procedure in a way that
is compatible with, but not fully identical to, the constitutional expectations relating to rules
on the protection of the personality rights enshrined in the Civil Code and Criminal Code.
One example of a possible derogation could be that even if due care is given [see Decisions
36/1994. (VI. 24.) AB and 7/2014. (III. 7.) AB], arguments against the protection of stating
untrue facts may be raised in the context of the election process because, although they do
not result in the violation of personality rights, they may mislead voters.
V The Threshold of Tolerance with Regard to Personality Rights 
for Persons Involved in the Discussion of Public Affairs
The enforcement of the rules on the protection of personality rights in debates of public affairs
and the higher threshold of tolerance for public figures and those concerned in public affairs
was first defined in Decision 36/1994. (VI. 24.) AB. Twenty years later, it was made more
precise when amended by Decision 7/2014. (III. 7.) AB, although regular courts did not apply
or only partially applied the decision of 1994.53 Decision 13/2014. (IV. 18.) AB partially
reinforced the argument formulated in 1994 for criminal law but, remarkably, it was applied
to the part of the test related to untrue facts:
[the] freedom of expression relating to public affairs fully protects facts that are proved true, while
it protects the act of stating or spreading false facts only if the person spreading the rumour was
not aware of the falsehood and did not fail to apply the circumspection required by their profession,
either. These statements of facts, capable of slander, constitute the criminal offence of defamation
and hence are subject to punishment.54
Concerning the freedom of value judgements, however, the Constitutional Court did not refer
to its decision of 1994 (intending to provide unlimited constitutional protection to value
judgements) but, in a previous paragraph of the Statement of Reasons, it quoted its Decision
7/2014. (III. 7.) AB, which is more restrictive in terms of the freedom of speech, but more
lenient in terms of the protection of the personality rights:
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[the] freedom of opinion no longer provides protection for self-serving statements, which are
outside the scope of the debate of public affairs, thus are related to private or family life, and aim
solely at humiliation or the use of insulting or offensive expressions, or the violation of other rights.
[…] Besides, it does not protect the opinion expressed in the public debate if the statements
formulated violate the unrestrictable essence of human dignity; as such, they are the embodiment
of an obvious and grave defamation of the human status.55
Decision 3328/2017. (XII. 8.) AB modified the test applied in 1994 on an important point.
The Statement of Reasons concluded that, since defamation as a criminal act can only be
committed deliberately, one of the elements of the test established in Decision 36/1994. 
(VI. 24.) AB may no longer be maintained, namely the one according to which the person
who ‘did not know of its falsehood [statement of fact offending one’s honour] because of his
failure to pay attention or exercise the caution reasonably expected of him pursuant to the
rules applicable to his profession or occupation, taking into account the subject matter, 
the medium and the addressee of the expression in question’ 
The Constitutional Court attributed special significance to the fact that the legislator does not
deem the defamation caused by negligence punishable as a criminal act in the effective Criminal
Code. Based on this, and taking the facts in the Statement of Reasons in Constitutional Court
Decision [34/2004. (IX. 28.)] into account, it concluded that the constitutional expectation
concerning defamation caused by negligence can no longer be maintained.56
This Decision 34/2004. (IX. 28.) AB, does indeed contain argumentation linked to the above.
However, I am of the opinion that neither there, nor in Decision 3328/2017. (XII. 8.) AB is the
point of departure appropriate: The decision of 1994 did not wish to introduce defamation
caused by negligence; it only provided grounds for exemption with respect to the conduct in
question in order to explore the reality of the given statement. As the decision of 2004 rightly
concludes: ‘The criminal act of defamation stipulated in Section 179 of the [old] Criminal
Code may exclusively be committed deliberately and, in order to establish the deliberate
nature of the act, it is necessary for the perpetrator to be aware of the fact that the statement
of fact is capable of offending one’s honour.’ Therefore, ‘deliberate nature’ here only refers to
the publication of offensive statements and not to the fact that only deliberate lies may be
offensive. The perpetrator needs to be aware of the fact that his statement is capable of
negatively impacting on the social reputation and perception of the person targeted. This is
also possible by making true statements, which the court might allow to be proved (Section
229 of the Criminal Code). If the court does not permit evidence to be provided, an otherwise
true statement might also be defamatory. It is enough if the person who did not proceed with
due care and diligence when establishing the truth of the statement knows that his statement
might have negative consequences for the person concerned, thus his conduct will be regarded
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as deliberate. The crime of defamation may be committed with a potential intention.57 As
a result, the reasoning of Decision 3328/2017. (XII. 8.) AB is unsound on this point, and it is
also questionable whether, in cases relevant to criminal law, a new test will be applied by the
Constitutional Court in the future.58 A positive answer to this would entail a significant
broadening of the scope of the freedom of speech as, in debates of public affairs in the future,
only deliberately untrue statements (wilful, intentional lies) would be criminally punishable
as defamation (though even in this case, the burden of proof would still lie with the speaker). 
The interpretation of the right to honour and the freedom of opinions in the debate of public
affairs is a question of fundamental importance. The Constitutional Court decision of 2014
introduced an interpretation that weighs up the options appropriately, and also provides room
for free speech and the protection of personality rights, which will also be reflected in
decisions handed down subsequently. Decision 3145/2018. (V. 7.) AB stipulated the following
with respect to a legal dispute between two figures in the tabloid press:
The courts acting in the case launched by the complainant examined the statements in the lawsuit
– as they were explicitly referred to by the court of second instance in its judgment – taking into
account the constitutional content of Article IX(1) of the Fundamental Law. Pursuant to this, they
formulated their uniform position, according to which the use of the term ‘psychopath’ in the case
is not a suitable ground for establishing the infringement of rights, neither on the basis of its
content, nor on the basis of the way in which it was formulated. In this context, the courts attributed
decisive importance to the fact that the defendant did not use the term at issue in a medical sense.
The court of second instance also referred to how, in everyday language, it is customary to use this
expression to describe somebody who does not act in a way liked by or expected by the other party.
Consequently, from the notes in the lawsuit, it does not follow that, according to the defendant, the
complainant suffers from the disease referred to. The defendant formulated the contested
statements as the subjective evaluation of the complainant’s conduct towards him. According to the
position taken by the courts, the formulation ‘under obscure circumstances’ can also be clearly
identified as an expression of opinion, which was a way in which the defendant reacted to the
conduct of the complainant toward him.59
The Constitutional Court laid down in its Decision 3263/2018. (VII. 20.) AB a  similar
interpretation of the right to honour in light of the free debate of public affairs, coming to the
conclusion that the right to honour does not really provide any protection in a debate of public
affairs, and only statements that go beyond the damage to one’s honour and which offend the
unrestrictable aspect of human dignity may be sanctioned: 
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[40] When interpreting the boundaries of the freedom of speech enshrined in Article IX para (1)
of the Fundamental Law – with special regard to its restriction by criminal law –, […] the
Constitutional Court established a more stringent test than ‘the offence of honour’. According to
the interpretation based on previous case law, and developing that further pursuant to the
Fundamental Law, in the debate of public affairs, a criticism or value judgement relating to the
person exercising state powers or a politician who is a public figure may not serve as grounds for
criminal liability as the main rule. Only statements that collide with the unrestrictable aspect of
human dignity, i.e. offending the legally expressed essence of one’s status as a human being, violate
the constitutional right of free expression. 
[41] The Constitutional Court emphasises that this restriction of the freedom of speech does not
limit the disparaging or abusive nature of expressing an opinion per se, but it protects the essence
of human dignity, which defines the essence of a human being. This unrestrictable domain of
human dignity is not damaged by disparaging certain partial rights derived from human dignity (e.g.
honour, good reputation) intensively and in a qualified manner, but if stating an opinion which ab
ovo is aimed at violating this sphere protected in a special manner. Such a violation of rights could
be, on the one hand, if the speaker negates or challenges the human status of those concerned or
the requirement to treat them as human beings; on the other hand, if it intrudes into the innermost
realm of human nature, attacking in a self-serving manner features that constitute the essence of
one’s personality and identity. As opposed to the subjective category of the ‘sense of honour’, this
violation provides an objective ground, which the courts may invoke when assessing defamation
from the perspective of criminal law.60
BDT 2018. 3808. follows an important supplementary interpretation, according to which
a more lenient judgment should be handed down in terms of the statement of untrue facts if
the organisation concerned in the public affair (in this case the National Tax and Customs
Authority) does not provide adequate information to the representatives of the media. In this
case, ‘speculation’, which might contain untrue statements that cannot be proved, might be
lawful if its publication is not abusive: ‘If, in public affairs of high interest to the public, the
proprietors of information withhold information of high interest, the press, in addition to
describing the facts and information serving as the basis of their conclusion, may also publish
data in the form of speculation: these are protected by the freedom of expression on condition
that they are not based on falsifying the facts.’61
It is also worth referring to a decision that relates to the constitutional interpretation of
the Act on Electoral Procedure. In the case on which Decision 3122/2014. (IV. 24.) AB is
based, a media service provider refused to broadcast a political promotional film by the
applicant. The film ‘depicts a man disguised as a monkey dressed up in a military uniform,
who is lip-synching to the voices of former Hungarian prime ministers’.62 According to the 
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position taken by the Curia, ‘identifying somebody with an animal at any time qualifies as
dehumanising the person concerned and this in a given case may be capable of violating
human dignity’.63 The position of the Curia is not sufficiently detailed; for example, the
statement of reasons does not elaborate on the question of the extent to which satire and
parody enjoy the protection of the freedom of speech. The conclusion that the phenomenon
of public figures metaphorically ‘dressing up as animals’ may be interpreted as ‘identification
with an animal’, the assessment of which concerns the very essence of the case, is dubious
and so a more detailed elaboration would have been justified. The Constitutional Court, in
agreement with the Curia, claimed that:
[the] scope of the freedom of expression protected by the Fundamental Law is broader with regard
to opinions concerning exercising state powers and politicians acting in public but, even in their
case, human dignity has an essential, untouchable core, which those formulating potential criticism
are also obliged to respect. In the present election-related case, the depiction of those concerned
as animals in a disparaging manner violates this essential content and thereby violates Article II
and Article IX(4) of the Fundamental Law.64
It may be contested that the depiction in this case violated human dignity. In the period of
election campaigns, public figures need to tolerate harsh, sometimes extreme criticism. It is
common sense that nobody would think that the filmmakers do not consider the public
figures of outstanding importance concerned in this case as homo sapiens, and so the film,
though it did depict public figures as animals, due to its characteristics as a parody, could not
have met the condition of ‘the total, obvious and severely disparaging negation of the human
status of the person concerned’.65
VI Dissemination — the Obligations of the Media in Respect 
of Reporting Different Positions in Public Debate
The matter of dissemination is one of the most sensitive issues connected to the rules on the
protection of reputation and honour. Dissemination means the act of relaying information
received from others. Under both the Civil Code and the Criminal Code, dissemination is
regarded as if the person who merely relayed the information made the false statement
himself. According to Position No. 14 of the Civil Law Department of the Supreme Court on
press correction – the validity of which may be extended to other means of protecting
reputation – ‘the correction of false statements is necessary, even if the communication
originates from other sources. For this reason, the law allows for press corrections in the event
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of both making statements based on their own experiences and of relaying or communicating,
i.e. disseminating, information received from others.’
The interest of publishing reports on public affairs and public events might collide with
the interest of publishing true statements. The media, due to their character and the pace of
publication, in numerous cases, do not have or have only a limited opportunity to check
whether information complies with reality. In policy questions, they cannot decide in favour
of any of the opposing positions, nor do they always have the opportunity to listen to the
other party (although there is a fundamental ethical requirement for the media to make efforts
to do so). Therefore, it is necessary to define the sources of information for which the media
are automatically exempted from the obligation to check the content for reality (official
communications, for example), and those that bring about some additional obligation (such
as a procedure in good faith), as well as those where due diligence or increased diligence is
expected in the course of publication.
Before the Civil Code was adopted, the case law of Hungarian courts had already shifted
to a more lenient approach toward dissemination, with exemption from liability for persons
disseminating information. In certain cases, and if using certain journalists’ sources, it may
be acceptable if the media provider merely publishes a statement as is. According to case 
EBH 2001. 407., such sources include the National Assembly, local governments and various
national and local public administration bodies. ‘Press members […] reporting on proceedings
falling within the competence (of these) or on motions or proposals filed during such
proceedings are not required to have evidence for the truthfulness of their statements.’
Similarly, the media may not be required ‘to verify the statements made in a press conference
by a police officer’ (BH 2002. 51.). By way of extending the application of this principle, the
act of relaying information received from a press officer of the court may not serve as grounds
for any claim for the infringement of personality rights (BH 2003. 357.). Similarly, ‘press
correction may not be sought if the press publishes correct information about a  fact
established in a criminal, civil or public administrative action before the completion of the
proceedings’ (BH 2004. 273.), even if the information subsequently turns out to be false in 
the course of the proceedings. For example, journalists who practically called a victim of
a crime a psychopath on the basis of a defective expert opinion prepared during the police
investigation were found not guilty of the crime of libel under case EBH 2005. 1289.
A Supreme Court decision has also been made concerning the interpretation of the notion
of dissemination in the context of on-line communication. If the on-line content provider
publishes the news on a public website of a weekly paper run by it in a way that is accessible
to anybody, the person who releases this information to others does not meet the statutory
conditions of dissemination (BDT 2012. 2742.). In contrast, according to BH 2013. 266.
‘relaying the infringing article by e-mail shall qualify as dissemination.’
It was rather late, at the end of 2017 that the Constitutional Court first dealt with the
question of dissemination in its Decision 34/2017. (XII. 11.) AB. In its first decision, it laid
down a rule on interpretation – as a constitutional requirement – that extends the scope of
exemption of the media from liability with regard to dissemination. The exemptions granted
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include not only official communications by various organisations exercising executive power
and other state organisations but press conferences of public figures in general.
The Constitutional Court establishes: It is a constitutional requirement stemming from Article
IX(2) of the Fundamental Law and the freedom of the press enshrined therein that media content
providers’ activity, when reporting on the statements made at the press conferences of public figures
in the debate of public affairs, in a way that is true to reality, without any interpretation and
assessment and clearly indicating the sources of information and providing space for the rebuttal
of the person affected by the statements of facts which might potentially offend his good reputation
(or offering the opportunity for a response) shall not qualify as dissemination that is sanctioned by
civil law as the violation of personality rights.66
The constitutional interpretation has also been followed in the case law of this area and indeed
the practices of courts have further extended its scope. According to the decision of the Court
of Appeal in Pécs, BDT 2018. 3835., the full and true to reality reporting of any statements
made by public figures – i.e. not only statements made at a press conference – provides
grounds for exemption from liability, even if the reporting published contains a statement of
untrue facts: ‘The media shall not be liable to prove truthfulness, if it reports the statement
of a public figure in its entirety and true to the original. The substantive content of the
statement in such a case shall be the opinion of the speaker itself, which may also include
statements of facts evaluated by the speaker.’67
A second Constitutional Court decision on this matter, 3002/2018. (I. 10.) AB, handed
down not long after this one, however, immediately narrowed the scope of the above
constitutional requirement. In a way that is somewhat difficult to interpret, it established that
the media shall be exempted from liability for an untrue statement they have disseminated
only on condition that the media content includes exclusively the statements of those
participating in the debate of the public affair, and nothing else beyond that. This is not too
realistic and ab ovo excludes the possibility of an exemption of any article or news report
prepared by the media themselves, beyond noting down and publishing the statements made
by others. At the same time, the Constitutional Court does not limit the theoretical possibility
of exemption from liability in terms of publishing facts stated at a press conference, thus such
a publication – in line with the decision of the Pécs Court of Appeal – may include any
statement concerning a  public affair on condition that it does indeed contain only the
statements of those concerned.
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In the interpretation of the Constitutional Court – taking the constitutional requirement established
in Decision 34/2017. (XII. 11.) AB into account – press coverage is outside the interpretation scope
of dissemination if the media content focuses only on the up-to-date and credible statements of the
persons participating in the debate on the public affair. In the given case, the press coverage did not
focus on the statement of the first defendant but the description of information related to the events,
which is contradictory. Consequently, in the given case, the press coverage examined qualifies as
dissemination.68
The Magyar Jeti Zrt. v Hungary case69 was launched following the latter decision of the
Constitutional Court. The applicant made a complaint before the ECtHR, claiming that the
Hungarian authorities had violated his right to the freedom of speech. The case is particularly
interesting in that the dissemination was committed by embedding a link into the article; as
such, the case was also about the legal judgment of a new form of communication made
possible by Internet-based communication: Is it possible for the mere publication of a link to
be infringing if the link leads to text or a video containing infringing, untrue statements?
According to the judgment of the ECtHR, if the journalist and/or the media content made
by him did not express his agreement with the infringing content, and if he proceeded in
good faith with due diligence, respecting the ethical rules of journalism or professional ethics,
posting the link in itself does not amount to defamation. In addition, the context of the
infringing content needs to be considered, namely what was the legal case regarding which it
was posted for the public and who is affected; clearly the threshold of tolerance of outstanding
public figures (in this case a parliamentary party) is also higher in such cases.70
VII Legislative Changes in the Summer of 2018: The Amendment 
of the Fundamental Law and the Civil Code, and the New Law 
on the Protection of Private Life
The summer of 2018 saw several important legislative amendments, which have
fundamentally affected the freedom of debate in public affairs and the enforcement of
personality rights in private law. In the seventh amendment of the Fundamental Law, Article
VI(1) was supplemented with the following text: ‘Exercising the right to freedom of expression
and assembly shall not impair the private and family life and home of others.’ If the category
of private life is interpreted by the Constitutional Court in line with Article 8 of the European
Convention of Human Rights then that may include the right to good reputation and honour. 
Act LIII of 2018 on the Protection of Private Life uses this as its point of departure (which,
however, logically may not tie the hands of the Constitutional Court when interpreting the
provisions of the Fundamental Law in the future). According to Section 8(1) of the Act, 
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‘the purpose of the right to respecting private life is especially the right to a name, the
protection of personal data, private secrets, image and sound recording, honour and good
reputation’. Section 7(2), however, stipulates that ‘[the] private and family life, as well as the
home of a public figure, shall be granted the same protections as those of a person who does
not qualify as a public figure’. Reading the two provisions concurrently, we may also conclude
that the right to good reputation and honour, as well as the right to one’s image and one’s
recorded sound, are part of the right to private life, and the scope of these rights of public
figures are exactly the same as the scope of the rights of private individuals. However, this
interpretation is not acceptable, because, on the one hand, in terms of the enforcement of
these rights, the most relevant category is not that of the public figure but the public affair
while, on the other hand, the same act amended Section 2:44 of the Civil Code, which
stipulates the restriction of personality rights in the context of the discussion of public affairs.
Nevertheless, the new act does not create a new statement of fact, which may have an impact
on the tests of the freedom of speech in the debates of public affairs, and so it remains possible
to establish a violation of ‘good reputation’ or ‘private life’ on the basis of the Civil Code and
the case law of the Constitutional Court and other courts based on it. Instead, the act defines
individual facts amounting to the violation of the right to family life, home and respecting
and maintaining contacts.
According to the provisions of the Civil Code, which took effect in August 2018:
Section 2:44 [Protection of the personality rights of public figures]
(1) The exercise of fundamental rights ensuring a free discussion of public affairs may limit the
personality rights of public figures to an extent that is necessary and proportionate and is without
prejudice to human dignity; however, it shall not violate their private and family life and home.
(2) Public figures shall be entitled to the same protection as non-public figures with regard 
to communications or conduct falling outside the scope of free discussion of public affairs.
(3) Activities and data in relation to the private or family life of public figures shall not qualify 
as public affairs.
The new text inserted into Paragraph (1) (‘however, it shall not violate their private and family
life and home’) makes it likely that the text of the Civil Code will lend itself to a more restrictive
interpretation of the concept of private life, as it does not include the right to good reputation
and honour. From the whole of Paragraph (1), it still emerges that, in debates of public affairs,
the protection of the right to good reputation, honour, image and recorded sound is restricted
and opinions published in these debates and negatively influencing these rights are not
infringing per se due to their character, but instead they are to be judged by earlier case law
applying the Civil Code and the constitutional interpretation of the freedom of speech.
Essentially, the new Paragraph (2) codified part of what is in decision 7/2014. (III. 7.) AB,
providing the same degree of protection to public figures as for non-public figures in terms
of statements falling outside the debate of public affairs. With regard to the new Paragraph
(3), it is extremely important that it should be interpreted by courts in light of the freedom of
speech enshrined in Article IX of the Fundamental Law: The private life of a public figure
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may also be of high interest to the public if it is related to his public activities or has any
bearing on any public affair.
Act LIII of 2018 seems, then, to be a strange piece of legislation, because for the most part
it repeats certain provisions of the Fundamental Law, the Civil Code and Act CXII of 2011 on
informational self-determination and the freedom of information with some additional
content and imposing the sanctions enshrined in the Civil Code in the event of infringements.
Its interpretation and identifying its autonomous normative content will be the responsibility
of courts and the Constitutional Court.
VIII Closing Remarks
The interpretation of personality rights and the relevant provisions of the Civil Code have
gained momentum as a result of the decisions adopted by the Constitutional Court and regular
courts in recent years related to the freedom of speech, specifically in discussions of public
affairs. It would not be an exaggeration to claim that the number of important decisions taken
during this period exceeded those made between 1994 and 2014, a span of twenty years. The
significant number of constitutional complaints raised indicates a similar intensity in the near
future, which one hopes will lead to the cementing of constitutional principles and the
resolution of contradictions in their application. Discussions of public affairs continue to
enjoy a broad degree of freedom, and the case law under the aegis of the Civil Code has been
extremely helpful in defining the scope of this freedom. With regard to questions of detail, no
long-term conclusions may be drawn, due to the rapid changes in this area and legislative
efforts as recently as the summer of 2018, but the main criteria needed to strike a balance
between the protection of personality rights, and the freedom of the debate of public affairs
have already been identified, and the principles applicable to decisions made in individual
cases are available in a solid and mature form with a sufficient degree of detail. The category
of public affairs is to be interpreted broadly, whereby the public figure is an important
category, but it is of secondary importance compared to the category of public affairs, and
where the differentiation between statements of fact and statements of opinion is to be treated
in a flexible way, and the threshold of tolerance of those concerned is clear from the case law
of the Constitutional Court. These are praiseworthy successes in the less than three decades of
history of the freedom of speech in Hungary.
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I Introduction, Methodology
1 Introduction
‘At the moment, Europe has huge reservoirs of scientific talent, but a very poor record at
creating start-ups. The question many investors ask is: where is the European Google?’1
The basis of a successful company is a good idea. However, a good idea is not enough for
success because it is necessary to finance the prototype, the marketing, the salary of the
employees, the machinery, etc. It is very rare for the inventor to have enough resources to
finance all expenses; as a result, funding usually involves external resources. Bank finance
always provides a possibility in order to satisfy these financing needs, providing the company
has enough assets as security for the bank loan. At the same time, we shall not forget that
even if companies in their early phases do not have such assets which would provide proper
securities for banks; on the other hand, the bank loans are expensive money. Unlike bank
loans, investors provide equity, which does not have to be given back, although the investor
will be a shareholder in the company. Equity transactions are good for the company, since it
can use the investor’s money as a capital increase, and equity transactions are also good for
investors, assuming the company becomes successful and the investor can sell his share at
a higher price than his original investment.2
In the different phases of company development, the typical investors are always different
entities. In the beginning, the company is financed by the founders and the so-called FFF,
namely friends, family and fools. In the very early phase, corporate finance is so risky that
there is no person who would take such risk other than the closest friends of the founders,
their families or ‘foolish’ people. In the later phases, the risk is lower and there are some natural
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persons, named business angels, who believe in the project and finance the company for
a  short time. When the company is more advanced and it already has sales channels,
permanent buyers, a complete prototype, etc., then other investors tend to appear, such as the
venture capital investors (VC) and private equity funds (PE). Finally, the company may
become strong enough to be financed from the capital market as a listed company.3
Obviously, these phases are only the typical, average development phases of a successful
company’s life cycle but it can probably be accepted as a general experience. The different
types of investors, in the different phases of company development are illustrated in Figure 1
below.4
Figure 1: Corporate finance in the different phases of the company development
2 Methodology
In this study, we analyse three German and three Hungarian investment contracts and present
the corporate governance of the target company after the first venture capital investor has
invested in the target company.
In this study, we seek for the person who really manages the target company. In other
words, we are looking for the person who is responsible for the decisions.
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In this study, the company that receives the investment amount will be named the 
target company, and the investor is always deemed to be a VC fund. The legal forms of the target
company were always GmbH in the German contracts and Kft. in the Hungarian contracts.
The members of the GmbH will be named shareholders in this study, because the German
contracts also used this expression. The Hungarian Kft. has members; therefore we use this
expression for the owners of the target company, although it is not a partnership. Many times,
when we discuss general problems, we do not differentiate members and shareholders, and
use the ‘shareholders’ expression, since there is no relevant difference between these
expressions regarding our study, and it will be easier to understand our statements.
The first shareholders or members of the target company are named founders. We have
to note that there is no big difference between VC and PE investors’ investment practices in
Hungary, so usually, the VC and PE funds use the same terms and conditions but we follow
the international trends and this study is based on the practice of VC funds.5
In this study, we analyse the Hungarian and German investment laws and practice. Our
research method was empirical; we analyse six investment contracts. Three Hungarian
contracts were chosen from my own ten-year long investment attorney practice, while three
German contracts were chosen from a remarkable German investment law firm’s practice,
where I worked as an observer researcher.
Our working method had two parts. The Hungarian contracts were selected from the
investment contracts available at our own practice, and chose the three most typical risk
capital investment contracts. The most typical contracts should be considered that contracts
in which the most frequently contained the most atypical investment contractual elements.
Atypical contractual elements are those terms and conditions that are not in the Hungarian
Civil Code or not otherwise used in daily commercial law practice. This is what Patton calls
‘purposeful sampling’.6 On the other hand, the German contracts were examined based on the
contracts, given to us by our German colleagues. We asked them to give us the three most
typical risk capital investment contracts from their own practice. The method, when the
researcher asks other experts to give research material for their study Webley names ‘snowball
sampling techniques’.7
We have to emphasise that our research is qualitative research; the sampling and our
conclusions are not necessarily representative or objective. Of course, it is not possible to
conduct quantitative research into contractual practice as there is no researcher who could
read every investment relevant contract. As was stated by Corbin and Strauss, ‘Nowadays,
however, we all know that in qualitative research, objectivity is only a myth.’8 Our only purpose
with this study is to describe the investment contracts which appeared during our research
and give a broad picture of the corporate governance system in these contracts.
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Our research is based on inductive method, using comparative legal analysis techniques.
We explain the most significant statutory laws from both legal systems and also draw some
conclusions.
First of all, we introduce the mandatory law relating to the general corporate governance
of the target companies in the examined agreements; later, the corporate bodies are presented
in detail and finally we will draw some conclusions.
II Corporate Governance in the Examined Contracts
First of all, we have to clarify what the definition of the corporate governance is.
We accept Richard Smaldon’s definition: 
corporate governance is the system by which business corporations are directed and controlled. The
corporate governance structure specifies the distribution of rights and responsibilities among
different participants in the corporation, such as the board, managers, shareholders and other
stakeholders, and spells out the rules and procedures for making decisions on corporate affairs. By
doing this, it also provides the structure through which the company objectives are set, and the
means of obtaining those objectives and monitoring performance.9
Moreover, it is also necessary to explain contractual corporate governance. Richard Smerdon
defines the contractual corporate governance as follows: ‘Contractual corporate governance
refers to the ways and means by which individual companies can deviate from their national
corporate governance standards by increasing (or reducing) the level of protection they offer
to their shareholders and other stakeholders.’10 In view of such a definition, we shall only
focus on the question of the difference between the statutory law and the applied corporate
governance in the examined contracts.
First of all, we introduce the structure of German and Hungarian VC contracts and later
we explain how the corporate bodies were working and what power the different corporate
bodies had.
1 Corporate Governance in the German Agreements
Each German investment contracts consisted of three main different types of agreement. 
The first agreement is an investment agreement, which regulates the investment
procedure, the amount of the investment, the tranches and KPIs.11 The second is a share -
holders’ agreement which sets out the internal rules of the company’s operations and the
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other rights and obligations between the parties. These two are considered to be trade secret
and it is not required to publish their content according to the applicable law. The third
agreement is the articles of association, which is a mandatory regulated document mandatory
law and qualifies as public data because it is registered in the commercial register. Besides
these agreements, there were many other documents in the transactions, for instance power
of attorney mandates, business plans, IP agreements and a list of shareholders, etc.
The shareholders’ agreement always had two parts in the examined contracts, the
corporate governance and the special rights of the investor. Therefore, in the following, we
focus on the rules of the shareholders’ agreement.
In each contract, there were three main corporate decision-makers:
a) Shareholders’ meetings, as the supreme body of the target company. 
b) Board: Each contract referred to a so-called ‘other corporate body’, namely the advisory
board. This body makes decisions on issues that are usually within the duties of senior
management’s (derogating from managing directors’ competencies).12
c) CEO: None of the shareholders’ agreements has any rules for the managing director of
the company (CEO), but it was regulated in the articles of association and in mandatory law.
As we will see, the managing director has a general power to manage the company, except
regarding the powers delegated to other corporate bodies. In fact, the shareholders’ contracts
all concerned the reduction of the managing director’s power and enhancing the power of the
general meeting and board.13
Finally, it is noted that none of the contracts has any rules for the supervisory board nor
the auditor.
2 Corporate Governance in the Hungarian Agreements
Unlike the structure of German VC contracts, there were only two main agreements in one
investment transaction in the examined Hungarian transactions: the investment agreement
and the articles of association. The first one contained the investment structure, tranches,
KPIs and the internal relationships regarding the company’s operations and the other rights
and obligations between the parties. This document was considered trade secret. The articles
of association contained the rules which governed the organization and operations of the
target company and which were regulated by the mandatory Hungarian corporate law. 
The articles of association are public data; thus it must be published upon being registering
in the company register. Both of these contracts have detailed rules regarding corporate
governance.
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We found the following corporate governance systems in the examined Hungarian
contracts:
a) Members’ meeting: The main body of the target company was the members’ meeting in
each contract.
b) Board: There was only one Hungarian contract in which an ‘other corporate body’ was
established, named as an advisory board. In this contract, there was neither a supervisory
board nor an auditor. 
c) CEO: Some of the duties and responsibilities of the managing director were regulated in
the articles of association but, in a similar way to the German agreements, most rules were
in the mandatory corporate law.
d) Supervisory board and auditor: In other two Hungarian contracts, where there was no
board, operated a supervisory board and auditor.
Now, let us see what power these corporate bodies have and how the different corporate
bodies can work together.
III Supreme Body of Target Companies
1 Shareholders’ Meeting in a GmbH
The shareholders’ meeting is the ultimate decision-making body of a GmbH in German law. The
shareholders usually exercise their rights at the shareholders’ meeting. According to the GmbH
Act (Gesetzbetreffend die Gesellschaften mit beschränkter Haftung; GmbH Act), there are two
types of shareholders’ resolutions: 
a) The exclusive competences of the shareholders’ meeting.
The powers that are regulated in the mandatory law have to be listed here which and the
shareholders cannot diverge from the law (ius cogens). Such powers are, for instance,
amending the articles of association;14 calling in additional contributions;15 dissolving the
company and appointing and recalling the liquidators;16 and making resolutions regarding
measures pursuant to the Transformation Act such as mergers, spin-offs, and changes of legal
form.17
b) The issues that are generally decided by the management of the company, unless the
articles of association of the company provided otherwise. 
These issues are not listed in the mandatory law, therefore they belong within the
management’s competence but, if the shareholders provided otherwise in the articles of
association, they can reduce the power of the management and enhance the power of the
shareholders’ meeting.
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Moreover, the shareholders’ meeting can also reduce the power of the management in
other ways, as follows:
a) the shareholders’ meeting has the right to instruct the management of the company by
its singular resolution, and
b) the shareholders’ meeting may set up other corporate bodies and appoint and dismiss
the members of these boards.18 As we mentioned above, in each examined German
agreement, the shareholders used this right and set up advisory boards.
In the examined German contracts, the competence of the shareholders’ meeting is
recorded in the shareholders’ agreement and the articles of association. The decision-making
system consists of the following rules: 
a) General rules: The shareholders’ meeting shall have a quorum when the members entitled
to vote and representing more than a half of the votes to be cast are present. Unless the mandatory
law, the articles of association or the investment agreement provide for a higher majority, all
shareholders’ resolutions are taken by a simple majority (i.e. more than 50%) of the votes.
b) Veto right: it is not possible to make any resolution in the shareholders’ meeting without
the consent of the investor. Therefore, the investor alone cannot decide a matter in the
competence of the shareholders’ meeting, but it can prevent any decision (‘destructive veto’).19
All of the examined German contracts contain a very particular and exhaustive list of
topics for the shareholders’ meeting. The issues on this list may be decided by the shareholders’
meeting with the exclusive destructive veto right of the investor.
Without listing all individual powers of the shareholders’ meeting set out in the contracts,
the following main groups are highlighted concerning the power of the shareholders’ meeting:
a) The exclusive competences of the shareholders’ meeting, mentioned above.
b) Every decision related to the structure of the management: determining the number of
the managing directors; concluding, amending and terminating the managing director’s
service agreement, granting sole and joint power of representation to the managing directors,
deciding on the remuneration of the managing board; etc.
c) Share-related decisions: approval of the allocation of shares or parts of shares in the
company, including any transfer, pledge or other encumbrance, implementation and
termination of a trust relationship; resolutions regarding and in connection with the redemption
of shares in the company; etc.
d) Establishment of another corporate body: supervisory board, auditor, advisory board and
any other corporate body.
e) Approval of certain transactions. This group divides into two further subgroups:
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– the legal form of contracts: any contract related to real estate (sale, lease, etc.); loan,
factoring, etc.;
– the value of the transaction: by using an exact, maximum value of the transaction, or
transfer of a significant part of the company assets. 
At this point, we should note that the German Federal Supreme Court clarified the
competence of the management in the Holzmüller case relating to the transfer of assets.
Although it concerned a listed company, we nevertheless highlight the main points of the
case regarding the content of investment contracts and the will of the parties to such
contracts. The court decided that the management board was not entitled to transfer the
assets to the subsidiary without the approval of the shareholders’ meeting, as this measure:
– touched upon the core of the company’s operation;
– related to the most valuable part of the company; and
– entirely changed the corporate structure.
In the first case, in 1982, the disposal of a business which amounted to 80% of the
company’s assets, but later in two other decisions, the Courts clarified the first decision: in
relation to company restructuring matters, the unwritten authority of the general meeting
exists only in relation to measures which:
– result in substantive changes to the articles of association and therefore affect the
fundamental authority of the supreme body,
– have a significant economic effect.20
In the contracts examined here, we found that the parties to the investment contract
diverged from the German mandatory law and, in a similar way to the Holzmüller decisions,
defined a significant asset transfer, whether relating to the deal size, or the types of asset deals,
and the significant asset deals drew upon the discretion of the shareholders’ meeting.
Although we do not assume that the parties agreed on the above rules because of the
Holzmüller cases, these rules are however deemed to be representative of the international
trend of VC investment contracts.21
As a summary, we can record that the role of the shareholders’ meeting in the corporate
governance is the strategic direction of the company; it decides on major transactions, the
designation of the management organisation and the appointment of the members of the
management.22
n ELTE LAW JOURNAL • ATTILA PINTÉR
n 152
20 BGH 25.02.1982, Az.: II ZR 102/81 in M. J. Thomas Möllers, German and European company law (university
notes, University of Augsburg 2017) 15.
21 Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP (Markus Piontek, Vanessa Sousa Höhl, Johannes Rüberg, John Harrison
Barbara Hasse, Lars Wöhning, Justine Koston), Orrick’s Guide to Venture Capital Deals in Germany (Orrick,
Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP, January 2018) 54.
22 See more about the role of the shareholders: Ken Rushton, The business case for corporate governance (Cambridge
University Press 2008, Cambridge) 81–99.
ELJ-2019-1__1.korr.  2020.05.20.  23:14  Page 152
2 Members’ Meeting in a Kft.
The legal structure of a Hungarian Kft. is very similar to that of a German GmbH. Although
the Kft. has its own legal personality and its members’ liability is limited, the liability of
members to the company extends only to the provision of their initial contributions, and to
other contributions set out in the memorandum of association,23 but the members do not
have securities regarding their legal relationship to the company.24 The membership of the Kft.
is named ‘üzletrész’, which means all rights and obligations arising in connection with the
capital contribution of the members. Üzletrész shall come to existence upon the company’s
registration.25 (The üzletrész is generally translated as business share or quota, but in the
following we use ‘share’, whilst the owner of the share is a ‘member’.)
The most important rules of the Kft. are regulated by the Hungarian Civil Code.
Regarding the Hungarian Civil Code, the main decision-making body of the Kft. is the
members’ meeting. There is no comprehensive list in the mandatory law of the competences
of the member’s meeting, although some questions can only be decided by it. Such issues are,
for instance, the appointment and dismissal of the managing director, the auditor and the
members of the supervisory board, increasing and reducing the capital.26 Other questions
fall into the scope of the member’s meeting, except if otherwise provided in the articles of
association of the company. Those that are not named in the mandatory law or in the articles
of association of the company as within the power of the member’s meeting or another
corporate body fall into the competence of the management.
In the examined Hungarian contracts, the supreme body of the company has very similar
competence and process as in the German contracts:
a) The member’s meeting is quorate when the members entitled to vote and representing
more than a half of the votes to be cast are present. If there is no quorum at the members’
meeting, the reconvened members’ meeting shall have a quorum for the issues of the original
agenda irrespective of the voting rights or investor being represented. In one of the examined
contracts, the reconvened members’ meeting is also void if the investor is not represented. In
this case, the second reconvened members’ meeting will only have a quorum irrespective of
the investor being represented.
b) Unless the mandatory law, the articles of association or the investment agreement
provides for a higher majority, all shareholders’ resolutions are taken by a simple majority
(i.e. more than 50%) provided the investor supports the decision (destructive veto).
All the examined Hungarian contracts contain a very particular and exhaustive list of
topics for the member’s meeting. This list is very similar, and the structure of the issues is the
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To understand the German GmbH management structure, we first examine the main mandatory
corporate rules.
The GmbH has two compulsory corporate bodies: the shareholders’ meeting and the
managing director. One or more managing directors have to be appointed in each GmbH,
according to the GmbH Act.27 The managing director represents the company in legal
transactions and performs the management. The law allows management by shareholder or
third-party managing directors.28 The managing director has the right to represent and act
on behalf of the company in all legal transactions in and out of court. The scope of his/her
authority is unlimited and cannot be limited in relation to third parties.29 Unless the articles
of association provide otherwise, the managing director is only jointly authorised to represent
the company.30 Nevertheless, the articles of association may allow the managing director to
have authority to represent the company alone, or together with another managing director
or a so-called procuration officer.
The managing director has a  large scope of duties. Generally, the main duty of the
managing director is to conduct the company’s affairs with the due care of a  prudent
businessman.31 Some particular duties of a  managing director, named in the German
mandatory law, are:
a) to ensure that the accounts are kept properly, and balance sheets are drawn up properly;32
b) to submit tax returns in the name of the company;33
c) that the shareholders’ meeting is convened by the managing director;34
d) to file the necessary applications with the commercial register;35
e) if the company becomes insolvent or over-indebted, the managing director applies for
insolvency proceedings to be opened.36
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Unless otherwise provided for in the articles of association, the managing director is
appointed and recalled by the shareholders meeting. The resolution on such an appointment
must be passed by the majority of the shareholders.37
Further corporate bodies are optional, and should be stipulated in the articles of
association of the company.38 The name of these bodies can be very different: advisory board
(‘Beirat’), administrative board (‘Verwaltungsrat’) or shareholders’ committee (‘Gesellschafter -
aus schuss’); but there is no mandatory law for these bodies.39
In some cases, the parties of the investment contract cannot diverge from the German
mandatory law (ius cogens), whilst in other questions, they can regulate their own legal
relationships (ius disponendi). For instance, it has to be at least one managing director in
a  GmbH, but some duties of the managing director are dispositive rules. Using the
opportunity of ius disponendi, the parties agree on setting up a corporate body in every
examined contract, which is not regulated by the mandatory law, and is named an advisory
board (‘Beirat’). In the following, let us see how the examined German contracts regulated the
power of the advisory board. 
In each transaction, the advisory board is established under the articles of association. The
advisory board consists of 3, 4 and 640 members in the three examined contracts. In one of
the contracts, the members of the advisory board were separately delegated by two investors
(2 members) and one member was jointly delegated by the founders. In the other two
contracts, the members of the advisory board were appointed by the shareholders’ meeting.
The resolution on such an appointment shall be passed by the majority of the shareholders.
We have to note that although the founders pass resolutions by a majority of votes, as we
mentioned above, the investor may block the resolution passed by using its destructive veto
right, so in fact the members of the advisory board are ‘nominated’ by the founders and
‘appointed’ by the investors. The logic of this system is that the stakeholders (founders,
investors) have to agree on the members of the advisory board since this corporate body has
a large scope of very important topics with regard to corporate governance. 
The list of these topics is very long; the parties listed the competence of the advisory
board in detail, in each contract. Without listing all the powers of the advisory board
individually, the following main groups are emphasised:
a) CEO: In one contract, the managing director is not appointed by the shareholders’
meeting, but by the advisory board. In this contract, the advisory board stipulated the number
of directors and their duties as well.
b) Management body: In two contracts, the advisory board has the right to establish the
rules of procedure for the management whilst in the third contract the shareholders’ meeting
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shall have such a right. In one contract, the advisory board may decide on the remuneration
of the managing director.
c) Financial statements: In each contract, the managing director makes and the advisory
board comments on the financial statements (balance sheet, profit and loss account, financial
plan, investment plan), which are accepted by the shareholders’ meeting.
d) Certain contracts: As we detailed above, the most important contracts are approved by
the shareholders’ meeting. Other contracts are approved by the advisory board, unless the
contracts were less significant or connected to the usual daily business which belongs to 
the duties of the managing director. In this group, the contracts are categorised based on their
subject (e.g. real estate, loan or other financing contract, security contracts, investment
transactions, etc.), or because of their value.
e) Employment relationships: conclusion, amendment and termination of key employment
contracts; implementation of an employee incentive plan; conclusion, amendment and
termination of a collective agreement.
f ) Subsidiary company: Setting up or acquisition of a  share in another company and
decision-making related to subsidiaries.
The advisory board could bring any decisions by passing a  resolution, except those
decisions delegated to the power of the shareholders’ meeting. In the company where the
advisory board consists of three members and two members are delegated by the investors,
the advisory board shall pass resolutions by a simple majority of votes. In the other two
companies, where the majority of the members of the advisory board are delegated by the
founders, the advisory board passed resolutions by a simple majority of votes, including 
the votes to be cast by a member with special rights. This member was delegated to the
advisory board directly by the investor.
The managing director shall execute the resolution of the advisory board, but the advisory
board cannot make decisions that are against the law, the articles of association and the
resolutions of the shareholders’ meeting.
2 Hungarian Structure
First, let us review the Hungarian mandatory corporate law.
The management of a Kft. is provided for by one or more managing directors.41 The
managing director can be a natural person or a legal person, but if the executive officer is a legal
person then it shall designate a natural person to discharge the functions of the executive officer
in its name and on its behalf.42 The managing director manages the operations of the Kft.
independently, based on the primacy of the Kft’s interests. In this capacity, the managing
director discharges his or her duties in due compliance with the relevant legislation, the
articles of association and the resolutions of the company’s supreme body (members’
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meeting). The managing director may not be instructed by the members of the Kft. and he
may not be deprived of his powers by the members’ meeting.43 Otherwise, the members’
meeting may decide to amend the articles of association of the company and make a decision
on changing the duties of the managing director; it can increase or decrease his or her
duties.44
The general rule of civil law is the decisions that are related to the governance of the
company and are beyond the competence of the members shall be adopted by one or more
managing directors.45 The Hungarian Civil Code lists some special rules, which belong to the
managing director’s duties, unless the mandatory law or articles of association of the
company otherwise provide for instance: requesting the registration of the company into
the company register, representation of the company, convening the members’ meeting, etc.
The managing director is responsible for every decision which is not included in the issues of the
members’ meeting or another corporate body, which are based on the articles of association
of the company.46
According to the decision of the Hungarian supreme court (Curia of Hungary, ‘Kúria’), it
is allowed that the structure of a kft.’s management is regulated in the articles of the association
differently from the mandatory law and more than one managing director is elected to
a management board of the company that can make a decision as a corporate body. Notwith -
standing, this structure may not change the representation of the company.47
In the examined Hungarian investment contracts, I found two different structures for
the board of the target company.
One of the examined Hungarian contracts had a management structure of a board,
without a supervisory board. Two of the examined contracts have a management structure
without a board but with a supervisory board.48 The decision-making system in these target
companies is presented as follows: 
a) The target company in which a board has been set up operated very similarly to the German
target companies. In this structure, the members’ meeting passed resolutions in the most
important but few in number of strategic questions; the board made decisions on the daily
operation of the target company and managing director executed these decisions. In this
structure, the member’s meeting was rarely convened, usually only once a year, but the board
had meetings very often, even more than two or three times a month. The main powers of the
board are not significantly different from the German structure, focused on personal
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questions (elect and dismiss the CEO, or other key employees), the operation of the target
company’s bodies, approval of some financial statements, decision on employee matters, and
issues regarding the subsidiaries.
b) In two other contracts, in which a board had not been set up but a supervisory board
was established, the competence of the members’ meeting is very wide; the members’ meeting
may pass a resolution on every strategic question and the most important operating questions: 
– any question that is delegated to the competence of the supreme body of the company by
the mandatory law (e.g. amendment of the articles of association, appointment of the managing
director, capital increase or decrease, etc.)
– the management structure of the company (e.g. setting up a  new corporate body,
remuneration of the managing director and key employees, etc.)
– any change of the ownership structure of the company
– the approval of high value or significant contracts.
In this structure, the managing director only executes the decision of the members’
meeting. The managing director can only decide on some questions that are not included in
the scope of the members’ meeting.
Otherwise, the management’s area of control is very wide; the members of the companies
elected an auditor and set up a supervisory board in both contracts. 
The permanent auditor is always an independent person who inspects the books of the
company and his or her report shall be published. The permanent auditor, who is appointed
by the supreme body, shall be responsible for carrying out the audits of accounting documents
in accordance with the relevant regulations, and shall provide an independent audit report to
determine whether the annual accounts of the business association are in conformity with the
legal requirements, and whether they provide a true and fair view of the company’s assets
and liabilities, financial position and profit or loss.49
Members of the Kft. may provide, in the articles of association, for the establishment of
a supervisory board. The supervisory board’s task is the supervision of the management in
order to protect the interests of the Kft. Regarding the statutory law, the members of the
supervisory board shall be independent of the management of the legal person, and shall not
be bound by any instruction in performing their duties.50 Nevertheless, it is not prohibited
for a member of the permanent supervisory board to be a member of the target company, or
his/her representative. 
The members of the examined target companies set up a supervisory board at the request
of the investor and one member of the supervisory board is always the deputy of the investor.
The investor required the establishment of the supervisory board since, in this structure, the
members’ meeting may decide on almost every issue of corporate governance, provided 
the investor supports the resolution, but the investor is not an active player in the daily
business of the company, therefore he or she needs information related to the operation of the
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company. The supervisory board continually supervised the management of the company; it
had up-to-date information about the problems with the business of the company or the success
of the managing director. The member of the supervisory board delegated by the investor
informed the investor about these problems or good news. According to the examined
contracts, the investor had the right to know about these problems and had the power to
make effective decisions at the members’ meeting to deal with such issues. 
We have to emphasise that, the member of the supervisory board who was delegated by
the investor was not independent; he or she had some legal relationship with the investor
and the investor had the right (directly or indirectly) to instruct their deputy supervisory
board member. Moreover, the parties accepted in the investment contract that the investor
member of the supervisory board could first of all or more particularly inform the investor on
the affairs of the target company. Because of their legal relationship, this member supervises
the management of the company in favour of the investor, but not in favour of the company
or every member of the company. Although we do not know a mandatory law that prohibits
this structure, corporate governance can however be deformed by the non-independent
supervisory board member.51
V Governance and Management
According to Tricker, a distinction must be made between governance and management: the
management runs the business; the board ensures that it is being well run and run in the right
direction.52 In the following, we summarize the theory of the actors regarding the examined
transactions and their roles in corporate governance; later we present the management
structure in the target companies.
a) Executive director
The executive director is the executive manager of the company who is engaged in the daily
management of the company. The chief executive officer is often known as the managing
director. The executive manager is usually a member of the management board.53
b) Non-executive director
A non-executive manager is the member of the board who does not hold any executive
management position in the company.54 The 2003 Higgs Review stated that 
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The role of the non-executive director is frequently described as having two principal components:
monitoring executive activity and contributing to the development of strategy. (…) However, as
the non-executive directors do not report to the chief executive and are not involved in the day-
to-day running of the business, they can bring fresh perspective and contribute more objectively
in supporting, as well as constructively challenging and monitoring, the management team. (…) The
role of the non-executive director is therefore both to support executives in their leadership of the
business and to monitor and supervise their conduct.55
Tricker makes a difference between an independent and a connected non-executive director.
The independent non-executive director is a director with no affiliation or other relationship
with the company, except the directorship, that could affect, or be seen to affect, the exercise
of objective, independent judgement. The connected non-executive director is a director who
is not a member of the management but does have some relationship with the company and
can affect the management. Such a connected non-executive director is a nominee director,
who has been nominated to the board by the majority of shareholders.56
In the EU law, a 2005 Commission Recommendation on the role of non-executive or
supervisory directors of listed companies and on the committees of the (supervisory) board
stated that: ‘a director should be considered to be independent only if he is free of any
business, family or other relationship, with the company, its controlling shareholder or the
management of either, that creates a conflict of interest such as to impair his judgement’.57
Annex II of the Recommendation clarified that it is not possible to give a comprehensive list
of all threats to the directors’ independence but it gave some criteria related to the
independence of the directors. Some of them:
– not to be an executive or managing director of the company or an associated company,
and not having been in such a position for the previous five years; 
– not to be an employee of the company or an associated company, and not having been in
such a position for the previous three years;
– not to receive, or have received, significant additional remuneration from the company
or an associated company apart from a fee received as non-executive or supervisory director;
– not to be or to represent in any way the controlling shareholder(s);
– not to have, or have had within the last year, a significant business relationship with the
company or an associated company, either directly or as a partner, shareholder, director or
senior employee of a body having such a relationship;
– not to be, or have been within the last three years, partner or employee of the present or
former external auditor of the company or an associated company;
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– not to be executive or managing director in another company in which an executive or
managing director of the company is non-executive or supervisory director, and not to have
other significant links with executive directors of the company through involvement in other
companies or bodies.
c) Chairman
According to Smerdon: ‘there should be a clear division of responsibilities at the head of
the company between the running of the board and the executive responsibility for the
running of the company’s business’.58 The reason for this separation is to avoid the potential
for abuse if power is concentrated in a  single person and enable the chief executive to
concentrate on managing the business whilst the chairman handles the running of the board
and relations with shareholders and other non-contractual stakeholders such as the
government, the regulators and the media.59
According to the 2003 Higgs Review, the most important responsibilities of the chairman
are to: 
– run the board and set its agenda;
– ensure that the members of the board receive accurate, timely and clear information,
particularly about the company’s performance, to enable the board to take sound decisions,
monitor effectively and provide advice to promote the success of the company; 
– ensure effective communication with shareholders and ensure that the members of the
board develop an understanding of the views of major investors; 
– manage the board to ensure that sufficient time is allowed for discussion of complex or
contentious issues, with appropriate arrangement for informal meetings beforehand to enable
thorough preparation for the board discussion.60
Tricker makes a difference between four groups of the board structure: a board only with
executive directors, a board with a majority of executive directors, a board with a majority of
non-executive directors and the board only with non-executive directors. In the all-executive
director board, the top managers are also the directors, whilst the all non-executive director
board is entirely composed of non-executive directors. Logically, the board composed with
the majority of the executive directors is the majority executive director board, and the board
with the majority of the non-executive directors is the majority non-executive director
board.61
Now, regarding Tricker’s grouping, we classify the examined corporate governance
structures.
An advisory board was established in four of the examined contracts and in parallel,
a supervisory board does not operate in these companies. In two other (Hungarian) contracts,
although there was supervisory board and an auditor and advisory board was not established.
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The governance structure, where there was an advisory board, is the following.
a) Majority non-executive director board
In two German and one Hungarian contracts, the board structure is the same: the
members of the advisory board were composed of, on the one hand, the representative of the
investors and founders and, on the other hand, of the managing directors. The representatives
of the shareholders were directly delegated to the advisory board by the shareholders or by
a resolution of the shareholders’ meeting and they were the non-executive managers of the
company. The members of the advisory board, delegated by the shareholders or the founders,
were non-independent non-executive directors of the company. The managing directors, who
were the executive directors of the company, had the same rights in the board as the non-
executive directors but they were always in a minority. The chairman of the advisory board
was delegated by an investor in the Hungarian contract and elected by the members of the
advisory board in the German contracts. There was only one contract where the chairman
was also the managing director.62
The majority non-executive director board is showed in Figure 2 below:63
Figure 2: Majority non-executive director board
b) All non-executive director board
There was only one German contract where the managing director was not a member of
the advisory board. The members of the advisory board are composed of the representatives
of the investors and founders. The representatives of the shareholders are directly delegated
to the advisory board by the shareholders (not independent non-executive directors) and the
chairman was elected by the members of the advisory board.
The all non-executive director board is showed by the Figure 3:64
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Figure 3: All non-executive director board
We had only two Hungarian contracts where there was no advisory board but there was
a supervisory board and an auditor. This system is often named two-tier or supervisory board
architecture (see Figure 4), but we have to emphasize again that, in these contracts, the
supervisory board does not have the right to decide on any issues.65
Figure 4: Two-tier system
In this system, the supervisory board only supervises the management of the company.
Nevertheless, the supervisory board is obliged to supervise the management and company’s
economic status in order to report to the members’ meeting. The necessary decisions are
made upon this information by the members’ meeting.66 The members of the supervisory
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Matthias Casper, German Corporate Governance in International and European Context (3rd edn, Springer 2017)
8–13.
66 Kecskés András, Felelős társaságirányítás (corporate governance) (HVG-ORAC 2011, Budapest) 263–311.
ELJ-2019-1__1.korr.  2020.05.20.  23:14  Page 163
board were always delegated by the investor and the founders (non-independent member) and
the supervisory board decided by a simple majority of votes, including the votes cast by
a member delegated by the investor. 
In this structure, the members always appointed an auditor by passing a resolution at the
members’ meeting with a simple majority of votes including the votes cast by the investor.
VI Final Remarks
1 Summary of the Corporate Governance in the Examined Investment
Contracts
Finally, we examine the power relations in the target company, and it is time the draw
conclusions and pinpoint the person who really manages the target company.
We have to identify the actors in corporate governance and characterise their roles. In this
context, we can set up three groups regarding the roles of the shareholders’ and members’
meetings, the advisory board, the managing directors, the supervisory board and the auditor.
I found that, from this aspect we can group the examined contracts and make three
different groups regarding the strength of the management or the main body of the target
company.
a) Strong members’ meeting
In the first group, there are two Hungarian contracts in which there was no advisory
board but there was a supervisory board and an auditor. In this structure, the members’
meeting was convened very often since the members of the company constituted articles of
association that diverged from the main rules of the Hungarian Civil Code and there are many
additional powers in favour of the members’ meeting. Usually, these powers are the
competence of the managing director; therefore the articles of association deprived the
management of power. Any other power shall not fall within the scope of duties of the
managing director.
In this structure, there was a  supervisory board and an auditor but they both only
supervised the operation of the managing director and made reports to the members’
meeting. The necessary decision, based on this report, was made by the members’ meeting.
See Figure 5 with the sign ‘Box a)’.
b) Balanced corporate governance
The third Hungarian contract and two German contracts are in this group. In these
contracts, a corporate governance system was constructed in which there was a relatively
strong shareholders’ or members’ meeting but the majority of the management tasks fell
within the competence of the advisory board. The advisory board was convened very often
and the company was actually managed by the advisory board. Furthermore, the main issues
of the corporate governance were shared between the advisory board and managing director,
whilst the managing director not only made decisions but he or she executed the resolutions
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of the shareholders’ and members’ meeting and of the advisory board, too. See Figure 5 below
with the sign ‘Box b)’.
c) Strong management
Finally, in the third group there is only one German contract. The corporate governance
structure was very similar to group b) but here the advisory board was stronger than
mentioned above, since it could make resolutions in more issues related to corporate
governance, including the appointment of the managing director. Mainly this latter power
explains why we classify this corporate governance in another group, because the advisory
board was able to actually manage the company, and if the members of the advisory board
were not satisfied with the execution of their resolution then they could dismiss the managing
director and appointed another one. See Figure 5 below with the sign ‘Box c)’.
The three groups related to corporate governance are illustrated in Figure 5. The vertical
axis shows how strong the main body is and the horizontal axis shows the strength of the
management. Of course, this is only a screenshot of a company’s corporate governance and
it must always be borne in mind that the members were able to change the power of each
corporate body at any time by modifying the articles of association.67
Figure 5: Corporate governance in the examined contracts
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2 Conclusions
As a summary, regarding Figure 5 above, we can conclude that the parties strongly applied
their freedom to derogate from the statutory law. The main purpose of the divergence was to
protect the investor and therefore the parties amended the rights of the supreme body and the
management. Those parties changed their form of corporate governance Nevertheless, our
experience is that there is no significant difference between the German and the Hungarian
investment contracts where the parties constructed an advisory board. In the case of the
Hungarian contracts in which no advisory board was established but there was a supervisory
board and an auditor, we found a different corporate governance system but we can state that
this solution is also effectively able to protect the investors’ interest by applying another legal way.
So, who manages the target company? We found that, the investor has a strong influence
on the management of the target company. It can be a direct influence when the investor
exercises his or her voting right in the main body of the target company, as we saw in the
cases of two Hungarian contracts, or it can be indirect when the investor’s delegated person
exercises the will of the investor in the board of the target company as we saw in the cases of
all the target companies where a board had been established. Anyway, we can conclude that,
after the first VC investment, the target company’s corporate governance was changed, and
the investor has the right to manage the decisions of the target company.
Although we analysed in detail the corporate governance system but have not examined
the strength of the investor’s voting rights in either the main body or in the board of the target
company. As such, we have to emphasise that although we stated that the investor can manage
the target company, we did not state that the investor manages the target company alone in
any and all cases. The strength of the investor’s rights in the target company is another topic
which requires further research and another study. The writer of these lines hopes the reader
will read our next study on investors’ rights with interest.
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